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ABSTRACT
In 1995, the membership of governing boards in colleges in British 
Columbia changed from lay persons appointed by the provincial government.
The new boards consisted of fewer lay appointees with the addition of elected 
faculty, staff, and students, together with the college presidents and education 
council chairs as non-voting members. The presence of employees and students 
on boards was viewed by most observers as likely to enhance the quality of 
decision-making in general. However, that same presence could introduce an 
element of real or potential conflict of interest (Flanigan, 1994).
The broadening o f input and decision-making brought about in the shared 
governance model, assuming the constituents could effectively manage the 
actual sharing of power, was expected to lead to improved quality of decisions 
and also to greater acceptance by stakeholders (Draper and Van Groningen, 
1990). Moreover, boards were also the final authority for setting institutional 
budgets and were the legislated employers. The established culture of boards 
had changed and had affected the boards’ role in general matters through the 
sheer presence of different constituents. In matters of finance and labour 
relations, boards had to find ways to fulfill their obligations while maintaining their 
integrity and credibility.
This quantitative study reported the views and experiences of board 
members concerning three aspects of leadership through shared governance in 
three decision-making contexts. The study explored the different views and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
experiences among seventeen colleges and between the six constituent groups 
of board members, and also identified differences which had emerged since a 
similar study conducted by the researcher in 1995/96. Colleges were found to 
differ significantly in philosophies and practices toward shared governance, 
particularly in relation to conflict of interest and the existence of clear policies and 
procedures. Presidents were found to be troubled by internal members’ lack of 
independence from their constituencies. The generally negative views overall of 
shared governance by presidents, although cited as common by Baliles (1996), 
were in marked contrast to the earlier study. In contrast, internal members had 
generally reported more positive opinions with the passage of time, while 
external members had remained consistently positive toward shared 
governance.
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CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM
Introduction
The governing boards of colieges and university colleges in British 
Columbia, Canada have been required to face hitherto unaddressed challenges 
in fulfilling their decision-making roles by virtue o f recent, far reaching changes in 
their membership. Colleges are two year institutions which ofFer a wide range of 
programs in the areas of university transfer, vocational and trades, career and 
technical, adult education, and non-credit community education. University 
colleges are a recent creation in British Columbia and are unique in Canada. 
They are essentially comprehensive community colleges with the additional 
mandate to offer baccalaureate degrees.
In 1995, an amendment, known as Bill 22, was made to the College and 
Institute Act of British Columbia which is the founding legislation of colleges and 
university colleges. This amendment resulted in the composition of the boards 
being changed from entirely that of lay community members appointed by the 
provincial government. In its place, the new boards consist of fewer lay 
appointees and the notable addition of faculty, staff, and students elected from 
within their own constituencies, together with the president o f the college and the 
chair of the education council as non-voting, ex-officio members. The education
1
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councils are faculty dominated, senate-like bodies which were created under the 
new legislation and have prescribed advisory (to boards), joint (with boards), and 
final authority roles in various areas of decision-making, all of which previously 
came within the sole purview of the boards.
The presence of employees and students on the governing boards is 
seen by most observers as a positive move by the provincial government and 
likely to enhance the quality of decision-making in areas of general responsibility 
for boards. However, it is possible that an element of real or perceived conflict of 
interest may enter the climate of boards in matters o f finance and labour 
relations. Consequently, the former could lead to tension among board members 
in reaching decisions on budget allocation, be it in times of growth in resources 
or in times of retrenchment, due to the vested interest of the employee and 
student members in determining the locus of budget changes. Similarly, the latter 
may be fertile ground for dispute when collective agreements are being 
negotiated and administered, again because of the vested interest of the 
employee and student members. In some cases, those employee and student 
board members may even wear two hats simultaneously when also serving as 
officers in their trade unions or student associations.
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Statement of the Problem
The problem under investigation in this study was how boards of colleges 
and university colleges in British Columbia have dealt with the change in their 
composition, which now includes employees and students, in selected aspects of 
boardsmanship applied to areas of decision-making in general matters, financial 
matters, and labour relations matters. The aspects of boardsmanship explored in 
this study are the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision­
making process, and how the real or perceived conflict o f interest of employee 
and student board members has been addressed. The views and experiences of 
board members since this significant change in the composition and power base 
of boards, as expressed by the members themselves, was the focus of this 
study.
Background of the Problem
Colleges have had a relatively short history in British Columbia, while 
university colleges are a very recent innovation. For the first half of the twentieth 
century, post-secondary educational opportunity in the province was extremely 
limited.
The University of British Columbia was established in 1915. Enrolment in
1945 was 3,000, and by 1953 reached just over 5,000. One satellite
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college was established in the capital city of Victoria, and these two 
campuses, as well as one small private college, represented the sum total 
of post-secondary education in British Columbia until 1965. In addition, a 
number of vocational training schools were constructed in the province by 
the Ministry of Education.
The sixties saw an increase in the college age population as a 
result o f the baby boom experienced in Canada after World War II, and 
the percentage of this population seeking higher education was growing.
In British Columbia, the numbers reached “...18 per cent by 1961, 
compared to 12 per cent in Canada as a whole and 40 per cent in the 
United States, with projections to 25 per cent by 1971. The University of 
British Columbia was projecting an enrolment of 30,000 by 1970—an 
unacceptable figure in the view of most academics of that day” (Dennison, 
1986, p. 25).
Community colleges, already established in the United States, 
were suggested as the answer although academics were split on their 
suitability for British Columbia. However, the newly appointed president of 
the University o f British Columbia, Dr. John B MacDonald, provided the 
lead in his report Higher Education in British Columbia and A Plan for the 
Future. He suggested that government create new universities in heavily 
populated areas, as well as encourage the establishment of regional 
colleges across the province. His reasons were twofold: (1) to take the
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pressure off the universities which were certain to grow; and (2) to create 
post-secondary educational opportunities for people in rural areas of 
British Columbia. MacDonald stressed the community orientation of the 
new institutions “ Two requirements are fundamental to the promotion of 
excellence in British Columbia’s higher education. These are first, 
diversification of opportunity, both in respect to the kinds of education 
experience available and the places where it can be obtained. The 
second requirement is self-government of individual institutions in respect 
to setting objectives, standards, admissions, selection of staff, curricula, 
personnel policies, administrative structure, and all the other things that 
go to make up the operation of a college. These two elements— 
diversification and self-government— together will not ensure excellence, 
but in their absence an excellent system of higher education in British 
Columbia would be unattainable” (MacDonald, 1962, p. 19).
The government was quick to respond. Victoria College was made 
into a degree granting institution in 1963, becoming the University of 
Victoria, and construction of Simon Fraser University commenced in 1964. 
The first community college, Vancouver Community College, was created 
in 1965 to be followed by Selkirk College the following year. Today, British 
Columbia boasts twenty two community colleges, university colleges, 
institutes and the Open Learning Agency.
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In 1988, a government study, known as The Access Report, 
revealed that British Columbia was producing fewer students with 
undergraduate degrees (3.07 per 1,000 of population) than the national 
average (4.5 per 1,000). This was partly attributed to the lack of student 
spaces at the three provincial universities. As a result, the government 
responded in 1989 with the “Access for All” initiative which saw the 
creation of the University of Northern British Columbia in Prince George 
and the conversion of four community colleges into university colleges. A 
fifth university college was created a few years later. The new institutions 
have sought to create a unique image for themselves rather than simply 
try to emulate traditional universities. The focus of their degree 
development has been in applied fields which represents an extension of 
their training tradition gathered as community colleges. However, as 
Dennison (1997) noted, they face pressure from the university sector to 
conform to more regular higher education standards; “ Sustained 
innovation in the post compulsory education sector has been relatively 
rare in Canada. Many institutions, established with optimistic flourish and 
noble goals, have been forced into more conventional formats over time. 
The university colleges have maintained their commitment to access, 
responsiveness, teaching quality, and curricular comprehensiveness. By 
any yardstick, they are innovative institutions" (p. 5). (van Toor, 1997)
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The College and Institute Act of British Columbia, under which the 
colleges and university colleges in this study operate, clearly articulates specific 
decision-making roles for governing boards and education councils. Indeed, 
although the scope of the roles did change with the arrival of education councils, 
the locus of decision-making was clearly specified both before and after the 
legislative amendment known as Bill 22. In effect, these roles are delegated by 
the Minister of Advanced Education, Training, and Technology to the boards and 
education councils and the roles cannot, in turn, be delegated to any other 
parties. With reference to boards, in some areas, such as the setting of general 
policy and the establishment of academic rules, the broadening of input and 
decision-making brought about by the shared governance model is likely not only 
to lead to improved quality of outcomes but also to acceptance by a greater 
number of the stakeholders in the institutions. Consequently, shared decisions, 
in theory, should lead to ease of implementation of the outcomes; and those 
outcomes may well be consistent with the values expressed in the legislation. 
However, these positive outcomes anticipated are based on the assumption that 
boards can effectively manage the basic task of sharing power among the 
constituents to deal with matters of common institutional interest.
Among the boards’ other prescribed responsibilities are finance and 
labour relations. Boards are the final decision-making authority in setting the 
institutional budgets and ensuring that appropriate resources are allocated to all 
departments in the institutions. Additionally, boards are also the employers of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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reference as defined in the provincial labour code and, as such, are one of the 
parties to every collective agreement. Both these roles require boards to take a 
higher moral stance when dealing with the legitimate vested interests of faculty, 
staff, and students. The problem may manifest itself when those vested interests 
actually infiltrate the boards and their decision-making processes. The erstwhile 
independent, disinterested nature of the boards is now being potentially 
compromised. In fact, the long established culture of boards has changed and 
has even affected the boards’ role in general matters by virtue of the shear 
presence of different constituents. As a result o f the new composition of boards, 
when it comes to the more overtly troublesome matters of finance and labour 
relations, boards have had to discover new ways to fulfill their obligations while 
maintaining their integrity and credibility as well as their cohesion. This they have 
done by interpreting provincially legislated guidelines and establishing local 
bylaws and procedures.
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Importance of the Study
The undemoted diagram highlights the main changes that occurred to the 
College and Institute Act as a result of the legislative amendment Bill 22:
Diagram 1: Changes to the College and Institute Act of British Columbia
as a result of Bill 22
Before Bill 22 After Bill 22
Objects of a College Objects of a College
To provide comprehensive
(a) courses of study at the first and 
second year levels of a baccalaureate 
program,
(b) post-secondary education or 
training, and
(c) continuing education.
Same as before Bill 22.
Objects of a University College Obiects of a University College
No reference before Bill 22.
To provide comprehensive
(a) courses of study for a 
baccalaureate degree program,
(b) post-secondary education or 
training, and
(c) continuing education.
Board Composition Board Composition
5 or more members appointed by the 
Lieutenant Governor in Council (in 
practice, boards generally comprised 
around 11 members)
No employee or student shall be 
appointed to, or continue as a member 
of, the board.
8 or more persons appointed by the 
Lieutenant Governor in Council,
1 elected faculty member,
2 elected students,
1 elected support staff member,
The president, and
The chair of the education council.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Term of Office Term of Office
Not specified, but generally terms of 1, 
2, and 3 years for a total of 6 years. 
However, there were numerous 
exceptions.
Appointed: Same as before Bill 22, 
Faculty and support staff: 3 years, and 
may be elected to further terms, 
Students: 1 year, and may be elected 
to further terms, and 
President and chair of education 
council: ex-officio.
(Selected) Powers of Board (Selected) Powers of Board
Shall manage, administer, and direct 
the affairs of the institution.
Shall manage and promote the 
educational or training programs.
Shall administer funds, grants, fees, 
endowments, and other assets.
Shall manage, administer, and direct 
the affairs of the institution, subject to 
the powers of the education council.
Shall manage and promote the 
educational and training programs, 
subject to powers of the education 
council.
Same as before Bill 22.
Student Union (Association) Student Union (Association)
No reference before Bill 22. Board will assess and collect student 
union fees, subject to certain financial 
reporting requirements.
Advisorv Role of the Education Council Advisory Role of the Education Council
No reference before Bill 22. An education council must advise the 
board, and the board must seek advice 
from the education council, on 
development of education policy on
(a) mission and goals,
(b) implementation of courses and 
programs,
(c) reports after implementation of non- 
credit courses and contract programs,
(d) implementation priorities for new 
courses and programs,
(e) cancellation of courses and 
programs,
(f) evaluation of programs and 
educational services,
(g) policies concerning library and 
resource centres,
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(h) setting the academic schedule,
(1) policies on faculty member 
qualifications,
(j) procedure for student discipline 
appeals,
(k) terms for affiliation with other post­
secondary bodies,
(1) consultation with community and 
program advisory groups,
(m) qualifications for admission 
policies,
(n) criteria for awarding certificates,
diplomas, and degrees, and
(o) other matters specified by board.
Powers of the Education Council Powers of the Education Council
No reference before Bill 22. (a) make bylaws,
(b) set policies on examinations and 
student evaluations,
(c) set policies on student withdrawal 
from courses, programs, and the 
institution,
(d) set criteria for academic standing, 
academic standards, and the grading 
system,
(e) set criteria for awards recognizing 
academic excellence,
(f) set policies and procedures for 
appeals by students on academic 
matters and establish a final appeal 
tribunal for these appeals, and
(g) set curriculum content.
Joint Board and Education Council Joint Board and Education Council
Approval
No reference before Bill 22.
Approval
(a) curriculum evaluation for 
equivalency from other institutions,
(b) curriculum evaluation for 
equivalency between departments of 
the institution, and
(c) other responsibilities of the board 
that, on the initiative of the board, the 
board and education council agree are 
subject to joint approval.
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Bill 22 provided a framework for the introduction of shared governance in 
British Columbia. While quite prescriptive in some areas, there are also other 
areas which are very loosely written and allow for local interpretation and 
implementation at each institution. A good example is the advisory powers of the 
education council on policies. It is not clear whether the powers relate only to the 
development of policies or also extend to the implementation of such policies. 
The language is ambiguous. This begs the broader question “Is the role of the 
education council one of governance or administration?”. Such ambiguity was a 
stated intention when the legislation was drafted. As a result, it is highly likely 
that institutions have differed in their approach to constructing the shared 
governance model, particularly in areas where they were given the greatest 
discretion; and this was explored in the study.
Bill 22 had quite a checkered history from its inception as part of the 
election manifesto o f the then party in opposition in the British Columbia 
Legislature to the final amendment to the College and Institute Act. The purpose 
of adding internal constituents to hitherto external boards of governance was 
deemed to “...put the community back into community colleges" by the Canadian 
Federation of Students (1992, p. 2) in one of many submissions from interest 
groups solicited by the new government once the change in legislation came to 
be drafted. However the Advanced Education Council of British Columbia (1994), 
representing the institutional boards of the day, argued that colleges were owned 
by their communities, that is the external communities-at-large not the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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employees and students. Consequently, it felt that boards appointed by the 
provincial government, i.e. the status quo, best reflected the nature of community 
ownership. Others saw the change to governance in colleges coming as a direct 
result of the recent creation of university colleges and their closer relationship 
and resemblance to universities. Malaspina University College (1993), in a paper 
contemplating its elevation to degree granting status, suggested that the 
credibility of such degrees would be dependent upon a more formal involvement 
of internal interests, notably those of faculty, in decision-making. In particular, it 
saw the then proposed education councils on academic affairs as being the 
formalization of curriculum committees which university colleges had voluntarily 
moved quickly to establish in order to satisfy standards’ requirements in the 
university sector.
The volatile educational climate in British Columbia at the time of the 
drafting of Bill 22 provides an interesting backdrop to the eventual legislation and 
the focus of this study. Collective bargaining, which had been conducted locally 
between individual boards/administrations and union locals throughout the 
history of colleges in British Columbia, was being legislated into a two-tier model 
of provincial negotiations on monetary items and local negotiations on the more 
professional type of items contained in collective agreements. It is fair to say that 
this change was more favoured by trade unions looking for a larger, more 
productive bargaining arena than it was by boards and administrations. The 
College and Institute Educators' Association of British Columbia (1994), in a
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submission to the drafters of Bill 22, drew very clear comparisons between the 
planned changes in labour relations and governance. The Association advocated 
collaboration between trade unions and student unions (associations) and 
interaction between unions and college boards, particularly once the latter 
included faculty, staff, and student members. Interestingly, the Canadian 
Federation of Students (1992) suggested to the provincial government that 
government appointed board members inevitably yielded to “...partisan political 
pressure” in order to ensure re-appointment whereas elected internal members 
would have no such temptation (p. 2). The Federation further argued that 
“...student unions are akin to labour unions in that their primary purpose is to 
collectively negotiate for and represent their members” (p. 4). There emerged, 
therefore, a clear indication of a faculty, staff, and student alliance to pursue a 
government legislated shift in power simultaneously in both the labour relations 
and governance fields.
The submissions which were made to the provincial government as it 
drafted Bill 22 were quite polarized in nature and reflect much of the diversity 
which has emerged in North American literature on the subject of shared 
governance in general. Firstly, it is important to note the elements of the political 
manifesto of the New Democratic Party (1990) which formed the basis for the 
whole legislative change:
• There will be multi-year budgeting [i. e. funding] for colleges [this has 
not been enacted by 1998];
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• There will be internal representation on college boards and senates 
[enacted in 1995];
• Tuition and supplementary fees will be frozen [eventually implemented 
in 1996 and still in force in 1998];
• Funding for continuing education administration will be restored [not 
enacted] and funding will be provided to private business and 
community groups to deliver non-credit continuing education [enacted]; 
and
• Private institutions will be brought under governmental control 
[enacted], (pp. 1-13)
The manifesto clearly represented a significant change to the status quo as far 
as governance was concerned. And it brought somewhat predictable responses. 
A special task force comprising representation from boards, administration, 
faculty, staff, and students struggled for consensus but eventually managed to 
stress the need for clear legislation, whatever the eventual composition and role 
for college boards. In addition, it was suggested that internal members should 
only form a minority on boards; and clear guidelines as to conflict o f interest and 
accountability would be required. Furthermore, it called for government to 
provide clear expectations of the roles of boards, education councils, and 
presidents (Report of the Committee on Governance in Colleges and Institutes, 
1993). In a more direct retort, the Advanced Education Council of British 
Columbia (1994), representing boards consisting solely of appointed members at
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that time, advocated little change. It suggested that boards, with a minority of 
internal members, should consult with constituency groups but should retain final 
decision-making power on all matters over which they had legislated jurisdiction. 
Further, constituency groups might include educational councils. Each institution 
should have the discretion whether or not to create such a body.
The trade unions were obviously more supportive of the notion of shared 
governance than existing boards but were less prescriptive as to what the 
legislation should look like. What was clear, however, was the expectation that 
internal members would play a full voting role on boards and education councils, 
the latter dominated by faculty, and would have extensive decision-making 
power on academic matters and perhaps even on other matters. In addition, it 
was suggested that the unions should develop "...appropriate conflict of interest 
guidelines as a model for consideration by locals, institutional boards, the 
Advanced Education Council, and the Ministry [of Advanced Education, Training, 
and Technology]” (College and Institute Educators’ Association Committee on 
Governance Implementation, 1994). At the end o f the day, the finalization of Bill 
22 assumed legendary status with the most popular version being that the 
legislation was penned by representatives of government and the academic 
faculty unions, behind closed doors and to the exclusion of all other interested 
parties.
One significant aspect of the legislation is the absence of any formal 
evaluation of the change that it brought. While institutions go through a routine
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self evaluation every five years where examination of governance is included, it 
is but one of many areas of focus and, subsequently, it is unlikely that the new 
governance models would be reviewed in any great depth. This lack of 
evaluation is all the more regrettable because each college is likely to have 
developed a slightly different structure and modus operandi. This study, 
therefore, focused on the views and potential differences of the board members 
themselves as a first step in discerning whether the intent of the legislated 
change has been effective in certain aspects and contexts of decision-making. 
Thereafter, the study examined what might be the leadership implications for 
engaging this new collection of members who come from a variety of campus 
constituencies.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which the new 
composition of boards influences three aspects of leadership through shared 
governance: 1.) The sharing of power, 2.) The effectiveness of the shared 
decision-making process, and 3.) How real or perceived conflict of interest 
because of the employment or student status of some of the board members has 
been addressed. These aspects of leadership were studied in three particular 
contexts, namely board decision-making in general matters of business, in 
financial matters, and in the field of labour relations.
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The impact of the change in membership of the boards as a result of Bill 
22 was explored through the anticipated differing views and experiences of the 
board members themselves. The researcher sought to find if differences 
emerged among colleges based on the likelihood that they have adopted 
different strategies in interpreting the legislation. Further, the potential for 
differences among members was examined, by virtue of the constituency from 
which they emanate, namely appointed members; elected faculty; elected staff; 
elected students; ex-officio presidents; and ex-officio chairs of education council. 
Finally, the results of the study were compared with a similar study conducted by 
the researcher in early 1996 to see if the passage of time since Bill 22 was 
enacted had changed board members’ views.
Conceptual Framework
Boards of governance in colleges play a definite yet unusual role. Clearly, 
the boards have power, much of which is established by legislation, and, through 
their decision-making role, they have the ability to set the direction for colleges 
and achieve long term impact through their policy formulation role was noted by 
Piland (1994). And yet, the boards sometimes seem to lead from behind 
because colleges have very democratic cultures, far more so than other 
organizations outside of the education sector. In a college, there are many 
leaders including administrators, both individually and collectively, and, faculty
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who tend to assume power collectively on matters such as academic standards 
and to wield power individually on matters such as curriculum.
Leadership in colleges is, therefore, quite fragmented and the power that 
is vested in those leadership roles is held quite jealously. The notion of 
ownership in decision-making in specific areas, e.g. curriculum for faculty and 
budget for board and administration, and the reluctance to concede it is central 
to the power struggle noted by many authors including Edelfelt (1982) and 
Kanter (1994). This somewhat tense, web-like structure functions through the 
existence of a clear, consistently applied process of consideration of issues and 
decision-making. Indeed, process is paramount to the peaceful climate of a 
college campus and, frequently, the nature of the process appears to be more 
important than the actual decision itself. When process breaks down, a college 
moves into a turmoil where the legitimate leadership is quickly called into 
question.
As noted earlier, this distributed leadership/power model is unique to the 
three levels of education—schools, colleges, and universities. The uniqueness 
comes from the sense held by the faculty, staff, and students of having a right to 
be involved in decision-making, whereas, in other organizations, devolution of 
power remains a voluntary action on the part of those occupying traditional 
leadership roles. Trust plays a significantly important part in shared governance 
and Lovas (1994) noted “...[ it ] requires that everyone have integrity in dealing 
with other groups which is hard when there are conflicting loyalties as we often
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find in the collegial environment” (p. 22). Moreover, inclusion of employees and 
students on college boards in British Columbia represented a major move 
forward from the leadership roles which these internal members previously had 
held. This is because o f the nature of board business and the consequences of 
its outcomes. The entrance by internal members into new areas of decision­
making with the attendant issues that arise was one of the major focuses of this 
study. Faculty, staff, and students clearly have a different interest in matters of 
finance and labour relations than do appointed lay members o f a board because 
the decisions to be made by that board will potentially affect their employment or 
program of studies. In addition, there may be other more general issues of 
decision-making that also have the same affect on employment and studies. 
Employee and student board members, therefore, have strong vested interests 
in board decisions. But, does that represent conflict of interest? Can boards 
function independently, with the expected degree of integrity and accountability, 
while containing members who stand to gain or lose from the decisions they 
make? The legislation, which created shared governance in British Columbia, 
assumed that boards could function appropriately. But, it then left individual 
colleges to make the necessary arrangements according to their own culture and 
history with only limited guidelines on conflict of interest. The potential for 
differing outcomes was, therefore, worthy of review.
This study investigated the three aspects of board leadership, namely the 
sharing of power among quite different constituents, often with a history of
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tension and confrontation; the existence of decision-making process in the 
shared governance model; and how the real or perceived conflict of interest of 
employee and student board members has been addressed. These aspects of 
boardsmanship were viewed through three contexts o f decision-making in the 
expectation that differing results might be generated. These decision-making 
contexts were general board matters, financial matters, and matters of labour 
relations; for the literature suggests that shared governance can be very 
successful in the first context but can be difficult to sustain in the second and 
third contexts.
Diagram 2: Study of the Aspects of Leadership in the Context of Certain
Decision-Making Areas





















Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
Research Questions
This study sought to answer the following questions in relation to selected 
aspects of boardsmanship required in the shared governance model in the 
context of selected areas of decision-making:
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain aspects of 
boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared 
decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of interest of 
employee and student board members has been addressed when it comes to 
decision-making in respect to general matters of business, financial matters, and 
labour relations matters?
2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the constituency 
from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members; elected faculty; elected 
support staff; elected students; presidents; and education council chairs, in 
certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the 
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived 
conflict of interest of employee and student board members has been addressed 
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of business, 
financial matters, and labour relations matters?
3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and those from 
an earlier study in respect to certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the 
sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and
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how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board 
members has been addressed when it comes to decision-making in respect to 
general matters of business, financial matters, and labour relations matters.
Diagram 3: Study of Aspects of Leadership in the Context of Certain 
Decision-Making Areas. Examined through Three Lenses
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The legislative amendment which brought shared governance to British 
Columbia is alternatively prescriptive and liberal in detail, therefore, it is 
conceivable that differing outcomes might have emerged in how institutions have 
chosen to operate. In addition, the disparate backgrounds of the boards’ 
memberships might also lead to differing views on how the shared governance 
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predictable outcomes based on experiences in other provinces and states. 
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are stated in the null form:
H1. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British 
Columbia colleges concerning the sharing of power in the shared governance 
model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial matters, and 
labour matters.
H2. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British 
Columbia colleges concerning the effectiveness of the shared decision-making 
process in the shared governance model for decision-making in general matters 
of business, financial matters, and labour matters.
H3. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British 
Columbia colleges concerning how real or perceived conflict of interest of 
employee and student board members has been addressed in the shared 
governance model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial 
matters, and labour matters.
H4. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board 
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn, i.e. 
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students; 
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning the sharing of power in the 
shared governance model for decision-making in general matters of business, 
financial matters, and labour matters.
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H5. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board 
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn, i.e. 
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students; 
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning the effectiveness of the 
shared decision-making process in the shared governance model for decision­
making in general matters of business, financial matters, and labour matters.
H6. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board 
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn, i.e. 
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students; 
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning how real or perceived 
conflict of interest o f employee and student board members has been addressed 
in the shared governance model for decision-making in general matters of 
business, financial matters, and labour matters.
H7. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the 
views elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning the 
sharing of power in the shared governance model for decision-making in general 
matters of business, financial matters, and labour matters.
H8. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the 
views elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning the 
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process in the shared governance 
model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial matters, and 
labour matters.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
H9. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the 
views elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning how 
real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board members 
has been addressed in the shared governance model for decision-making in 
general matters of business, financial matters, and labour matters.
Assumptions of the Study
This study was predicated on the belief that there is need to expand the 
body of knowledge on shared governance in general in the education setting 
and, in particular, to start building a body of knowledge based on the experience 
of introducing shared governance into the college and university college sectors 
of British Columbia. It is assumed that, in the absence of specific formal 
evaluation tools attached to the governance legislation, board members would 
acknowledge this shortcoming and would view the study as warranted and 
useful. Consequently, it was anticipated that at least a representative number of 
board members would choose to participate in this study. Representation in this 
context extended both to the potential of seventeen institutions and six 
constituencies of membership, namely lay appointees by the provincial 
government, elected faculty members, elected support staff members, elected 
student members, and the ex-officio positions of college president and chair of 
the educational council.
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Further, it was assumed that the office of the researcher did not adversely 
influence participation in the study. The researcher holds a senior administrative 
position in a British Columbia university college and, consequently, plays an 
active part in the shared governance model at his institution. In addition, a further 
potential complication was his position vis-d-vis the employee and student 
members of his institution's board which can be characterized as indirectly 
supervisory. However, it is assumed that participation in the study was based on 
willingness to be involved in an academic exercise rather than any implied 
obligation that might be construed due to the nature of the researcher’s status.
Delimitations of the Study
The study focused entirely on members of the boards of governance of 
the colleges and university colleges of British Columbia. Its purpose was to elicit 
board members’ views of and experiences with the shared governance models 
that have been developed in response to Bill 22. The impact of the legislation 
might reasonably be expected to extend to other stakeholders, including 
legislators, media, the general public, and constituencies from which some 
members have been elected, i.e. the faculty, support staff, and student 
populations at large. However, that speaks to further fields of study, and this 
particular study was deliberately confined to board members.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
Limitations of the Study
Participation in the study was entirely voluntary and called for donation of 
time by board members who virtually all have other occupations and 
commitments. In addition, membership of boards is fairly volatile and any 
number of new members may have felt that they did not have the experience of 
college boardsmanship necessary to complete the survey instrument. This 
possibility was addressed to some extent by trying to include former board 
members rather than new members where the replacement took place in the 
weeks immediately prior to the study.
In the two month period before and during the study, five presidents 
announced their resignation or retirement. This is an abnormally high number out 
of a total of seventeen. While it would appear that these significant decisions did 
not affect willingness to participate in the study, it is possible that the data 
provided by the individuals was affected by their recent decisions. However, it is 
impossible to ascertain the impact of these events.
Concurrent with the study has been a concerted effort on the part of 
boards, trade unions, and student unions to lobby government about the funding 
crisis facing the British Columbia post-secondary education system. The time 
has been described as a crossroads for education and has prompted an 
advocacy alliance among the players which is virtually unheard of in British 
Columbia. This initiative may have had an affect on the study. While some
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boards may have seen the study as an opportunity to further express concerns, 
others may have seen it as the less important of two tasks and declined to 
participate. Again, it is impossible to quantify the possible impact.
In the period of follow-up to initial returns of questionnaires, when board 
members who had not participated were being encouraged to think again about 
doing so, Canada was faced with the prolonged threat of a postal strike. 
Ultimately, the strike did take place and lasted seventeen days. This may have 
had some negative impact on further participation. An alternative method of 
returning questionnaires by fax was initiated but may not have been convenient 
for all potential respondents.
Finally, it must be recorded that the researcher’s closeness to the subject 
matter through his employment may have influenced the choice of some board 
members to participate. In this regard, separation of the roles of research and 
employment was stressed as much as possible to the potential participants in all 
correspondence and material pertaining to the overall study and questionnaire.
Specific Term inology
For the purposes of this study, the undemoted terms are defined thus: 
Shared governance: a structure of leadership involving employees and 
students as well as provincially appointed trustees which has full, legislated 
decision-making powers in defined situations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
Post-Secondary Education Institu tions: colleges, university colleges, 
institutes, and universities. Note, this study was confined to the first two 
institutions and one example of the third. In the study, they are often referred to 
collectively as colleges, unless some distinction is to be made.
Board: a body empowered by the College and Institute Act of British Columbia 
to govern an institution in prescribed areas.
Education Council: a body of employees and students empowered by the Act 
to govern and administer in an institution other than a university in certain 
prescribed areas and in others at the discretion of the board.
College and Institute Act: legislation which establishes and regulates post­
secondary institutions in British Columbia with the exception of universities.
B ill 22: the amendment to the Act which introduced and specified shared 
governance.
Appointed Board Member: a member of the community, who is not an 
employee or student, appointed to the board by the provincial government. 
Elected Board Member: an employee (faculty member or support staff member) 
or student who is elected to the board by his/her constituency.
Constituency: the sector of the college population or the general community 
from which a board member has been appointed or elected or qualifies for an ex­
officio position on the board.
Constituent: an appointed, elected, or ex-officio board member who has been 
drawn from one of the six constituencies noted in this study, i.e. government
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appointed lay persons, faculty, support staff, student, president, or chair of the 
education council.
Organization of the Study
Chapter I contains the statement o f the problem, the background of the 
problem, the importance of the study, the purpose o f the study, the conceptual 
framework within which the study was constructed, the research questions to be 
examined, statement of the hypotheses, assumptions o f the study, delimitations 
of the study, limitations of the study, and specific terminology used in the study. 
Chapter II contains a review of literature including the definition of shared 
governance, description of the background to the development of shared 
governance, discussion of the issues surrounding shared governance, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of shared governance. Chapter III contains a 
methodological overview, the research design of the study, discussion of the 
validity and reliability of the data, entry to the population participating in the 
study, selection of the sites and subjects, protection of the subjects, approach to 
the data analysis, and background of the researcher. Chapter IV contains 
presentation and discussion of the findings o f the study including focus on the 
descriptive statistics, comparative statistics, and the practical significance of the 
study. Chapter V contains the conclusions, i.e. the relationship between the 
hypotheses and the findings, and the recommendations regarding
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implementation of the findings and suggestions for further research. The main 
chapters are followed by a reference list and appendices containing 
documentation used in the study and the tabulated analysis of the raw data 
obtained from the questionnaires.
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CHAPTER II REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
Shared governance in a broad sense is a popular topic for discussion and 
study. It ties into contemporary views on leadership as they move away from 
models of exclusiveness, the great man theories, towards models o f 
inclusiveness and collaboration. In addition, there are obvious links to the quality 
movement based on the premises that an organization will be more effective 
through shared decision-making, and the individual participant will be more 
motivated through a sense of contribution and belonging.
The sharing of powers traditionally held in an organization by the board 
and the chief executive officer is occurring throughout the public and private 
sectors to varying extents. The experience in education differs somewhat in that 
the university sector has a long tradition of limited shared governance which 
stems more from the culture of a community of learning than other organizational 
cultures. The school and college sectors have gradually followed the university 
path with accelerated progress occurring in the last twenty-five years but with the 
fundamental difference that these sectors have, at the same time, become 
unionized to a far greater extent than their senior counterpart. This potential 
clash of cultures provided a strong undercurrent in this study as the sharing of
33
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power among participants who have a history of confrontation was explored. The 
decision-making tasks of boards fall into two categories, those where internal 
and external members have no particular vested interest and those where the 
internal members would appear to have vested interest on account of their 
employee or student status. The former may still cause tension between internal 
and external members if power sharing and decision-making procedures are not 
carefully planned. However, the latter will almost certainly cause tension unless 
the real or, at least, perceived conflict of interest on the part of the internal 
members is handled in a way which is satisfactory to all board members.
Boards and senior management traditionally play significant roles in the 
financial affairs and labour relations of an organization. This is especially true in 
the education sector. Shared decision-making in these areas would appear to 
take on far greater significance with the likelihood of conflict than, say, curriculum 
or student affairs where the locus of ownership is not so fiercely contested.
This review of literature explored the views and experiences of educators 
and governors in shared governance models across North America. It focused 
on the research questions which were posed in this study:
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain 
aspects of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness 
of the shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict 
of interest of employee and student board members has been addressed
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when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of 
business, financial matters, and labour relations matters?
2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the 
constituency from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members; elected 
faculty; elected support staff; elected students; presidents; and education 
council chairs, in certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of 
power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how 
real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board 
members has been addressed when it comes to decision-making in 
respect to general matters of business, financial matters, and labour 
relations matters?
3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and 
those from an earlier study in respect to certain aspects of 
boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the 
shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of 
interest of employee and student board members has been addressed 
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of 
business, financial matters, and labour relations matters.
The information derived from the literature was intended to provide a backdrop to 
the drama of shared governance and to offer experiential insight and opinion on 
the aspects of leadership in three contexts of decision-making under review in 
this study.
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This chapter contains the definition of shared governance, background to 
the development of shared governance, discussion of the issues surrounding 
shared governance central to this study including a general perspective and 
those of financial affairs and labour relations, and the advantages and 
disadvantages o f shared governance. The issues of a general perspective 
discussed include roles to be played, influence of the president, consensus and 
representation, the scope of involvement in shared decision-making, an advisory 
or decision-making role and the impact on middle managers, structures and 
relationships, the importance of shared governance for students, and faculty and 
support staff attitudes.
Definition of Shared Governance
Shared governance is not a precise science with universal application. It 
is a sharing of power brought about by changing processes to suit the culture of 
the organization and, thus, will differ accordingly in terms of approach, 
expectations, and outcomes. Lovas (1984) noted that “...shared governance is 
both an opportunity and a risk...[it] truly means shared responsibility and 
authority but not necessarily equally shared power or decision-making” (p. 22). 
Therefore, it is immediately noted that there is no standard approach. Draper and 
Van Groningen (1990) suggested that there is quite a range to the degrees of 
power sharing:
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There are many definitions of shared governance circulating in the field.
At one end o f the continuum are formalized structures of process and 
procedure; at the other end are largely informal and simple means for 
getting people involved in decisions. Leadership styles are often the key, 
but district history - particularly with collective bargaining - seems to play a 
major role in determining to what extent shared governance is formal or 
informal, and to what extent it can succeed, (p. 11)
This issue of formal/informal structure, often expressed as the right to make 
decisions versus the right to offer advice to those who would make the decisions, 
is an important one which will be explored later in greater detail.
Reil and Sodemnan (1993) noted the underlying philosophy upon which 
shared governance is founded:
Wisdom and common sense tells us that decisions based on shared 
values and made by the stakeholders in those decisions who are 
responsible for acting are going to have more commitment and chance of 
success than those that don’t. Along with common sense, there is a good 
deal of research, both in and out of schools, that corroborates this basic 
tenet, (p. 2)
Accordingly, decisions made by those most affected and grounded in common 
values are likely to be successful. Wood (1991), in a study of internal board 
members in a shared governance model in a college system, found “Most 
institutional members and the presidents of their associations considered the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
composition of their boards to be an important reflection of values and beliefs 
about collegiality, participation, and professionalism in higher education 
organizations” (p. 360). Inclusion of interested parties is one thing, arriving at 
common values may be another. Inevitably, a sharing of power brings together 
players o f disparate backgrounds and beliefs, not to mention goals and 
objectives. For a decision-making model to function under these conditions, 
there is a fundamental requirement that trust pervade the entire culture. This was 
noted by Draper and Van Droningen (pp. 12-13) and many other authors. Bogen 
and Moskus (1992) compared shared governance to a marriage and suggested 
both require to be “...a relationship based on a strong commitment, mutual 
support, shared understanding of roles, honest communication, and trust” (p.
11).
The values of shared decision-making are consistent with those of 
progressive educational institutions. Later in this chapter, the correlation will be 
noted between student success, faculty satisfaction, and the sharing of power. 
Mahon (1994) drew the comparison between shared governance as a process 
and total quality management as a process of continuous incremental 
improvement based on the Japanese concept of Kaizen. However, he noted “I 
cannot stress enough that TQM and shared governance are processes. They 
are not quick fixes" (p. 9).
Education is not a static entity. Education is about change. Freire (as cited 
in Harris, 1996) described education as an agent of action as opposed to being a
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simple provider of knowledge, for its own sake. In this vein, Rost (1993) opined 
that shared governance is leadership that leads to real, intended change, while 
management is more about efficiently and effectively maintaining the status quo. 
This notion of change and innovation being linked to shared decision-making is 
further supported by Lau (1996), “The need for shared governance is not as 
great when resources are available to support the majority of the program 
requests" (p. 5). Therefore, the need for innovation when times are tough can be 
met through the collaborative governance structure. From this, change can be 
brought about because of the stakeholder inclusiveness. Such change is often 
not dramatic but, rather, is a gradual process of building small success stories, 
one at a time. In due course, systemic change can occur incrementally through 
participative decision-making (Lappe and DuBois, 1994).
It has been seen that shared decision-making can exist in different forms 
and is generally reflective of the organization’s established culture. The 
differences that exist between universities, where shared governance is firmly 
established, and schools and colleges, where it is still in the process of being 
established, were explored. Clearly the cultures of these educational subsectors 
differ and this may have significant affect on the sharing of power. Southern 
Methodist University (1979) observed in a report that governance of universities 
is unlike that of corporations in that power tends to reside in the faculty and is 
directed upward, whereas, in the latter, power resides in the board and senior 
management and is directed downward. This very unique climate of universities
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might be considered to readily facilitate the concept of shared governance in an 
informal sense and even encourage its formalization. It was found that colleges 
and schools are considered more akin to corporations than universities in their 
governance structure, and hence the experience of sharing differs accordingly.
Background to the Development of Shared Governance 
1. Institutional Planning and For What?
“Shared governance may be the only way to restore order, tranquillity, and 
morality in our public institutions” espoused Thomas (1979, pp. 1-2). He then 
went on to list the characteristics, and not from a perspective of strengths, of 
institutions as seen by social scientists:
1. Most of our public institutions, once established, tend to spend a great 
deal of time and money to maintain themselves;
2. Public institutions, in their concern to maintain themselves, tend to 
forget their original purpose for which they were established;
3. Leadership in public institutions has a tendency to forget that the 
institutions were set up to benefit clients and not the personal goals of 
their leaders;
4. Public institutions, like schools, tend to create conflicting interests 
between teachers and administration;
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5. Accountability in public institutions is difficult to achieve; and
6. Public institutions talk a great deal about equity and justice but have 
difficulty establishing it.
Munitz (1995) found that views of educational institutions have not changed 
much from those of public institutions fifteen years on. He stated “Surveys show 
that voters in many states now view public colleges and universities much as 
they do other public agencies: self-regarding bureaucracies wasting too many 
taxpayer dollars” (p. 10). Is this a system swaying on its philosophical and moral 
principles? By adjusting the locus of power and decision-making, can the 
foundation principles be reinforced? There is strong suggestion that decision­
making based on consensus of all stakeholders tends to be more ethically 
principled than when based on power alone. Whether the introduction of shared 
governance does begin to address the systemic shortcomings leveled at 
education were further explored.
Decision-making is an important contributor to the climate of an institution. 
Roueche and Baker (as cited in Deas, 1994) noted that it ranked along with 
leadership, motivation, and communications as the keys to a climate for 
excellence. Thus, it is suggested that the model of decision-making is crucial to 
achievement of excellence. Many of the shortcomings attributed to education are 
to do with its inability or unwillingness to engage in long term planning. The 
historically short tenure of college presidents probably precludes their adopting 
anything other than a short term perspective, suggested Boggs (cited in Baker,
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1995), however, boards could and should be able to take a long term view in 
institutional planning (pp. 33-34). While the apparent favouring of short term, 
multi-directional goals may also be the result of a lack of governmental 
commitment and consistency, it tends to reinforce the notion of educational self- 
centeredness. Phelan, Kirkland, and Freed (1993) cited six areas of inhibition 
towards long term institutional planning:
1. A majority of institutions plan from year to year rather than for long 
term. Crisis management becomes the norm. No formal mechanism 
integrates departmental or institutional efforts;
2. The external environment is evaluated infrequently...and the institution 
does not have the broad view necessary to make appropriate 
decisions. Leaders may be unaware of external factors posing threats 
or offering opportunities;
3. The internal environment is seldom assessed. Thus, the institution is 
unable to identify its own strengths and weaknesses;
4. The relationship between institutional resource allocation and goals is 
commonly ignored. Consequently, the institution is unable to respond 
to emerging needs;
5. Institutions often evaluate their performance on revenues and 
expenditures, encouraging spending rather than working to achieve 
goals; and
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6. Institutional mission statements are not used to guide the organization. 
Rather than providing a pragmatic guide for the future, mission 
statements simply adorn college catalogs and presidential offices.
(P- 3).
The need for change within an institution frequently comes from external 
pressure, and a commitment to long term and strategic planning affords the 
institution the opportunity to control and influence the change. This would appear 
to suggest a likely correlation between a commitment to planning and a shared 
governance structure made up of those who will be affected by the change.
Thus, the governance structure may itself be seen as the change agent. 
However, Dennison (1994) noted that colleges do not historically have well 
established shared governance structures. This is due to colleges having their 
roots in the public school system, as opposed to the university system, with the 
consequent lack of professionalism among the faculty and a preponderance of 
trade unionism (pp. 32-33). This absence of tradition in shared decision-making 
was strongly suggested by Giles (1981) as contributing to ineffectual college 
boards. She opined that external, lay board members lack the investment in the 
college enterprise and are not prepared to spend the time necessary. “Good 
governance is a full time job" (Giles, p. 22). Wood (1991) concurred with Giles’ 
view, “The power of the boards of governors is limited by a number of factors 
such as their part-time involvement, the expertise of the presidents, and the
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technical nature of the decision-making. A number of research studies conducted 
in a variety of settings support this analysis” (p. 333).
The message that emerged, therefore, is that colleges have not been 
seen as strong on long term planning because of several internal and external 
factors. Boards were viewed as being capable of adopting the necessary long 
term view, however, authors tended to doubt the boards’ ability and commitment, 
especially in the 1970's and 1980’s. It was evident that the arrival of shared 
governance, with the inclusion of committed and knowledgeable internal 
members, was seen as the way to bring about improvement of institutional 
planning performance.
2. A Climate of Confrontation.
As a concept, the sharing of governance is relatively simple. Where the 
difficulties appear to develop is how it is perceived, and how the participants 
choose to behave. Rather than a sharing, there is much to suggest that 
governance changes represent more of a shift in power. This was noted by 
Lovas (1994) and as faculty and administrators both perceive the shift, and 
corresponding gain/loss o f power, the author questions whether true sharing is 
ever possible. Mitchell, Grant, and Rossa (1992) also acknowledged the shift in 
power but suggested that there are mutual obligations among 
boards/administrators and faculty, “Those in positions of power need to let go of
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their concentrated authority, and those newly participating need to look at 
problems and solutions from a college wide perspective” (p. 21). The notion of 
ownership in decision-making in specific areas, e.g. curriculum for faculty and 
budget for trustees and administration, and the reluctance to concede it is center 
to the power struggle noted by many authors including Edelfelt (1982) and 
Kanter (1994).
It would appear that a sharing of decision-making, perhaps presenting a 
win-win situation to the confrontationists, is more likely to occur in an informal 
setting rather than under prescriptive legislation. Kanter (1994) observed that the 
early 1990’s experience among community colleges going through the 
development of shared governance in California was that “...when behaviour is 
legislated, issues become polarized and often much more complicated than they 
were originally envisioned” (p. 229). Certainly, as noted by Lovas (1994), rigidity 
of positions is the antithesis of effective power sharing —“Blessed are the 
flexible, for they shall not be bent out of shape" (p. 14). This holding of power is 
often effected by committees with specific responsibilities. As a result, they tend 
not to acquire a big picture perspective but, rather, jealously hold onto their 
authority in a narrow context. Acebo (1992) suggested that colleges are not by 
nature collegial:
While the concept of a team is easily grasped, and most people have 
experienced at least some aspect of the power of the team, the collegial 
setting has precious few of them. Instead, colleges generally have an
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abundance of committees, and committees are not teams—nor are 
academic divisions, administrative cabinets, and boards of trustees, (p. 9) 
This lack of cohesion frequently leads to confrontation between groups on 
campus. The “...turf wars between governing boards, senates, and unions” was 
an example of confrontation cited by Nussbaum (1995) where overlapping 
interests collide. This tension will be further explored in the context of decision­
making in a labour relations environment.
What is the nature of the traditional college and school governance and 
administrative structures that it makes it seem so difficult to change? Reyes and 
McCarty (1986) observed that while educational institutions are sometimes seen, 
and this is an image which they themselves encourage, as a community of 
scholars in which governance is shared, this is more true of universities than 
colleges and schools. The latter are quite bureaucratic in nature, particularly 
where there is a heavy union presence (pp. 1-24). This observation was echoed 
by Piland and Butte (1991, p. 6).
The main characteristic of a bureaucracy is a power base founded on a 
top/down principle, where decision-making resides at the top and involvement of 
others is generally on an advisory basis if there is a role at all. The notion of a 
community and its involvement in governing the institution is not prevalent in a 
bureaucracy:
The concept of community within the institution of higher learning cannot 
survive if the power of administration is thought of as a supreme echelon
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in a hierarchy o f authority, if the concept of hierarchy is acceptable within 
a college, the administration becomes the fount of authority from which 
faculty, students, and alumni draw their respective roles and under whose 
direction and control all activity is performed. Such a concept of 
authority...is alien to the great social purpose of higher education and 
does not conform with the facts o f academic life. On the other hand, when 
the power o f administration is conceived as a constituent element of a 
community o f power, then the functions of that power are more definitely 
prescribed, and the limitations of that power are more clearly understood. 
(Mann, 1968, p. 2)
Thus, the concepts of community, consensus, and social purpose are 
established in contrast to the absolute power of a hierarchical bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, Lau (1996) noted, “Genuine involvement produces identifiable 
results capable of providing satisfaction separate from the decisions themselves. 
The results are then the product of the whole, and accountability to the affected 
groups are from those groups that were involved in the process. The 
interdependency o f the relationships within the organization maintains a state of 
balance between the competing groups” (pp. 3-4).
Notwithstanding the common good that may be seen to derive from 
shared governance, there remains the clash of confrontation and consensus 
seeking. While the latter is noted as the academic way by Polishook and Naples 
(1989, p. 2) and provides the foundation to the shared governance model, a
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stark anomaly can occur when it is situated in a confrontational unionized 
environment. The anomaly is that faculty and support staff players may be called 
upon to simultaneously adopt positions of opposite value, consensus in decision­
making and confrontation in collective bargaining.
In this tense arena of alternating collaboration and confrontation, one 
common theme pervades the literature as being absolutely essential to the 
success of shared governance. That theme is trust. Its importance is constantly 
stressed, and yet its absence is frequently noted with sadness. Mitchell, Grant, 
and Rossa stated “...shared governance depends upon trust, a trust that is best 
built upon positive experiences with the process and a sincere conviction that the 
advantages of having the best minds collectively steer a course for the college 
far outweigh any disadvantages, real or imagined” (p. 22). However, the doubts 
exist. Dennison (1994) observed that questions of conflict of interest and the 
relationship between internal board members and the constituencies from which 
they are drawn are so often raised without satisfactory answers as to seriously 
undermine the shared governance structure (pp. 26-27). Indeed, Nussbaum 
(1995) found, in a study of the views of both college presidents and senate 
presidents, that neither believed that trust and cooperation had been enhanced 
with the advent of the shared decision-making model (p. 24). Furthermore, Trani 
(1997) suggested that the ongoing, perhaps escalating, tension that has been 
associated with shared governance has caused noticeable weakening of the 
institutional presidency. “The authority of the university and college presidents is
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being undercut by all of its partners—trustees, faculty members, and political 
leaders” (p. 16).
Wirth (1991) also identified the potential weakness in participative 
decision-making that exists because only relatively few faculty and staff are likely 
to have lead roles and thus, they have the opportunity to impose their own 
will,“...it is all too easy to take advantage of the power vacuums which 
temporarily exist in the early stages of shared governance and impose one’s own 
view without appropriate consultation with other faculty” (p. 4). Even in a climate 
of consensus seeking there may exist, therefore, the natural tendency to assume 
individual power. Several authors, including Nussbaum (1995), suggested the 
need for institutions to develop a code of ethics to guide the behaviour of 
participants (pp. 57-58). While this may appear to go against the desire to avoid 
prescriptive legislation noted earlier, it may be the answer. For, it is clear that the 
internal constituents of colleges—administration, faculty, staff, and students—are 
not necessarily natural partners. A history of confrontation and the continuing 
tension of industrial style labour relations may mean that it will take more time 
than regulations, or perhaps a combination of the two, before the necessary 
trusting relationships between the traditional appointed or elected boards of 
governors are established.
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3. State/Provincial Centralization of Boards’ Responsibilities.
A third and final setting to be considered in the issue of shared decision- 
making at the institutional level is the amount of actual decision-making that is 
possible. During the period of the last twenty five years of local democratization, 
there has also been a change in the relationship between institutions and 
states/provinces. Hodgkinson (1974) noted two important shifts, the effect of 
each moves in the opposite direction “...students began to be included on faculty 
senates and other campus-wide decision-making bodies, as well as on boards of 
trustees, [while] more and more decision-making power was taken over by 
statewide coordinating agencies and influenced by legislative politics” (p. 1). 
Piland and Butte (1991) discerned from trustee views concerns about the trend 
towards state centralization of decision-making, particularly where it concerned 
funding schemes. Cohen (1996) noted the differing impact of this centralization 
tendency on various areas of decision-making:
As the states become more involved with college policies, gaps in inter- 
institutional cooperation will be filled and criteria for student matriculation 
and progress will be set. These pressures will result in efforts to micro­
manage the administrative functions of community colleges, but they will 
have minimal effect on classroom instruction and student services The 
thrust o f state-level coordination focuses on reporting, compliance with
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regulations, and accountability for numerous aspects of institutional 
operations, (p. 2)
Stevens and Piland (1988), in a study of Californian educators, noted further 
concern at the local level about the degree of centralization in general and in 
specific areas of decision-making. They recorded strong disagreement with the 
suggestion that the California community college system should be administered 
as a unified system by a state board. While there was agreement that the state 
should establish uniform systems of budgeting and accounting for local districts, 
there was strong disagreement that the state should have comprehensive 
authority with regard to academic affairs. It is interesting to note that trustees had 
stronger opposition to centralization than presidents, but both groups were 
agreed on the locus of responsibility and authority:
The concept of increasing state control...is opposed by the locally elected 
trustees, and to a lesser extent, the colleges’ chief operating officers. 
However, both groups want the state board to assume a considerable 
amount of accountability and responsibility while authority is maintained at 
the local level, (pp. 255-259)
It would appear that the trend towards centralized decision-making has occurred 
in the areas which have tended to be the purview of trustees and administration 
at the local level and which faculty, staff, and students sought jurisdiction over in 
the call for shared governance. Dennison and Gallagher (1986) observed in the 
Canadian case that colleges have never really enjoyed the degree of
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independence associated with the universities, “Canada’s colleges have never 
fully been the master of their own destiny. Since their inception, the degree of 
their mastery has steadily declined, with the power and influence of provincial 
and federal governments gradually became more dominant” (p. 189). This 
centralist tendency has become even more prevalent in British Columbia in the 
1990’s and is one of the undercurrents which was examined in this study in 
relation to shared decision-making. Dennison and Gallagher were in no doubt 
about the limitations of college board decision-making power, irrespective of the 
boards’ composition, and the dependency of the boards upon the two levels of 
government:
Power and decision-making authority are a serious business to and for 
Canada’s colleges. Both their current effectiveness and their potential are 
intimately connected to the relationships that will be established between 
both levels of government and the institutions. However college board 
membership is determined, and whatever powers these boards may 
acquire, in the final analysis, the colleges are instruments of governments 
which have created and supported them. What confidence provincial 
governments place in college boards, and how the two levels of 
government work out their relationships as they pertain to post-secondary 
education, will surely have a major impact on the future direction of 
colleges in Canada, (p. 194)
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It is clear, therefore, that college boards in both the USA and Canada 
have experienced a gradual but definite diminution of their authority and scope of 
decision-making. This shift in power has coincided with the development of 
shared governance and, consequently, has left the more democratically 
represented boards with less room in which to exercise that democracy. There is 
no particular evidence to suggest that boards consisting of internal and external 
members are better suited to establish effective relationships with government, 
than were the former boards consisting only of external members. However, the 
forging of relationships with government, given the systematic centralization of 
decision-making power, is absolutely necessary to maintain the status of the 
colleges, and the task appears to have fallen on the chief executive officers. 
“Presidents must take the lead both in communicating frequently with legislators 
at the local, state, and federal levels and in keeping the board members aware of 
the important legislative issues” (Boggs, 1995, p. 33). The literature would 
appear to suggest that the advent of shared governance might have resulted in a 
weakening of the powers of the presidency within the colleges but a 
corresponding strengthening of those powers outside the colleges.
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Discussion of the Issues 
Shared Governance in General
1. Roles to be Played
Shared governance involves individuals coming together in specific 
groups such as the board o f trustees, traditional administrative groups, and multi­
representative groups such as senates. The movement away from exclusive 
decision-making bodies, usually involving only trustees and senior administrators 
(the corporate management structure) to bodies incorporating all stakeholders in 
an educational institution is dramatic and likely to be chaotic. “Although trustees 
may have backgrounds in private business, they will soon realize that colleges 
cannot be run like private business enterprises" (Nason, cited in Boggs, 1995, p. 
35). This is because of internal and external restrictions. Internally, constituent 
groups such as faculty and students have a traditional interest in being involved 
in decision-making. And, externally, uState/[provincial] and federal laws restrict 
the freedom of judgment of both the president and the board” (Boggs, 1995, p. 
35). Mitchell, Grant, and Rossa (1992) also differentiated between participatory 
business management and shared educational governance, with the latter 
involving more extensive structures, more formal roles, and the sense of right-to- 
be-there held by the participants—the faculty, staff, and students
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(p. 21).
Shared governance, as has been frequently noted in this review, is 
viewed as a natural progression in colleges and schools, it is considered logical 
that the time honoured practices in the universities should flow down to the junior 
branches of education. Furthermore, this sense of impending destiny contrasts 
somewhat with moves towards participatory management in the business sector 
which are very much at the discretion of boards and senior managers. However, 
Baliles (1996) suggested that the transition to shared governance in colleges is 
still much dependent on the philosophy and actions of the presidents (p. 11). The 
influence that presidents can exert starts to shape the governance model into a 
functional structure. Lau (1996), drawing on the California community college 
model, illustrated such a structure:
All policies and most of the strategic decisions flow from the board of 
trustees to the president/superintendent for implementation. The 
president/superintendent interprets the policies and, with the approval of 
the board, allocates resources in order to operationalize the strategic 
plans. Decision-making and power on both these levels, policy making 
and operations, are shared among several competing groups, (p. 2)
This pivotal role for presidents is interesting and contrasts with the views of Trani 
(1997), who posited the weakening o f the presidencies as a direct result of 
shared governance (p. 16). Lau further noted the requirement of boards that they 
develop policies and guidelines which provide senates with the mandate and
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strength to “...administer academic and professional standards, course approval 
and curricula, and other academic matters” (p. 7). Nussbaum (1995) expanded 
on the senate role in states where it is only nominally advisory to the board. He 
suggested that boards should “...consult collegiaily with senates on academic 
and professional matters and, while the boards make the final decision, they 
should rely on the advice and judgment of the senates" (p. 10).
The volatility of the educational environment and the strong expectations 
of inclusiveness held by the constituency groups has been recorded extensively. 
Hence, there is considerable support in legislation for the need for clarity and 
definition of roles. Both Hodgkinson (1974) and Allen (1991) emphasized the 
need for clear enunciation of what the participants in a collaborative structure are 
supposed to do, and perhaps more importantly what they are not required to do. 
The latter noted that “...administrators and teachers are not accustomed to this 
type of [shared] governance and it is hard for them to function in new, often 
unprecedented roles in their schools [or colleges], and easy to fall back into 
traditional, familiar roles” (p. 13). Lovas (1994) noted the important distinctions of 
authority and responsibility/accountability and stressed the need to identify who 
had what in a structure. The consequence of failing to do this is likely to lead to 
unclear decision-making steps and a lack of ownership in the results.
Mitchell, Grant, and Rossa (1992) cited the first step toward shared 
governance as the “...delineation of the roles, responsibilities, and relationships 
among all the major committees involved in the governance of the college” (p.
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21). And yet, while delineation is called for, there is frequent reference in the 
literature to caution against prescription o f shared decision-making procedures. 
However, Allen and Glickman (1992) continued the call for clarification, “Shared 
governance is an elusive process with many pitfalls. Participating schools [and 
colleges] must first define the process and identify the players and then clarify 
and resolve the issues” (p. 80). Baliles (1996) echoed this need and suggested it 
be done sooner rather than later (p. 11). Moreover, and not for the first time in 
the literature, he identified the presidents as playing a key role in the delineation 
process, noting “...[they] should lead the board and faculty through a process of 
clarifying the precise nature of shared governance on each campus and 
reducing ambiguities in authority and decision-making processes” (p. 8). The 
complexity of educational governance has been stressed over and over again 
and is at the root of the apparent need for clarification of roles in order to make 
shared decision-making successful. The nature of that complexity is never more 
evident than in the relationships between boards, senates, and trade unions, the 
latter particularly in the case of faculty unions. Sumner (1991) advocated the 
necessity of developing policy which clarifies processes and roles in relation to 
governance, administration, and collective bargaining. She observed the 
potential overlap of interests but highlighted the need to prevent discussion o f a 
matter spilling over from one arena to another with the possible outcome of 
unofficial views and even unofficial decisions emerging. Seitz (1993) echoed this 
sentiment and suggested that such clarification must be openly articulated in
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formal documents like policies or memoranda of understanding to which all 
parties have agreed.
Kanter (1994) noted that “...the institutional challenge—is for 
administrators and faculty both to identify specific areas of responsibility and 
authority before decisions are made and actions are taken” (p. 230). However, 
Allen and Glickman (1992) offered that the very tendency to want to avoid being 
prescriptive on roles and procedures is what leads to dysfunctional boards in the 
educational system (p. 80). Dennison (1994) observed in the Canadian context 
that, where provincial ministries have declined to develop detailed regulations on 
shared governance and have left it upto individual colleges, they have ended up 
with quite different models from institution to institution (p. 27). Whether clear 
role definition can be achieved at the local level on a voluntary basis is 
questionable. Deas (1996) suggested that shared governance is more likely to 
be effective where it is legislated at the state/provincial level with prescribed 
roles for the players and built-in controls to prevent ambiguity and turf wars.
Piland (1994) offered that true sharing of power is only achieved when the 
board of trustees and the senate can come together in a jo int decision-making 
role. However, Hodgkinson (1974) noted the traditional differences:
...relationships between boards and senates are quite confused and often 
threatening to both sides. Board members often may see the senate as a 
group attempting to wrest power and authority away from the president. 
The senate, on the other hand, may see the board as a distant, unthinking
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group o f businessmen[/women] who get together only two or three times a 
year and try to solve all the institution’s problems on the basis of that 
limited exposure, (p. 147)
The Academic Senate for California Community Colleges (1996) underscored 
the tension between the disparate players. It expressed particular caution around 
the acceptance o f advisory governance councils in place of what it saw as the 
legitimate decision-making roles of the academic senates and faculty unions 
within their respective jurisdictions. Moreover, the suggestion was made that 
senates and unions should engage in active collaboration so as not to be 
undermined by boards, administrations, and advisory councils (p. 4). This call to 
arms very much resembles the strategy adopted by unions in British Columbia 
around the introduction of shared governance in colleges and university colleges 
and which provided a backdrop to this study.
Piland and Butte (1991), in a study of trustees, noted a strong view that 
boards should not be involved in college administration. In a deeper analysis, 
they concluded that elected trustees have a tendency to want to get more 
involved in administrative matters than do appointed members (pp. 9-10). In 
another study of trustees’ views, Deas (1994) found that boards described their 
role as “...rubber stamping the work of the administrators. This was not intended 
in a negative context, but reflected the high-level role of trustees and their trust in 
administration...” (p. 47). Such a relationship was possible through “...the 
existence of well designed policies...to steer [ board and administration ] through
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the processes of management" was noted by Jasiek, Wisgoski, and Andrews 
(cited in Deas, 1994).
In summary, the potential acceptance and success of shared decision­
making processes seems, on balance, to be dependent upon a clear set of 
definitions as to roles and procedures. There is, however, much discussion 
around a prescriptive, top down approach to this need for clarification with a lot 
of support for development of the guidelines at the local level, among all the 
players. The college president is seen in an important leadership role in this 
context. On the other hand, much has been written about the widely differing 
models, and differing success rates, that emerge when state and provincial 
governments do not set minimal standards.
2. The Influence of the President
The change that is shared governance is an example of leadership. And 
leadership, even if it involves all stakeholders, is directly associated with the 
beliefs and actions of the college president or school principal. Gulassa (1989) 
noted that leadership which inspires others to outperform is determined by the 
style of the CEO. Edelfelt (1982) observed “...that programs [of teacher 
involvement] in schools in which principals were not supportive were not making 
the progress [towards shared governance] that schools with supportive principals 
were making” (p.7). Thus, the importance of leadership from the top towards
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sharing o f power was identified, albeit in a collaborative manner as noted by 
Hackmann and Berry (1994), “...while top administrators cannot create effective 
change by themselves, they can and must be an integral part o f the process as 
they facilitate change” (p. 2).
The role of the president is obviously crucial in the transition to shared 
decision-making. His/her own characteristics play an important part in this. The 
president is clearly aligned to the board of trustees, indeed Deas (1994) noted 
that trustees view their president as a colleague first and an employee second. 
The president can also be seen as a catalyst in change of governance. A smart 
president will, however attempt to hone him/herself as an educational leader 
and, consequently, an ally of all the constituents—faculty, staff, students, and 
fellow administrators. This is, o f course, not an easy task and speaks to the 
necessary juggling skills of the ringmaster in the educational circus.
One of the considerations of power sharing explored in this study is the 
financial stewardship context which is commonly associated with the board of 
trustees and may appear to be much sought after by faculty, staff, and students. 
He who holds the purse strings holds the real power. Here, the president’s role in 
change is not so clear as Deas (1994) found that “...while trustees noted that 
faculty are less desirous of being involved in fiscal management but seek the 
sort of assurances that the board can provide...vice-presidents felt that the buck 
stopped with them and not the president" (p. 48). Perhaps this confirms that 
presidents are not natural financial leaders (Wood, 1984 and Taylor, 1988). In
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any case, there is clear suggestion that internal constituents often view the 
advent of shared governance as the opportunity to get into the budget but do not 
relish the role if they are given such authority, particularly when it comes to 
setting priorities for budget cutting.
One important consequence of the move towards shared governance, 
noted by Lovas (1994), is the frequent elimination of the president’s cabinet or 
similar group of senior administrators which commonly had a key role in 
administrative decision-making. The impact on these players and how they have 
responded will be examined later in this review. In addition, the elimination of a 
close circle of advisors has affected the behaviour of presidents They are now 
required to be far more consultative and open to other views, and this has called 
for a different set of leadership skills. In some cases, presidents have been very 
successful in broadening the consultative and decision-making base while at the 
same time serving as the titular head of the college. However, in other cases, 
presidents have grown to feel isolated, with no close allies, and have tended to 
withdraw from the leadership role in deference to the various constituency bodies 
which have legislated power and authority in the institution.
3. Consensu? and Representation
Most contemporary writings lean toward a decision-making structure that 
is collaborative and constructive rather than a top down authoritarian structure
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
where final decisions rest with a few high ranking individuals or even just a board 
and president. It is important in this new democracy to create the right kind of 
inclusive environment. Hunt (1984) noted “...there is a growing body of literature 
which stresses the importance of social context rather than personal 
characteristics as the main influence on the outcome of social interactions” (p. 
170). The creation o f such an environment where individuals can contribute to 
the common good becomes the responsibility of those formerly looked to for 
exclusive decision-making. “The essential task of management is to arrange 
organizational conditions and methods of operation so that people can achieve 
their own goals best by directing their own affairs toward organizational 
objectives” cited Mann (1968, p. 3). Those organizational objectives, the 
common good, are a powerful issue in determining the effectiveness of any 
shared governance model. Lau (1996) stated it plainly with reference to his 
institution, “Compton Community College was founded for the benefit of society 
at large, not for the benefit of professors, administrators, students, trustees, or 
any grouping of constituents. As a result, the governing board represents the 
public at large” (p. 9). This calls for a coming together of board members in spite 
of their differing constituencies, social statuses, and values. Seitz (1993) also 
seemed in no doubt as to the simplicity of the requirement to surrender personal 
agendas in favour o f the common good:
Board members must subordinate personal interests to those of the 
institution. That stance is essential. The fiduciary relationship in board
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affairs hold members to a standard of good faith and honesty in their 
actions. Persons reluctant to comply with that standard should seek 
another pastime, (p. 8)
Alas, despite the calls for board members to act as one, the individualism that 
many exhibit is probably the greatest knock against shared governance and 
goes hand in hand with the omnipresence of allegations of conflict of interest. In 
that respect, therefore, the tendency toward individualism is more often directed 
at the internal board members—faculty, staff, and students. “The definition of 
individualism offered by Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1996, p. 
334) where reality or prominence rests in the individual as opposed to the 
greater society can be applied to a board as a corporate entity representing the 
larger community but with its members embarking on personal agendas” (cited in 
Deas, 1997, p. 2). As a result o f this behavioural tendency, “...the common good 
that is the object of a board is sacrificed by an individual member in favour of 
narrower, more personal values, a tendency which has been observed by Buber 
(1985)” (cited in Deas, 1997, pp. 2-3). Individualistic behaviour by board 
members, whether it be the pursuit of personal agendas or the hoarding of 
power for whatever reason, seriously undermines the effectiveness of a college 
board. The opposite of individualism, and the ideal state for a functional board, is 
a group of board members exhibiting relative neutrality. Relative neutrality is 
seen as the position o f compromise that is proposed as the overlapping of self 
interest and participation stewardship (Abascal-Hildebrand, 1997) and the mean
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of the extremes of excess and deficiency noted by Aristotle over 2000 years ago 
(cited in Deas, 1997, p. 5). If the charge of individualism that is directed against 
internal board members is valid, what does it say about their motives? Do they 
join boards with the express intention of disregarding the group culture in favour 
of their own objectives? Deas (1997) believed that, generally, there was no overt 
intention toward individualism but, rather, a tendency on the part of some internal 
members to fail to recognize the group culture which is directed toward the 
common good. As a result of this, there is an almost inevitable tendency to lean 
toward what they know best which becomes something of a personal agenda, 
“...boards are tending to look upon that kind of virtue of boardsmanship 
[receptiveness to change] much in the same way as the crew observed Plato’s 
sea captain. They see it but they do not understand it and, consequently, they 
revert to what they are comfortable with, which in the case of the elected 
[internal] members are the narrow, short-term issues that most directly affect 
them and their constituencies” (p. 8).
Are faculty, staff, and students interested in contributing to the common 
good of the institution? Senge (1996) predicted so with the observation that 
“...deep within us is a tremendous longing to understand how wholes work. The 
inability to understand wholes is damaging and dangerous.” Hodgkinson (1974), 
similarly, placed value on the community of decision-making when he noted the 
direction of senates:
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The campus senate operates on the apparent assumption that faculty, 
students, and administration can best make decisions in a communitarian 
environment with each group represented, (p. 4)
Consensus based decision-making may not just be more effective, there are 
those such as Thomas (1979) who believe that it also upholds ethical principles 
while exclusive decision-making based on power tends to violate such principles. 
And yet, clearly, shared governance is steeped in politics and that is not a 
subject which is generally associated with ethics. The very creation of shared 
decision-making is generally a politically motivated act, often government 
initiated in response to pressure from unions and associations o f faculty, staff, 
and students. Moreover, the behaviour of internal and external board members, 
especially when it is sufficiently polarized to be differentiated, is characterized as 
political. Boggs (1995) noted that arguments can be made that appointed 
external members are inherently less political than elected external members 
and internal members. However, such appointments are generally themselves of 
a political nature, a reward for services rendered to the party or administration in 
power (p. 29). Wood (1991), in a study of internal board members, concluded 
that participation in the governance process is political in nature by all standards 
of organizational politics literature. Members’ behaviour may be influenced by 
social characteristics, the power of presidents, and expectations of the role but, 
nevertheless, the strongest factor was the constituency from which they had 
been elected (abstract, p. 2).
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One of the most important aspects of shared governance, and one which 
is frequently among the most contentious, is whether members of college-wide 
decision-making bodies should represent the constituency from which they have 
emerged or should act more as members-at-large. Hodgkinson (1974) favours 
the latter and noted “...if senates were always engaged in bloc voting, and 
decisions were always made in accordance with numbers present from each 
constituency, the institution-wide perspective might be lost on certain crucial 
issues” (p. 16). Zald (1969) posited that there is a “...direct relationship between 
a board’s degree of power in relation to an institution’s administration and the 
degree to which board members represent the interests of external groups”
(cited in Wood, 1995, p. 41). By interests of external groups, it is assumed that 
the reference is to the outside community at large, which many authors believe 
represents the ownership of community colleges. Lovas (1994) also noted the 
value of independence of membership, “...shared governance requires us to take 
the time to listen to one another from an institutional as opposed to a 
constituency perspective” (p. 14). This role for faculty, in particular, may not be a 
natural one with tradition leaning towards specialization and narrowness of 
interest and knowledge. Wirth (1991) underscored the need for change of focus, 
“...individual faculty must acquire a view or perspective broader than his/her 
department and must be willing to study material and data outside of their own 
area of interest" (p. 2). It seems that some sort of accommodation has to be 
made for internal members. For, it is inevitable that they will retain links with their
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constituency; often some are even officers in their trade union at the same time 
as they sit on a college board (as noted by Wood, 1991, p. 2). Separation of 
responsibility to board and union is difficult but not impossible. Wood (1995) 
managed to prescribe such a separation:
All board members, regardless of role, were expected to think 
institutionally, placing the needs of the whole college over those of 
specific interest groups. More specifically, institutional members were 
supposed to act as trustees rather than delegates, but they were 
encouraged by their board colleagues to facilitate two-way communication 
and contribute their special knowledge and insights resulting from their 
participation in the college community, (p. 45)
Further, Wood suggested that internal members should not raise constituency 
issues at the board table or use their board status to interfere with or influence 
the administrative processes o f the college (p. 48). By taking such a position, he 
believed that internal members did much to avoid the allegation of conflict of 
interest. Dennison and Gallagher (1986) concurred with the view that the areas 
of responsibility can, indeed, be separated:
...the employee members of colleges should be able to contribute 
significantly to the policies o f their institutions and should have full 
freedom to exercise their professional responsibility to their students. The 
fact remains, however, that the interests of the personnel o f community
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colleges must not take precedence over the judgment of the 
representatives of the community to be served by the college, (p. 154)
The vision o f the decision-making body as a whole is, at the least, as 
important as that of each of its members. Weisbord (1993) noted the danger that 
any body, regardless of its membership, faces of becoming insular and 
accountable only unto itself. He suggested that this can be avoided by 
maintaining an institutional perspective and concentrating on the big picture 
rather than getting embroiled in trivial issues or personal agendas. There were 
numerous references to the difficulty that faculty, in particular, have in remaining 
with the big picture. And the task becomes even more difficult in a climate of 
conflict. Filan (1992) observed the dilemma facing the internal members:
Two of the most difficult aspects of the job are learning how to shift one’s 
loyalty from a specific discipline to the institution as a whole and learning 
the skills to resolve conflict—between faculty in their departments, 
between faculty and students, between faculty and administration, and 
between themselves and their faculty. Unfortunately, few institutions 
provide any kind of formalized training to assist either their new or 
experienced [participants] to hone these skills, (p. 4)
The lack of training is an important point which will be revisited later in this 
review. Wood (1995) suggested that presidents, board chairs, and external 
board members must act in the best interests of the college to create a 
supportive yet directive climate which serves to persuade internal members that
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their focus should be on institutional, not constituency, affairs (p. 48). In a similar 
vein, Periey (1995) stated that the problems of boards, made dysfunctional by 
individualistic behaviour on the part o f internal members, have to be solved by all 
the members themselves. He called for a higher level o f professionalism in order 
to protect the credibility of educational institutions when coming under public 
scrutiny. In particular, he implored his fellow faculty to demonstrate loyalty to the 
profession before loyalty to an individual discipline (p. 47).
Broad-based representation on bodies looking for decisions through 
consensus is democratic, empowering, and likely to produce sound outcomes 
which will enjoy support throughout an institution. But are such bodies effective? 
Hodgkinson (1974) was somewhat doubtful about their existence alongside less 
democratic vehicles emerging in the educational sector of the day:
It is the diversity of background and outlook within and across faculty, 
student, and administrative groups that makes consensus improbable and 
strict “representation” ( one person truly speaking as his [/her] constituents 
would themselves speak) unlikely. Thus, we tended to see the broadly 
representative campus senate model as somewhat utopian and romantic, 
given the hard-nosed styles of adversary bargaining widely used in higher 
education today, (p. 14)
Regardless of whether a consensus based model can eclipse or at least coexist 
with adversarial models, and it is probably no clearer today than it was twenty- 
five years ago, many writers agreed that the consensus model is difficult and
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time consuming to operate. Lovas (1994), in a survey of administrators, noted 
the three most common knocks against shared decision-making:
1. Shared governance is slow, tedious, time-consuming, and wasteful;
2. More time implementing the shared governance process results in 
greater difficulty for administrators in implementing new programs and 
otherwise meeting their responsibilities; and
3. [ Shared governance ] has resulted in chaos, confusion, stalemate, 
and the inability to make decisions and respond to situations in a 
timely manner, (p. 15)
It would seem, therefore, that shared governance is not a quick fix option and 
ought not to be entered into with intention of streamlining procedures.
4. The Scope of Involvement 
in Shared Decision-Making
There is a challenge to being a member of a college board. Whether 
he/she is elected or appointed, internal or external, the challenge exists. Seitz
(1993) neatly categorized the challenges for each member as follows:
1. Knowing and properly observing board functions, duties, and 
relationships;
2. Knowing the nature of education and the unique character of the 
institution charged to represent;
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3. Knowing the difference between policy making and administration; and
4. Knowing how to assess, foster, and preserve institutional strength and
quality, (p. 3)
Meeting those challenges successfully involves the board acquiring a group 
culture and focusing on a set of high level goals which pursue the common good. 
“Board agenda and focus primarily [is] on the big picture and on the future, i. e. 
on major board-realm issues. The board is not involved in management o f staff, 
programs, or facilities” (Gregory, 1996, p. 3-4). And then, there is turf.
In a governance structure, there is turf to be considered, that is areas 
where a particular constituency has traditionally held sway and likely will view the 
prospect of sharing that role as giving up turf. Polishook and Naples (1989) 
revisited the landmark US Supreme Court decision of 1980 in the National 
Labour Relations Board vs. Yeshiva University case which concluded that 
“...faculty pervasively control the educational enterprise” (p. 6). However, Collins 
(1970) in examining faculty views of the student role in shared governance noted 
that “...faculty enthusiasm for student involvement in decision-making waxed in 
regard to social matters but waned in regard to academic matters” (p. 11). 
Perhaps it was getting too close to a turf issue? Certainly, there is overwhelming 
support in the literature for the notion that academic affairs should be controlled, 
or at the very least heavily influenced, by faculty. That seems to be the most 
basic tenet, strongly rooted in the university culture and well established in 
colleges even before the move to formal shared governance. Munitz (1995)
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confirmed the academic affairs principle that control should rest with the faculty. 
He opined that in state or provincial situations where the president and trustees 
do have legal decision-making authority, they should “...concur with the faculty 
judgment, which can be overruled only in rare instances and for compelling 
reasons stated in detail” (p. 11).
The other side of the coin from academic affairs is financial affairs, long 
the purview of the board and administration. It has been noted by a number of 
writers that faculty and faculty dominated bodies still have little or no real power 
in regard to fiscal matters and the setting of the budget in particular (Mann, 1968; 
McConnell, 1970; and Flanigan, 1994). There were frequent references to poor 
input opportunities for other stakeholders and poor communications on this 
fundamental management issue. Indeed, Gulassa (1989) noted that where there 
is a truly collaborative approach to budgeting, and examples do exist, shared 
governance has finally been achieved. Lovas (1994), noting support staff views 
on financial affairs, also highlighted the need for an open, participative process 
particularly when a budget reduction exercise is required. There may be a 
cultural difference here between faculty and support staff with the former wanting 
greater involvement in decisions related largely to budget growth while the latter 
appeared more concerned about having a role in the event o f budget reduction. 
Wood (1995) concluded from a study of internal board members that, by and 
large, they had only achieved limited to moderate power within the board 
structure (p. 33). In another dimension of the progress of shared governance
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development, Munitz (1995) observed that faculty still control academic affairs, 
but the board and administration still control the budget and, therefore, progress 
has been inhibited (p. 11). Progress, here, is taken to mean both progress in the 
development of the board/senate relationship and in the development of 
programs, curricula, and teaching methodology. This limited impact by internal 
members on the decision-making realm of boards may be due to the fact that the 
internal members function more effectively in the less formal forums that also 
exist in a college. Allen and Glickman (1992) noted that schools and colleges 
end up in a shared governance model with overlap between the formal (board, 
senate) roles and informal (departments, committees) roles (pp. 81-82). Although 
it will vary according to institution, it is likely that a good deal of real decision­
making, particularly where it relates to proposed change, is still transacted 
through the informal network. The final reason for the perception that internal 
members achieve only limited power in the board environment may be due to a 
resistance on their part to conform to the expectations of the role. Wood (1991) 
found that presidents and external members have established clear standards: 
College presidents and public board members define the institutional 
members’ role as trustee rather than delegate with the explicit or implicit 
goal of integrating them into the boards’ culture, social dynamics, and 
decision-making priorities and processes, (p. 354)
There is fairly strong suggestion in the literature, and from experience, 
that the impetus for the call for shared governance comes more from faculty than
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it does support staff and students. Perhaps, as a result, shared decision-making 
models differ from state to state and province to province. In most cases, 
however, faculty now have a formal role on college boards while in many cases 
staff and students are also represented. Wood (1995) observed that faculty are 
seen by all internal members as having more impact on boards than the other 
internal constituents (p. 39). Nussbaum (1995) reported that staff, students, and 
administrators, the latter of which infrequently have a formal role on boards, felt 
marginalized by the shared governance structure (p. 23). Perhaps also, this 
feeling of marginalization can de attributed to the strong impact and influence of 
faculty. However, Wood (1991) observed that “...the institutional [internal] 
members appear to me to be less powerful members on the board than others— 
the other board members do not look to our institutional members to be highly 
influential “ (p. 279). Interestingly, the second comment by Wood (1991) may be 
the more telling and speaks to an ongoing dichotomy of opinion on shared 
governance.
Wood (1995) suggested that the boards’ focus on the community good 
and the tendency of internal members to hang onto personal values and 
interests may be a reason for the limited impact that internal members have 
made on boards:
The presidents’ and public members’ frequent emphasis on the good of 
the college in their discussions of role expectations for institutional 
members illustrated their desire to establish a unity of interests within the
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board and to divorce themselves from the interests of the college’s 
constituent groups. At each college [in the study] this tendency toward 
social cohesion and unanimity limited the influence of institutional 
members by restricting their opportunity to pursue interests they defined 
as important and to introduce dissenting opinions, (p. 42)
However, Wood (1991), in a study of internal board members, observed “...most 
employee and student members consciously sought to achieve credibility in the 
eyes of their board peers by working within the role expectations with the goal of 
gaining influence in that way” (p. 357). It is probably not so surprising that 
observations of shared decision-making reveal internal members adopting 
strategies which allow them to pursue their personal interests. Certainly, it 
causes boards to exhibit the sort of moral conflict, identified by Ricouer (1992), 
when an organization struggles with competing values (cited in Deas, 1997, p. 
10). However, Deas suggested that internal members are “simply playing out the 
roles [which they have been accustomed to and] which have been entirely 
natural to the culture o f post-secondary education system” (p. 10). Only time and 
experience may change that natural tendency, if indeed it does change.
Clearly, the issue of scope of involvement in areas of decision-making 
which have a tradition of being effectively controlled by one constituency has 
only been addressed to a limited extent in the power sharing progress of the last 
twenty-five years and today remains something of a bone of contention. A 
common concern expressed by authors, internal board members, and external
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board members alike is the lack of orientation or training given to new members. 
If boardsmanship is largely cultural and procedural, and the literature would 
suggest so, it does seem shortsighted, or perhaps a little Machiavellian, not to 
prepare new members for the rigour of shared decision-making. Seitz (1993) 
called for an extensive program of orientation for new members and identified 
the president to be responsible for ensuring that it takes place (p. 13). Further to 
the need for board training, there also exists the chance to craft board cultures 
and procedures that are unique to community colleges. This would appear 
appropriate given the uniqueness of those institutions. However, as Dennison 
and Gallagher (1986) noted:
...community colleges have had a clear opportunity to test new forms of 
internal governance, but they have tended to forfeit this opportunity.
Young as they are, most have moved very quickly to institutionalize their 
forms of government, their administrative structures, and their 
organizational patterns. The ambiguity o f their role, their lack of public 
support, and the general insecurity of their status have prompted many 
colleges to cast in stone their styles and forms of management all too 
quickly, (p. 154)
It must be concluded, therefore, that the scope of involvement by constituent 
members in the shared governance model is not consistent or well defined. The 
varying degrees o f impact by faculty, staff, and students and the ongoing clash 
between the boards’ focus on high level, long-term issues and the internal
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members’ tendency toward promotion of personal values and issues would 
confirm the uncertainty o f the external members’ involvement. It has been 
suggested that more orientation and training of board members might bring 
about more cohesion to the groups in the future.
5. An Advisory or Decision-Making Role 
and the Impact on Middle Managers
Crucial to much discussion around shared governance is the status of the 
participants, more specifically, do they have the right to provide input to those 
who will make the final decision or do they have the right to actually participate in 
making the decision? W hile much power can be derived from the former, it would 
appear to be the goal o f the aspirants to shared governance to acquire the latter. 
Allen and Glickman (1992) stressed the importance of making it clear to the 
participants in any shared governance model who, precisely, has the authority to 
make the final decision on any given issue. Moreover, they opine that there is 
nothing more demoralizing for a group to enter a process believing it is decision­
making, only to find that it has an advisory role (p. 84).
Many faculty models revolve around an advisory role noted Collins (1970) 
although there has been a tendency towards an actual decision-making role 
since that time.
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Shared governance has replaced participatory governance in our current 
lexicon. There has been a substantive shift from a governance model in 
which all constituents have a right to participate to one in which these 
same parties have a right to collaborate in making those decisions. The 
difference in the degreeism of involvement can be illustrated between the 
right to comment and the right to vote. (Lau, 1996, p. 8)
Collins also noted, and this probably remains more true today, that student 
involvement has largely been confined to an advisory role (pp. 5-6).
Hodgkinson (1974) observed that participation in decision-making is often 
seen in a different light by administrators from faculty, staff, and students:
One is also led to believe that the meaning of participation for central 
administration is quite different than participation as interpreted by 
students and faculty members who characteristically want to be near the 
center of the decision-making process. Thus, the administrative 
perspective on participation emphasizes not shared decision-making but 
rather the possibility of access to the decision-making process in the form 
of senate recommendations. For many students and faculty, this a big 
shock when they come to realize that they are not actually going to decide 
things, (pp. 135-136)
Similarly, Dominguez (1975) noted that “...board members’ attitudes towards a 
faculty role in the decision-making process was limited to the faculty offering 
advice only. They were unequivocally opposed to faculty participation in major
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decisions” (p. 25). The president’s position is often called into question in a 
shared governance model. There is a considerable school of thought to suggest 
his/her authority is automatically diminished when other constituents have a 
decision-making role, particularly in the case of board representation and 
through the senate. Trani (1997) advised presidents not to operate in isolation 
but to ensure that they retained their leadership authority:
...presidents must resist academia’s insatiable appetite for the kind of 
excessive consultation that can bring the institution to a standstill; instead, 
presidents should be given the authority they need to lead their 
institutions and manage their resources, (p. 1)
One notable impact of the advent of shared governance, whether faculty, 
staff, and students have an advisory or decision-making role, has been the 
sense of marginalization among middle managers such as deans and directors 
(Gulassa, 1989; Lovas 1994). Gulassa noted “...middle management are by­
passed or undermined by shared governance—which puts them at a 
disadvantage, especially in relation to the faculty with whom they must work" (p. 
16). Managers’ reaction to this affect has been to try to find a place in the new 
structure. As a result, administrative committees and even senates have been 
formed for administrators’ input. The primary purpose of this approach, as noted 
by Gulassa, is to make sure that those administrators, e.g. the president or vice- 
presidents, who do have a prescribed role in the formal (shared) decision-making 
structure carry to it a consensual administrative view.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
6. Structures and Relationships
Shared governance is all about structure of the participants and the 
relationships that emerge between the bodies involved in the structure and 
between the jurisdictions from which the participants have been drawn. There is 
no standard structure, and what has evolved is different structures which reflect 
the different cultures among educational institutions. McConnell (1970) observed 
notable differences in structures even among schools within the same state 
system. In a detailed study of institutions, Reyes and McCarty (1986) 
categorized structures as collegial, political, or bureaucratic. They noted that 
organizations where presidents had a strong influence tended toward collegiality 
while those where deans and other administrators held more sway tended 
toward political or bureaucratic models. Unionized organizations tended strongly 
toward bureaucracy. The type of institution was also found to influence the type 
of governance structure, as follows: major research universities—collegial; minor 
research universities—collegial/bureaucratic; doctorate granting universities— 
collegial/bureaucratic with tendency toward the latter; comprehensive 
universities—collegial; liberal arts colleges—collegial/political; and two year 
colleges—highly bureaucratic (pp. 24-26).
On the assumption that a governance structure is generally based on the 
philosophical nature of the culture of the institution, it is interesting to examine 
some of the participants’ views. McConnell (1970) quoted the American
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Association of University Professors’ principle of shared authority and 
responsibility:
Among the faculty, administration, and governing board there is an 
inescapable interdependence and these three components have joint 
authority and responsibility for governing the institution. The essential and 
overriding idea is that the enterprise is joint and there must be adequate 
communication among those components and full opportunity for 
appropriate jo int planning and effort, (p. 4)
This view is sound as far as purpose goes, but is not totally inclusive as it 
contemplates no role fo r students or support staff. Gulassa (1989) espoused that 
faculty and staff should be seen as both the means and the ends to the 
educational enterprise; in other words, faculty and staff should serve the 
institutional goal of educating students through the governance structure but that 
same structure should in turn serve faculty and staff. Epp (1992) characterized 
this model as serving mutual needs and suggested it is the “...process by which 
administrators may shift their administrative style away from the pyramid toward 
the web” (p. 3).
Lovas (1994) cited the undemoted characteristics of any effective shared 
decision-making process:
1. The process should strive to be authoritative and anti-authoritarian;
2. The process should seek to understand and explicitly recognize the 
differing kinds of authority among participants;
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3. The process should encourage that decisions to act occur closest to 
where the greatest authority for that action exists in the organization;
4. The process redefines “authorship”, establishing an ethic and a 
practice that ideas are not credited and owned by individuals in a 
collaboration; and
5. The process demands creating new ways of acknowledging individual 
participation and contribution to the outcomes and products of shared 
decisions and organizational collaborations, (pp. 11-12)
Bergquist (1993) noted that a governance model based on shared decision­
making is constructed on open dialogue. He related this to the post-modern 
foundation of voice rather than the modernist concept of vision and underscored 
the attendant need for internal communication within the decision-making body 
and externally with all the stakeholders of the institution. It would appear that the 
relationships within a shared governance structure have a degree of reliance and 
trust built into them. Wood (1995) observed “...the public [external] members’ 
lack of experience with educational institutions and their part-time, volunteer 
status made them very much dependent upon the information they received from 
the president and senior administrators" (pp. 41-42). Moreover, internal members 
bring special qualities to their relationships within the collaborative structure. 
Scherr (1994) highlighted the value of insider status, of knowing how the 
prevailing culture of an organization functions, and being able to apply that 
knowledge to the decision-making process.
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Trust plays a significantly important part in shared governance. As Deas 
(1994) noted, relationships between board and administration, even in vastly 
differing institutions, are recognized as effective and lasting where there is a 
discernible trust in one another (p. 51). In the case o f a governance model that 
extends beyond the board and administration to include other jurisdictions such 
as faculty, staff, and students, the need for trust and respect among the 
participants is viewed as absolutely crucial (Mann, 1968; Draper and Van 
Groningen, 1990; and Lovas, 1994). Draper and Van Groningen noted that 
“...mutual trust...does not necessarily imply total agreement by all participants”
(p. 11). In a similar vein, Lovas observed “...shared governance requires that 
everyone have integrity in dealing with other groups, which is hard when there 
are conflicting loyalties as we often find in the collegial environment” (p. 22). 
Ricouer (1992) has identified a norm of reciprocity, i. e. an obligation to 
others which will be returned, in organizations intent on attaining the good 
life [common good]. Alas, the obligation does not seem to be in evidence 
in the culture of college boards, (cited in Deas, 1997, p. 6)
Liontos (1994) believed that shared decision-making itself has the potential to 
build trust among the participants by challenging them to engage each other 
rather than work in isolation in the traditional “...egg-crate organization of 
schools" (p. 1).
Shared governance in colleges and schools has evolved over more than 
twenty-five years. In many cases, it amounted to a logical, natural progression
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for the institution and was entered into on a voluntary basis. Generally the 
change, at first, consisted of providing access for faculty, staff, and students to 
offer input into decision-making by the board of trustees and administration. 
Gradually, however, this has progressed through to the point where all the 
stakeholders have an active part in most areas of decision-making, if not in all. In 
other state and provincial settings, shared governance has been legislated from 
on high and, consequently, its nature has been far more prescriptive and 
involuntary. However, regardless of the route by which an educational institution 
has arrived at a collaborative decision-making structure, Carver (1990) noted 
“...no single relationship in an organization is as important as that between the 
board and its chief executive officer" (cited in Boggs, 1995, p. 27). The overriding 
principle in effective boardsmanship which seems to emerge from the literature is 
that the board makes policy and the president interprets and operationalizes the 
policy. This principle stands firm throughout various different models of shared 
governance. Hence, Carver’s contention that the “...board should think of itself 
as having only one employee, the CEO” (cited in Boggs, 1995, p.28) begins to 
make sense.
Views differ on the impact of legislated change to governance. Draper and 
Van Groningen (1990) believed that loose, enabling legislation allows an 
institution to develop a local governance model in an “...open, deliberate, and 
collegial manner” (p. 30), thereby, providing opportunity for the participants 
commensurate with their knowledge and responsibility. Draper and Van
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Groningen did note, however, that there has to be some order to the process of 
delegating formal power:
As long as a body that is legally responsible for a function retains the 
power to make, modify, or revoke a delegation of its authority regarding 
that function, the body has the means to control the performance of the 
particular function. On the other hand, if the delegation of authority is fixed 
by some external entity, the body with legal responsibility is without the 
means of controlling the exercise of the particular function through its own 
delegation of authority and revisions thereof, (p. 30)
In a study of two separate education systems where loosely legislated shared 
governance had become totally bogged down in the initial years on issues of 
mandate, jurisdiction, powers, and procedures, Deas (1996) concluded that 
“...legislated shared decision-making should be more prescriptive. The control 
built in at the outset will allow the participants to work with the process rather 
than get all hung up in the early stages and cause near fatal doubts to emerge 
[among the participants]” (p. 13). However, Kanter (1994), in relation to the 
experience of Californian community colleges, suggested that “...when behaviour 
is legislated, issues become polarized and often much more complicated than 
they were originally envisaged” (p. 229). She espoused “...the fewer rules the 
better. Rules reduce freedom and responsibility." Where differing views do, 
however, converge is in the need for clarity o f mission, no matter how it is 
achieved. Draper and Van Groningen (1990) noted “...if a person or body is
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given a clear statement of responsibility, a clear grant of authority, the resources 
necessary, and adequate time, it is entirely reasonable to hold that person or 
body fully accountable for the performance of responsibility” (p. 31).
There may be examples where an organization is effective through the 
sheer energy created by conflict within its ranks. Most views, however, of shared 
governance in education are that in order to achieve any success there must be 
a climate conducive to sharing. Comer, Haynes, Joyner, and Ben-Avie (1996) 
noted u...a post-modern shared decision-making environment has a consensus 
climate rather than one of competition. They describe such a climate as 
embracing collaboration, consensus, and communication”. To that, one might 
add a fourth uc”, the characteristic of caring as suggested by Starrat (1996).
Gulassa (1989) made the important distinction between collaboration and 
consultation in a culture of shared governance. While the latter is the general first 
step, facilitating access for stakeholders to provide input to decision-making, the 
former signifies the de facto sharing of power. He cited consultation as being a 
vehicle of the vertical structure while collaboration signifies a horizontal or 
flattened structure. Gulassa went on to note that integration, the goal of shared 
governance, can be an effective counteraction to conflict:
Integration means that...interests of all parties merge. Defensive 
strategies dominate, e.g. preservation of the organizational entity and 
protection of the interests of the members. The more management and 
union view each as competitors for coveted power and resources, the
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greater the need for strong unions and an equally strong management 
class. But if players can be persuaded to see beyond the horizons of their 
own organizational interests to the needs of the institution as a whole— 
idea integration—then all sides profit. The welfare of each discrete 
organization is biologically dependent on the health of the host institution, 
(pp. 3-4)
Lovas (1994) noted that the necessary coming together is not easily achieved, 
nor is it a swift process:
For me, shared governance requires careful consideration of...differing 
kinds of authority, arranging structures and processes to ensure the most 
authoritative members of the organization participate in the decisions 
appropriate to their authority. This notion is relatively easy to 
conceptualize, but quite difficult to operationalize. I think it’s the major 
reason that shared decision-making seems so ponderous, so time- 
consuming, and sometimes quite ineffective. The problem lies not in the 
notion of sharing but in the particular authorities of those doing the 
sharing, (p.11)
In addition to definition of roles, there is also a need to ensure that the 
players in those roles are competent. Clearly faculty, staff, and students bring 
something different to the party compared to trustees and administrators. 
However, there has to be an understanding of one another’s values and history. 
Hodgkinson (1974) questioned “...do faculty and students have a wide enough
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perspective to actually engage in policy-making for an institution?” (p. 6).
Perhaps not in the initial stages. Hackmann and Berry (1994) note that it cannot 
be presumed that faculty inherently possess leadership skills, [accordingly] any 
change model must provide for leadership development” (p. 2).
Lovas (1994) noted the need for training and staff development for all 
participants in shared decision-making bodies. Wirth (1991) suggested the need 
for all round tolerance:
Administrators have to become teachers again, exercising great patience, 
giving participants time to discover and develop. Individuals and groups 
who formerly did not share in decision-making must agree to spend 
sufficient time and energy learning new skills, (p. 2)
Flanigan (1994) echoed this statement and noted, in particular, the need for 
professional development “...which enhance[s] team facilitation, conflict 
management, decision-making, and leadership skills” (p. 10). In contrast, Young 
and Thompson (1982) recognized the need for trustees to understand the 
principle of academic freedom and the culture from which faculty emerge to 
share in governance (pp. 124-126).
Almost as important as a consensual climate and, indeed, one of the 
vehicles of consensus building is communication. Many authors cited good, 
effective communication as absolutely crucial to shared decision-making, both 
down and across the organizational structure as noted by Lovas (1994). 
Nussbaum (1995) warned against the balkanization effect that can occur,
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particularly in complex shared governance structures. Where there are several 
advisory councils, often representing each of the constituency groups, effective 
communication between them is essential to prevent them operating in a vacuum 
and developing their own, self-serving positions (p. 20). Further, Messina, 
Cearfoss, Trueblood, and Young (1994) cited communication as the virtual 
foundation for successful governance.
Consistent with good communication is visibility of decision-making. 
Stakeholders of an institution have to see decision-making as open and feel that 
they are well informed as to process, issues, discussion, and outcomes. Nason 
(1982) highlighted the important status of the college board, describing it as 
“both a bridge and a buffer between the college and the community” (cited in 
Boggs, 1995, p. 34). Gulassa (1989) noted that “...at any point where the 
decision-making process stream flows underground, bad things begin to happen, 
and those bad things include cynicism, paranoia, and distrustfullness” (p. 3).
7. The Importance of Shared Governance for Students
While one might point to the concept of a community of learning and 
increasing the body of knowledge, or even to an educational institution as a 
player in the economic community, it is generally accepted that schools’ and 
colleges' main reason for existence is students. It is, therefore, reasonable to 
question what the impact of shared governance has been on the student
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population. First, one must consider whether students are actually to be part of 
the shared governance or not, and opinions and outcomes differ on that 
question. Nason (1982) was quite emphatic that the concept of a student trustee 
is inherently flawed; he noted that "students serve too short a time to master all 
they need to know and will not be around long enough to live with the 
consequences of their decisions" (cited in Boggs, 1995, p. 30). In contrast, the 
Canadian Federation of Students (1992), in its lobby of the British Columbia 
Government regarding student representation on college boards, was able to 
make the point that representation was justified on the grounds that students 
comprise by far the largest segment of the college community (p. 2).
Liontos (1994) believed that the primary purpose and goal of shared 
decision-making should be student success. "Using it as a means to shift 
accountability or abolish a top-heavy central office staff will simply make shared 
decision-making a buzzword. Student success and achievement must be kept in 
the forefront of our thinking as the reason to implement i f  (p. 1). Mahon (1994) 
similarly justified shared governance being about and for students by tying it to 
the inverted pyramid of the total quality movement which places students at the 
top.
The Southern Methodist University (1979), in designing a new shared 
governance model, was adamant, and embodied it in the principles of the model, 
that students would henceforth play a significant role in the governing body of 
the school. Many other instances exist of institutions, o f their own volition or
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through prescribed legislation, moving to include student representatives in all 
facets of governance and decision-making. There remain, however, lingering 
doubts as to whether they are welcomed by the other stakeholders. Collins 
(1970) noted:
The faculty, administration, and trustees were described as dubious 
champions of student rights and freedoms. Without reliable protectors 
within the academic community, it was concluded that students had the 
options of securing their rights and freedoms by the exercise of raw 
power, by finding means to participate in the decision-making process, or 
by seeking judicial protection through a student bill of rights and freedoms. 
Since confrontational politics has been talked to death and since 
guarantees of students’ rights and freedoms...seems remote in [the] 
political climate, primary focus has been on the second option, inclusion of 
students in the power structure, (pp. 10-11)
Hodgkinson (1974) noted a trend during the middle and late sixties which is 
seeing itself repeated in the nineties—“1) students began to be included on 
faculty senates and other campus-wide decision-making bodies, as well as on 
boards of trustees, and 2) more and more decision-making power was taken 
over by statewide[/provincial] coordinating agencies and influenced by legislative 
politics" (p. 1). Thus, it may be said that the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh 
away, twice around.
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Has shared governance had a positive impact on students? A number of 
studies would appear to offer a positive response. Richardson and Wolverton
(1994) found that one of the eight characteristics o f high performing institutions 
was the existence of often loosely defined, participative governance structures. 
Lesser performance was clearly linked to either complex, highly structured and 
controlled decision-making environments or the absence of shared governance 
altogether (p. 46). Manilla (1979) questioned, however, if students were not likely 
to get hurt in a shared decision-making model which really only represented a 
power struggle between administrators and faculty. Thomas (1979) lauded 
consensus decision-making and noted empirical evidence that conflict in an 
institution leads to lower achievement as evidenced by test scores.
Interestingly, there is a commonly held view that benefit to students 
comes not so much from their involvement in shared governance directly but 
rather from the fact that faculty are involved (Mann, 1968 and Gulassa, 1989). 
Gulassa noted “...the more a college invests in the intellectual and scholarly 
development [in the context of power sharing] of its faculty the greater the 
difference in the meaning of life and professional work and the greater the 
success with students” (pp. 2-3).
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8. Faculty and Support Staff Attitudes
In general terms, the jury is still out on the success of shared governance 
at the college and school level. Experiences have differed from site to site, and 
outcomes have greatly depended on the reasons for introducing it in the first 
place (voluntary or involuntary), the existing culture, the presence or otherwise of 
unions, and the general attitudes and behaviour of participants. Furthermore, 
there may be differing views among the constituents about the actual level of 
participation. Drummond and Reitsch (1995) observed “It appears that there is 
some difference of opinion between faculty and administrators with regard to 
decision-making and the level of shared governance present at the institution. 
Administrators report more faculty involvement in governance procedures than 
do faculty respondents” (p. 53). Drummond and Reitsch noted that these findings 
from their study of faculty and administrator attitudes toward shared governance 
models touched on a statement made as long ago as 1918 by Veblen (1957)— 
"...administrative use o f faculty committees-for-the-sifting-of-the-sawdust give the 
appearance, but not the reality of participation, and are a nice problem in self- 
deception, chiefly notable for an endless proliferation” (cited in Drummond and 
Reitsch, p. 53).
Debow-Makino, Hill, Atwood, Murdoff, and Westphal (1993) highlighted 
the divergence o f views which appears to be quite common:
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...on many of the questions related to sharing of decisions there are sharp 
differences among the staff sub-groups. For example: a majority of full­
time faculty members believe committees have little influence on major 
decisions, but a majority of managers are persuaded they do; and a large 
majority of the College’s managers believe the administration is making 
efforts to expand participation in decision-making, but only small 
minorities of the other groups agree, (p. 6)
Much of the literature suggests that faculty, at least a majority of them, are really 
not too bothered about power sharing or getting involved in it. Dominguez (1975) 
referred to the “...pervasive ambivalence in faculty attitudes toward participation 
in decision-making” (p. 11) and noted that teachers have had a historical 
reluctance to actively engage in the type of politics necessary to acquire a place 
in democratically elected decision-making bodies. There are even some views 
that all this focus on sharing of power with regard to institutional matters has had 
a negative affect on academic matters:
Management attention to collective bargaining and reorganization (internal 
threats) and state level control of funding and curriculum (external threats) 
was perceived as inattention to instructional matters. (Stamm, 1989) 
Faculty and support staff performance in shared decision-making has 
frequently been criticized by authors, trustees, and administrators. Several 
recurring difficulties have been noted, the most basic of which Filan (1992) 
addressed was constant open competition between faculty and administration at
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the board table. He remarked that the ongoing rivalry represents a challenge for 
the board chairs to adjudicate. Furthermore, Wood (1991) reported that “support 
staff [board] members over time have lived a little close to home, that is, focused 
on internal matters and have lacked the...visionary breadth” (p. 276). A further 
example of faculty difficulties, which speaks to the testing of allegiances, was 
stated by Munitz (1995), They [faculty board members] frequently worried that 
we were cutting [the budget] too much across the board, and not singling out 
whole programs for elimination. Yet, they could not develop a consensus on 
which programs should go” (p. 11). All three examples of difficulties ascribed to 
faculty and support staff board members appear to be connected to their internal 
constituency status and personal closeness to the issues faced by college 
boards. This closeness, which at times develops into perceived or real conflict of 
interest, was, of course, one of the principal areas of inquiry in this study.
At the front and centre of all views on the progress in sharing governance 
is the continuing lack of trust among the participants. There is certainly 
suggestion that faculty and administrators, in particular, have such marked 
differences in their values of what an institution should represent that suspicion 
and defensiveness are almost inevitable. Flanigan (1994) noted “...despite this 
increased involvement [of faculty on institutional committees], both [CEOs and 
Senate Presidents] also agree that the levels of cooperation, trust, and shared 
values, quality of committee meetings, and quality of committee reports and 
recommendations to the board of trustees have not changed much with shared
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
governance” (p. 9). It should be suggested, however, that much of the 
ambivalence or even hostility to shared governance expressed by faculty is 
directed to the context of shared governance in an advisory capacity and 
perhaps reflects that satisfaction can only be attained with full decision-making 
power.
One of the big complications in the development o f shared governance is 
its parallel existence with the development of trade unionism in the college and 
school sectors. The two institutions (governance and unionism) appear different 
yet related, independent yet overlapping, and cause a high level of confusion 
and tension which is worthy of examination in this study. There is much in the 
literature to suggest that the interests of both institutions are best served when 
they are kept apart. However, The Academic Senate for California Community 
Colleges (1996), in its position paper Developing a model for Effective 
Senate/Union Relations, favours a much more collaborative approach. For 
example, it suggests that senates and unions should set out their objectives with 
regard to academic and professional policies and conditions of employment 
respectively. Thereafter, “...it is essential that the two bodies communicate 
regularly, settle their differences directly, and do not let outside forces 
[unspecified] pit the two organizations against one another” (p. 4). Moreover, the 
statement is made that “Faculty are best served by having two strong 
organizations, both promoting faculty interests and their commitment to
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academic excellence and integrity" (p. 5). There appears to be clear indication 
here of the link between shared governance and the perceived welfare of faculty.
One of the major barriers to getting faculty and staff involved in shared 
decision-making is considered to be the low level or non-existence of release 
time from regular duties. Flanigan (1994) cited lack of release time, along with 
distrust between the participants, and faculty interest as the three key barriers to 
a faculty role in shared governance. Liontos (1994) suggested that release time 
is the single greatest barrier. However, there is another side to the argument as 
noted by Wirth (1991):
Teaching and learning may become secondary priorities. Representatives 
[engaged in shared governance] miss time away from work or the 
classroom. This is a major problem and creates havoc with scheduling 
and program/curriculum development. Some shared governance 
participants become more interested and involved in the coordination 
effort than their instructional or work assignments, (p. 2)
Obviously, the issue of too little or too much release time is really an extension of 
the issue of what is the purpose of shared governance, is it sharing of power or a 
shifting of power?
Support staff views to some extent mirror those of faculty, but there is also 
a status thing with, perhaps, staff not being as convinced about their acceptance 
in the shared governance structure. Wirth (1991) noted that “...classified 
participants report that there is a feeling that their participation may be token,
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that even though they may speak, their voices may not be heard or considered” 
(p. 2). However, in states where colleges have created a series of councils or 
senates to individually represent constituency groups, Nussbaum (1995) found 
that support staff had generally taken the opportunity to form classified councils 
or senates. He explained “The notion has been that collective bargaining 
framework is not the appropriate arena into which to bring shared governance 
and the broad spectrum of policies in running a college” (p. 14).
Wirth (1991) discussed whether participation in shared decision-making is 
really all that attractive to faculty and staff. She noted that, although participation 
is likely to satisfy affiliation and esteem needs in Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
(1954), participation, in itself, is unlikely to produce the self-actualization that can 
only come from a role that offers opportunity for achievement, growth, 
development, and challenge (p. 4). Perhaps this explains the results of studies 
reported by McConnell (1970) that suggested two thirds of faculty tend never to 
get involved in any advisory or decision-making capacity. However, Drummond 
and Reitsch (1995), in a study of faculty and administration attitudes toward 
shared governance, found that more satisfaction was expressed by both groups 
when the level of shared governance in which they participated was greater 
when judged against the authors’ scale o f constituency involvement (p. 55). 
Drummond and Reitsch noted that faculty sought a sense of real belonging in 
the decision-making model, not the sense of token inclusion feared by Plante 
(1989):
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...to one who nurtures contemplative leanings, as many faculty do, no 
sense of self-worth is enhanced and no feelings of membership in a 
serious enterprise is promoted when one is asked to interrupt work on a 
manuscript or on class preparation to join administrators who are acting 
out of heavy-handed good intentions, or, worse yet, are making a 
calculated attempt to appear open and nonautocratic, and so think it time 
to touch base with the faculty, (cited in Drummond and Reitsch, pp. 55-56) 
Lovas (1994) explored another possible reason why relatively few faculty 
are motivated to participate in shared decision-making. He suggested the natural 
tendency of faculty, as spawned from years of scholarship, is toward individual 
authorship and decision-making. Therefore, there is a reluctance to be involved 
in what amounts to group authorship through shared decision-making. Certainly, 
the incentive of reward for involvement in shared decision-making does not seem 
to be a significant issue for faculty. In a study of faculty at private and public 
universities, Miller, McCormick, and Norman (1996) found that “...the 
respondents from the private university were less supportive of the ideal that 
faculty should be rewarded for participation in the governance process...” 
(abstract, p. 1). Finally, Hodgkinson (1974) highlighted the dichotomy of 
adversarial collective bargaining and collaborative decision-making in an 
institution, often potentially involving the same players, as a disincentive to 
faculty who are not prepared to do a juggling act with their values and beliefs 
(cited in Deas, 1996).
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It would appear, therefore, that shared governance is something that is 
much sought after by faculty and support staff. Once achieved, however, it 
seems that relatively few employees actually tend to get involved. In addition, 
there is a complicated link between shared governance and labour relations with 
many writers suggesting that the two should be kept separate, but members of 
senate and union executives advocating alliance and collaboration for the 
common benefit of faculty, in particular.
Shared Governance in Financial Affairs
Educators have somewhat simplistic views about funding of education— 
there is never enough and there should be. However, as Rollins (1972) noted 
“...when budgets are critically examined, educators naively express surprise, 
expecting legislators to continue accepting their requests without too much 
scrutiny and with few strings attached” (p. 2). In the last twenty-five years, there 
has been a notable tightening of public funding of education along with greater 
and continuous calls for more accountability.
Faculty, support staff, and students have not traditionally had a prominent 
role in fiscal priority setting and decision-making in the mature university 
governance structure or in the emerging college and school structures. Rather, 
as noted by Deas (1994), they have looked to the board of trustees for the fiscal 
assurance that all is well. As a result of this practice, financial affairs has been
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one of the strongest components of the close relationship between the board 
and administration. In addition to general fiscal stewardship, the most important 
issue dealt with in this relationship has been the setting of priorities and the 
allocation of resources because in spite of what educators might expect of 
funding levels, they are never quite sufficient and as Rollins (1972) noted 
“...community colleges [and other sectors of education] cannot afford to be all 
things to all people” (p. 7).
The need for planning in financial matters is as strong as it is for any other 
aspect of education, and greater than most. In addition, it cannot be done well if 
in isolation of other aspects:
It is obvious that fiscal planning which realistically links academic 
aspirations with revenues available for both a short term and a long term 
period is sorely needed. It’s time for all of us [educators] to fight the battle 
of the budget together—and not merely by going to the public trough 
pleading for more and more funds. We need to prove to our publics that 
we are currently getting a dollar’s worth of value out of each dollar spent. 
(Rollins, 1972, pp. 2-3)
Hence, not only is the case being made for accountability but also for an 
approach involving all educational constituents when traditionally the power and 
responsibility has rested solely with the board and administration.
There is not total acceptance that a planned, coordinated, and justified 
approach to the fiscal development of education is the only way to go. There
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remains, as noted by Rollins (1972), the anti-planning faction which argues that 
educational growth (and presumably contraction) is solely at the discretion of the 
politicians, whose constant vacillating renders it pointless to plan extensively. 
Rollins noted, and experience since then has reinforced it, that a planned 
approach is necessary, however, to protect the educational share o f the public 
purse, and that approach must be a coordinated one involving all stakeholders:
A humanistic view must be incorporated into the whole planning process. 
Institutional morale is a delicate thing, and if lost through some cold 
impersonal political and economic process, is difficult to recover. 
Therefore, fiscal planning should be sufficiently democratic so that those 
affected by the decisions have the opportunity to supply input and be 
involved to the greatest extent possible, (p. 5)
As in other aspects of decision-making, the need for clear, effective 
communications in financial affairs has been stressed extensively (Rollins, 1972 
and Miller, 1993). Never is that need greater than on the, not infrequent, 
occasion of budget cutting which is perhaps the most traumatic and threatening, 
and often divisive, event in the educational lifespan.
The classic dilemma facing any institution in a budget reduction exercise 
is determining the basis of the cuts. The choice between making reductions 
across the board and targeting specific areas in a strategic manner, based on 
some sort o f sound rationale, can never be made easily (Smith, 1975, Griffith, 
1993, and Miller, 1993). Most educational views, although not always shared by
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unions, lean toward strategic reductions rather than starving everyone, the latter 
described by Smith as “...[leading] to an inevitable weakening of the fabric of the 
university as a whole—a choice for universal mediocrity or worse" (p. 4).
However, if cuts are to be selective, there remains the difficult task of choosing 
where. Phillips (1996) observed that, of all the aspects in the shared decision­
making agenda, developing budgets is the least desirable task to be undertaken 
by teachers in a high school (abstract, p. 1). This reluctance is likely to be largely 
true of faculty in the college sector as well. Chaffe (1982) noted that behaviour 
during a period of budget reductions takes on political characteristics, rather than 
the rational qualities that are looked for in a climate of shared decision-making. It 
is suggested that, while conventional wisdom advances the involvement of all 
stakeholders in decisions around cutting budgets, the nature of the task is likely 
the single greatest threat to shared decision-making itself with the high risk of 
tearing constituencies apart. Indeed, the problem may rest with the urgency of 
budget cuts causing Griffith to comment that a financial crisis requires a surgical 
rather than a consultative response which speaks against the culture of 
democratic, shared governance.
Smith (1975) offered the view, however, that notwithstanding the urgency 
and the trauma of deciding budget cuts, more effective decisions will continue to 
be made when all stakeholders have a role to play. He noted that “...faculty 
assume primary responsibility for the quality, health, and usefulness of its 
academic programs. If this is not done [in times of fiscal hardship in particular],
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then the reason for being a community of scholars with general responsibility for 
the recovery, organization, dissemination, and enhancement o f knowledge is 
abandoned” (p. 4). It is further suggested that the sort of data upon which budget 
cuts are to be based requires the careful evaluation of programs, thus ensuring 
the academic credibility which is also required when a more positive financial 
climate later rolls around. Nussbaum (1995), however, expressed concern that a 
budget constructed in a shared governance model is “...cobbled together...[and, 
invariably not] in the best interests o f students, the system, and the state” (p. 23). 
By this, he meant that such a budget is likely to reflect differing views—the board 
and administration espousing the common good while the senate and unions 
pursue local vested interests. A budget, after all, is just a numerical reflection of 
values and objectives and, if there is wide diversity among the value and 
objectives in a college, the budget w ill simply reflect that diversity.
There has been a recent tendency, in particular where states and 
provinces have not pursued policies of centralization, for greater democratization 
at the local level in regard to fiscal affairs. Institutions are addressing the finding 
of the balance between the need for traditionally narrow stewardship and the 
value of shared decision-making on priority setting and resource allocation. The 
ever changing financial climate facing institutions, especially where the 
dependence on direct grants is greatest, places a strain on the shared 
governance structure which only time and experience may ease. However, 
Nussbaum (1995) placed faith in shared decision-making:
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Running a college, particularly during times of limited budgets, requires 
countless decisions to be made regarding competing values. Shared 
governance mechanisms provide the arena where these values can be 
expressed, where conflicts can be addressed, and where priorities can be 
established. Through shared governance, communication is enhanced, 
opportunities for buy-in are increased, and there is a greater likelihood 
that the decisions are neither arbitrary nor uninformed, (p. 19)
A second consideration in comparing shared governance in a general 
sense to that of a financial context is the issue of stakeholder involvement on an 
advisory or decision-making basis. While the general tendency is toward the 
latter, there remains an argument toward the former in financial matters on the 
basis of trying to avoid vested interest. A case can be mounted for the neutrality 
and independence of the board and administration in making decisions around 
allocation of resources which contrasts with the academic stewardship upon 
which faculty might base their right to be involved. Breneman (1995) further 
suggested that the shared governance model is not necessarily best equipped 
for making difficult financial decisions. “The collegial nature of most colleges and 
institutions, emphasizing consultation and shared decision-making, seems poorly 
suited to the sorts of wrenching changes that lie ahead” (cited in Munitz, 1995, p. 
12). Certainly, decisions that relate to increases or decreases in budget 
invariably bring internal board members into the spotlight when their program or 
department is under review. It is all very well for the faculty, staff, or student
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member to excuse him/herself from discussion and decision-making around that 
particular issue, but, in reality, all components of a budget are integrated and 
interrelated, and the member who is in conflict of interest on one issue in the 
budget is technically in conflict on all issues in the budget. Consequently, if the 
member is then unable to participate in consideration of the budget at all, then is 
the member really fulfilling his/her obligations to the board? This question is at 
the heart of the issue as to whether internal board members are able to function 
appropriately in general decision-making and, in particular, in financial decision­
making. This issue is one of the major focuses of this study.
Shared Governance in Labour Relations
One of the most important, and at times volatile, areas of governance in 
education is labour relations. This has become increasingly so in the college and 
school sectors where the growth of unionism has been extensive and profound.
In universities, the growth has not been so marked, perhaps because of the long 
established academic collegiality among the stakeholders. Certainly, the conflict 
of interest faced by internal college board members in the area of labour 
relations is well documented. Wood (1995) suggested “Institutional [internal] 
members should have proportional representation on all board committees, 
except, in the case of employee members, those dealing with labour relations”
(p. 51). It is interesting to note that neither Wood nor, for example, the guidelines
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on conflict of interest of board members issued by the British Columbia Ministry 
of Education, Skills and Training identified student board members as having 
conflict of interest in labour matters. And yet, often the decisions made by boards 
during contract negotiations can lead to strikes or increases to employees' 
compensation, both of which can ultimately affect students directly. Specifically, 
the former can interrupt their education while the latter can cause possible 
increases to tuition fees in order to fund the escalating costs.
Is there permanent incompatibility between collective bargaining and 
shared governance? Hodgkinson (1974) noted that “...many respondents [in a 
study] felt that the existence of a collective bargaining unit on the campus would 
immediately do in the campus senate [the flagship of shared governance]” (p. 
153). He also highlighted the dichotomy of adversarial collective bargaining and 
collaborative decision-making in an institution, often involving the same players 
(cited in Deas, 1996). Nussbaum (1995) detected some muddying of the waters 
through legislation in terms of who is responsible for what in collective 
bargaining. AB 1725, the founding legislation of shared governance in the 
California community college system, prescribed a role for the academic senates 
(in concert with the boards) on “matters of hiring criteria for new faculty, retreat 
rights for administrators, and equivalency processes for determining instructor 
qualifications” (p. 9). These matters might reasonably be considered issues 
which management and unions would negotiate into collective agreements. 
Hence, there is a clear overlapping o f interests in two separate areas of
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engagement—one purportedly collegial and consultative (boards/senates) and 
one often confrontational (boards/unions). From a different perspective, Gulassa 
(1989) reported on the serious concern about the impact shared decision-making 
on the allocation of resources within the budget process would have on collective 
bargaining, in effect amounting to a separate set of negotiations away from the 
bargaining table (p. 7). Thomas (1979) noted that unions face the dilemma of 
whether to trade shared governance for traditional hard-nosed collective 
bargaining (pp. 2-3). Again, this suggests that there can only be a dominance of 
one over the other.
Messina, Cearfoss, Trueblood, and Young (1994) suggested a distinction 
between the two (shared governance and collective bargaining) and the room for 
coexistence:
Governance is not intended to interfere in any way with the collective 
bargaining process, nor should the collective bargaining process interfere 
in any way with governance. Recommendations regarding collective 
bargaining matters may not be made by the senates. Efforts shall be 
made to clarify the distinction between collective bargaining and 
governance issues affecting faculty and support staff. Further, officers, 
board members, other representatives or negotiators of collective 
bargaining units may not serve simultaneously as officers, board 
members, representatives or in any other elected or appointed capacity of 
their respective senates, (p. 31)
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A certain clarity and division of responsibilities is suggested but, given the fact 
that few faculty and staff choose to get involved in either sphere o f influence, the 
division may be difficult to actually achieve. In addition, the division of 
responsibilities did not occur in British Columbia where, by accident or design, 
many employee and student board members happened to be ranking officers in 
their trade or student unions, often serving as presidents. This particular 
occurrence was examined in detail in the study. Polishook and Naples (1989) 
cited legislation in the California community college system which attempts to 
provide a legal distinction between collective bargaining and shared governance 
in order to keep them apart. However, Douglas (1979) noted that collective 
bargaining and shared governance inevitably conflict with one another and 
stated that “...faculties seek to manage and...by their very actions...tend to blur 
the principle of mutually exclusive spheres of management and employee 
legitimacy” (p. 4). On the other hand, Lavine and Lemon (1975) observed that 
“...collective bargaining should be permitted on economic issues related to 
[faculty and staff] roles as employees, while professional and academic issues 
should be dealt with through shared governance mechanisms" (p. 15). This 
might suggest that shared governance should not extend to financial matters and 
the question of allocation of resources.
Polishook and Naples (1989) noted that the collegial nature of shared 
governance tends to contrast sharply with the confrontational nature of collective 
bargaining, although they held out the hope that the existence o f both might lead
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to a softening of the relationships at the bargaining table, particularly after a 
number of years. However, Rhoades (1993) illustrated the existence of 
retrenchment clauses in collective agreements as an example of the different 
direction taken to the principle of tenure which would be upheld in a shared 
governance culture. He cited this as indicative of the clash between 
confrontational and collaborative values surfacing in educational institutions (pp. 
341-343). Further to this seemingly irreversible division, Deas (1996) questioned 
whether successful shared governance can actually be spawned from 
confrontational collective bargaining as has been the result of contract 
negotiations in several college systems.
There are strong suggestions that collective bargaining can have a 
directly positive affect on shared decision-making, that affect being to 
“strengthen" (Polishook and Naples, 1989), “underpin” (American Association of 
University Professors, 1987), and “protect” (Lavine and Lemon, 1975). Lavine 
and Lemon noted that the typical characteristics of a faculty collective agreement 
such as no strikes, no lockouts, compulsory binding mediation and arbitration 
provisions separate it from an industrial contract and speak more to the collegial 
climate, consistent with shared governance, than they do the traditional labour 
relations climate in industry (pp. 32-33). (It should be noted that the inclusion of 
such clauses in collective agreements may not be as typical today). Polishook 
and Naples cited an example in the California State University system where the 
collective bargaining and shared governance structures can actually come
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together as happened in the response to state budget submissions by union, 
faculty senate, and administration in a “tripartite process.” There are, however, 
other examples where the values espoused in bargaining and shared 
governance are far apart and seem unlikely to be reconciled, as in the case of 
the National Association of Scholars’ charge that the American Association of 
University Professors’ defence of race and gender based hiring jeopardizes the 
academic freedom that has long been championed by faculty and promoted in 
shared governance (1995).
So far, this review has focused on the interaction of labour relations and 
shared governance from the viewpoint of individual faculty members. Unions, 
reflecting the policy of the body corporate, have tended to be antagonistic toward 
shared governance noted Polishook and Naples (1989). Piland and Butte (1991), 
in a study of trustees, were left with a split view on the suggestion that unions 
work against college goals (pp. 8-9). This may suggest that unions are not 
natural partners in shared governance. Certainly, Starrat (1996) noted that 
partners in shared decision-making, as agents of change, are always likely to 
meet headlong with unions and special interest groups (cited in Deas, 1996). 
However, Covey (1996) took a different view and saw unions as able to play a 
role in a collaborative culture:
Trade unionism is merely protectionism, the necessity for which 
diminishes with the building of trust and the creation of a learning 
environment. I am not against unionism, I am against management
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practices that cause unionism to flourish. In a progressive learning 
environment, unions become communication vehicles not barriers or 
agents of confrontation.
There remains, nevertheless, the lingering doubt, particularly in the university 
area, that unionism is a threat to the academic ideal. Cameron (1996) stated that 
“...unionism stands in potential opposition to academic self-government which is, 
in turn, one of the pillars underpinning academic freedom” (P. 8). Drummond and 
Reitsch (1995) found that the greater the level of shared governance in an 
institution, the more the likelihood that collective bargaining will not be as 
confrontational or as widespread in its scope as would otherwise be the case (p. 
57).
Examination of the issues that faculty want included in collective 
bargaining have [sic] revealed that faculty working in institutions with 
strong shared governance tend to limit the collective bargaining to salary 
and work conditions, while those in institutions with weak or unsuccessful 
shared governance want to extend the bargaining to cover academic 
issues. [Accordingly]...the more influence a faculty member believes 
his/her department has over academic issues the less they want to 
bargain it. (Ponak, Thompson, and Zerbe, 1992, cited in Drummond and 
Reitsch, p. 57)
Shark, Brouder, and Miller (1975) studied the impact on students of the 
growth, jointly and severally, of collective bargaining and shared governance.
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They predicted that, just as students have found a legitimate role in the latter, 
there is room for them in the bargaining process on the basis that bargaining 
comprises parties with vested interests. It was noted that the process of 
negotiation affects the quality, content, style, and cost o f programs and services; 
and this has a direct impact on students, hence the notion o f vested interest. 
Furthermore, negotiation of economic benefits for employees tends to have a 
direct affect on the economic status of students by leading to tuition fee 
increases (pp. 1-4). In the intervening twenty-three years since Shark’s study, 
the vested interest of students has been consistently confirmed but the evolution 
of a role for students in the collective bargaining process has not materialized to 
any extent. Nussbaum (1995) viewed collective bargaining in the college sector 
as an extension of shared governance in contrast to the virtual unilateral 
approach to labour relations prior to collective bargaining:
In terms of shared governance, the advent of collective bargaining was a 
watershed event. Governing boards were not only required to involve an 
internal constituency (their employees) but also, for the first time, to share 
their authority to act. Under collective bargaining, the governing board 
essentially had to have the agreement of the appropriate exclusive 
representative before it could act on matters within the scope of 
bargaining. If agreement was not reached and a governing board acted, 
an elaborate set of external dispute resolution procedures was made 
available to test the legality of the governing board’s action, (p. 7)
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The suggested incompatibility between labour relations and shared 
governance, which has brought widely contrasting views of agreement and 
disagreement, perhaps becomes more focused in the actual task of collective 
bargaining. In the context of governance councils as advisory bodies within 
shared governance structures, The Academic Senate for California Community 
Colleges tended to see such councils as a potential threat to undermine 
academic senates and unions (abstract, p. 1). Furthermore, the danger of 
collective bargaining issues sliding into the agenda o f governance councils was 
expressed:
If academic senates and bargaining agents choose to participate in such 
a [governance] council, several factors should be kept in mind. Academic 
senate members should not be drawn into discussion of bargainable 
issues in an inappropriate forum such as a governance council.
Bargaining agent representatives should not be party to such a council 
usurping the role of the senate in academic and professional matters. 
Discussions of the appropriate roles of the bargaining agent and the 
senate should take place directly between the two organizations, (p. 6) 
This view speaks again to the formation of alliances between employee players 
in the shared governance model and their unions, as has been noted in the 
British Columbia situation and which was examined in this study. Additionally, 
there is difficulty in determining the ideal representation of management on its 
side of the negotiating table. Piland and Butte (1991) found that trustees strongly
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disagreed with the notion that they should be directly involved, presumably 
preferring to leave it to the administration assisted by outside help if required.
The notion of the board “...remaining in the background, limiting its role to major 
decisions, encouragement of the management team, and ratification of the 
contract” (p. 39) was suggested by Seitz (1993). That administrators have been 
given this difficult mantle may tend to explain why Polishook and Naples (1989) 
reported negative administrative views on both shared governance and collective 
bargaining, citing them as “...forums to provide two bites at the same apple” (p.
5). They noted some dismay among university presidents following the arrival of 
faculty unions when it was said “...but they promised that the senates would 
disappear when the union was elected” (p. 6). Administrators would, therefore, 
appear to be suggesting that there is a not so great distinction between collective 
bargaining and shared governance. However, Filan (1992) described the attitude 
toward collective bargaining that participants in a shared governance model 
expressed as a “balancing act”. He contrasted the inclusiveness of shared 
governance, irrespective of constituency, with the exclusiveness, often hostile, of 
collective bargaining (p. 4). Piland, Lovell, and Janes (1981) proposed a team 
management model including faculty and administration that could even include 
divisional chairs, traditionally elected from the faculty, on the management team 
for negotiations with the faculty union. They noted that such representation 
would break down barriers and encourage better understanding o f the issues 
which sometimes get clouded in the heat of the negotiations battle (pp. 17-18).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
117
However, there remains the huge question as to whether unionized 
participants, in any collaborative model that touches on collective bargaining, 
could ever be truly independent. For, as Wood (1991) found, there is a clear 
expectation on the part o f trade unions, and with it pressure is brought to bear, 
that employee board members will represent the best interests o f the unions in 
board activities and decision-making. This expectation makes it difficult for 
individual employee board members to live up to the ideal of being members-at- 
large with the interests o f the whole college, the common good, as their goal (p. 
267). Consequently, boards, when dealing with sensitive labour issues, have 
tended to move much o f the business to in-camera meetings with the express 
intention of excluding internal board members, or at least compelling them to 
observe oaths of confidentiality (p. 268).
It would appear that the last twenty-five years has not really provided any 
clear indication of whether labour relations and shared governance can 
peacefully coexist. In terms of forging a relationship between two apparently 
disparate cultures, it may be that a longer period o f time is required.
The Advantages and Disadvantages of Shared Governance
It was stated that shared governance is not a precise science, and that 
has been demonstrated in the many differing observations noted. It can differ 
from institution to institution and can mean different things to the participants
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depending upon their background and values. It is hardly surprising, then, that
there is a fairly even split between advantages and disadvantages of shared
governance according to the literature.
Advantages of Shared Governance
• Fosters greater understanding and acceptance of decisions by the entire 
institutional community (Draper and Van Groningen, 1990);
• Encourages long term planning in preference to quick, short term decision­
making (Lovas, 1994);
• Leads to institutions which are better equipped to pursue the common good, 
both for themselves and for society in general (Carver, 1997);
• Empowers the participants and, by extension, those from whom they are 
drawn (Wirth, 1991);
• Focuses on utilizing the expertise of professionals within an institution, 
reflecting the norms and values of an academic community, modeling 
democratic thought and increasing job satisfaction and commitment (Wood, 
1995);
• Leads to more intense commitment on the part of stakeholders to implement 
the decisions (Draper and Van Groningen);
• Facilitates the development of collegial relationships and an improved 
environment within the institution (Wirth);
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• Can lead to productivity from faculty and staff as they have ownership in the 
operation and can lead, consequently, to student success (Gulassa, 1989);
• Provides an avenue for the constituents to develop a greater breadth of 
understanding of the issues faced by education in general and their institution 
in particular (Wirth);
• Facilitates increased meeting of employee needs for self-identity, autonomy, 
achievement, and psychological growth (Draper and Van Groningen);
• Reduces the influence and bias of the president and senior administrators on 
boards on account of the presence of internal constituency members (Wood);
• Provides opportunities for conflict resolution even in cases of divergent 
objectives, through consultation and joint decision-making (Draper and Van 
Groningen);
• May lead to improved communications across campus (Wirth); and
• May lead to leadership training and other professional development for 
faculty, staff, and students (Draper and Van Groningen).
Disadvantages of Shared Governance
• Has a time-consuming reputation, for the decision-making process itself as 
well as for the various groups involved, with a likely significant impact on 
administrators (Draper and Van Groningen, 1990);
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• Can lead to the ‘balkanization’ of the decision-making process whereby 
shared governance slows down and fails to meet the immediate need of a 
rapidly changing environment (Flanigan, 1994);
• Discriminates between board members because institutions do not provide 
adequate levels of training for internal members (Filan, 1992);
• Requires recognition of the appropriate role o f administrators, faculty, staff, 
students, and trustees (Wirth, 1991);
• Suffers because it is perceived as costly in terms of time and money 
(Gulassa, 1989);
• Slows the college response to societal change and community demands, 
thereby striking at the very purposes of such institutions (Nussbaum, 1995; 
Baliles, 1996);
• Results in greater difficulty for administrators in implementing new programs 
and otherwise meeting their responsibilities because they have to spend 
more time implementing the shared governance process (Lovas, 1994);
• Effectiveness is hampered by the making of decisions by individuals with 
limited expertise (Draper and Van Groningen);
• Viewed by outsiders as self-serving because special interest groups have a 
tendency to focus more on their needs than on the global needs of the 
institution (Flanigan);
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• Systematically undermines and weakens the office of the president through 
the actions o f the other participants in the shared decision-making process 
(Baliles);
•  Runs the risk that teaching and learning may become secondary priorities as 
representatives spend time away from work and the classroom (Wirth);
• Results in middle managers who are uninformed about matters they will be 
called upon to implement on account of their potential exclusion from 
decisions made through shared governance committees (Draper and Van 
Groningen);
• Tends, itself, to be bureaucratic in nature while shared governance is often 
cited as the alternative to bureaucracy (Lovas); and
• Identifying responsibility, authority, and accountability is not always clearly 
managed among the range of participants and participant groups (Wirth).
Summary
The passage of time since shared governance became topical in the 
community college context has made interesting reading in the considerable 
amount of literature available on the subject. It seems that the tentativeness and 
philosophical diversity of the 70’s was replaced by a dogged determination to 
make shared governance work in the 80’s and that, in turn, has been replaced 
by a period of reflection and, not a little, doubt in the 90’s. Throughout the three
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decades, authors have divided into proponents, standing on the side of 
inclusiveness and even moral justification, and detractors, citing the very real 
issue of self-interest on the part of board members who coincidentally are 
members of the faculty, support staff, and student constituencies. In some ways 
the issues of those early days are still with us today and seem no nearer to any 
satisfactory resolution.
In the midst of the confusion, however, there are several strong themes 
that emerge from the writings on shared governance which served as the basis 
for this particular study. One of the most basic issues is the actual role of the 
board itself. Given that colleges are democratic organizations in which a good 
many of the stakeholders have the ability to control their own affairs, it might 
seem that boards are an unnecessary layer of officialdom. However, there is 
strong indication that the boards play an important role in providing the high 
level, long term vision that colleges need but are not particularly inclined to 
explore. Two further points arise from this designated purpose for boards—1) 
some body has to take the long term view because no one else will, not even the 
presidents whose tenure is far too insecure to allow anything other than a short 
term perspective, and 2) it seems entirely appropriate that all the stakeholders 
have a say in the long term future of institutions, hence the inclusion of internal 
members on boards. Shared decision-making is seen as being more ethical than 
any hierarchical form of governance and it is, at the same time, both reflective of 
and a major contributory to the climate of an institution.
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There are doubts about the ability of boards. Some express concerns 
about the commitment and knowledge of the external members but acknowledge 
their independence and connection to the general community. While others 
acknowledge the commitment and knowledge of the internal members but 
express concerns about their real or perceived conflict of interest. The two 
groups, internal and external, certainly seem to exist as separate entities in 
virtually all the literature. Their differences form the basis of most of the 
scholarship. Perhaps the reason for the emphasis on differences is the fact 
colleges are not by nature collegial organizations; and there is a long history of 
confrontation between boards and administrations on one side and faculty, staff, 
and students on the other. Consequently, bringing the combatants together in 
the shared governance model does not necessarily make for a marriage made in 
heaven. There is much said of the need for trust in the relationships that form the 
structure of shared governance, but little evidence that the trust is generally 
there.
Both the USA and Canada have witnessed, along with the growth in 
shared decision-making, a tendency toward centralization of decision-making at 
the state or provincial level. Of course, the latter serves to diminish the impact of 
the former. However, it has also been recorded extensively that participative 
decision-making tends to undermine the status of presidents who no longer have 
virtual absolute authority. Conversely, presidents are now viewed as having a 
more prominent role in dealing with external agencies, and so it is clear that they
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have been at the forefront of change during this period under review. As a result, 
presidents have had to acquire new sets of leadership skills in order to fulfill the 
expectations of their office.
One of the most forceful themes to emerge from the literature was the 
necessity for clear procedures to make shared decision-making work. However, 
opinions were split on whether such procedures should be developed internally, 
to reflect the local culture, or externally, to avoid self-interest. There was virtual 
unanimity that shared decision-making is a tedious, time-consuming process. 
Willingness to endure such hardships clearly varies according to the degree of 
philosophical value that the constituents placed on shared decision-making. 
Again, however, most writers could agree on the need for the decision-making 
process to be open to scrutiny through extensive communication with all the 
stakeholders.
The inclusion of internal constituents—faculty, staff, and students—on 
boards of governance was bound to have an impact on those people. However, 
the results were surprising. Students seem to have made little headway as a 
group although test scores would underline the value of a collegial atmosphere 
in which to study. Support staff seem to suffer something of an inferiority 
complex in terms of their relationship with external board members, 
administration and faculty. Staff also appeared to have difficulty sorting out the 
relationship between unions and governance bodies and the overlap o f their 
interests. The pursuit of self-interests rather than the common good was a
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common charge leveled at staff and faculty board members and forms probably 
the greatest general argument against shared governance. It was, of course, one 
of the main themes of this study. Faculty, who were by far the most vociferous 
champions of shared governance, have also tended to make the greatest 
contribution toward it from among the internal constituents. However, it is not 
clear that the advancements over the past twenty-five years have brought any 
greater degree of harmony and trust to college campuses. This may be because 
relatively few faculty actually want to get involved in governance in spite of the 
large-scale interest in the philosophy.
This study of shared decision-making focused on general matters and 
also those connected with financial affairs and labour relations. The research 
questions anticipated that board members would profess problems related to the 
two latter areas. That anticipation was very much underscored by the literature. 
Internal members faced the strongest charge of conflict of interest in matters of 
the budget where they have personal interest and several aspects of labour 
relations, the most notable of which would be contract negotiations. The latter 
also served to illustrate the overt alliances formed between unions and unionized 
members of boards which made authors and external members uneasy. Clearly 
many employees and students have viewed the changes in governance more as 
a shifting of power than a sharing of power. The evolution of shared governance 
remains incomplete and should provide fruitful content for study for some time to 
come.
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CHAPTER III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter details the research methodology which was applied in the 
study. In a study which is based solely on the views of a population, in this case 
the board members of the colleges and university colleges covered by the 
College and Institute Act o f British Columbia, it is important that the process for 
gathering the views and the instrument to achieve that task are effective, fair, 
totally inclusive, and easily understandable by the participants. Furthermore, the 
techniques used to sort and analyze the data obtained from the participants must 
be statistically sound and accurate. The research methodology in this study 
contains the highest level of integrity that is obtainable and has been applied 
with a similar level of rigour.
The survey questionnaire represents a refinement of the instrument used 
in a similar study carried out by the researcher in early 1996. In addition, the 
questionnaire was reviewed by colleagues in the British Columbia post­
secondary system. Several questions were added, deleted, and modified as a 
result of input from this source as well as from the researcher’s dissertation 
committee. Further, the process of distributing the questionnaires, arranging for 
their collection, and following-up to encourage additional participation was similar
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to the approach adopted in the earlier study which had proved successful. As a 
senior administrator in the British Columbia post-secondary education system, 
the researcher is both familiar with the system and the structure of governing 
boards within it. Accordingly, this background facilitated entry to the population 
and execution of the study.
Methodological Overview
The purpose of this study was to examine three aspects of leadership 
through shared governance:
• the sharing of power,
• the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and
• how real or perceived conflict of interest on account of the employment 
or student status o f some of the board members has been addressed.
These aspects of leadership were studied in three particular contexts:
• board decision-making in general matters of business,
• board decision-making in financial matters, and
• board decision-making in the field of labour relations.
Therefore, the conceptual framework of the study took the form of a matrix with 
the aspects of leadership interacting with the contexts in which they are placed.
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The views of all board members were sought relative to the contextual 
aspects noted above and were gathered in such a way as to allow fo r the 
following analysis and comparison:
• between colleges, without making distinction between the 
constituents;
• between constituents, without making distinction between the 
colleges they represent; and
• by total population, in a form that permitted comparison to the 
results obtained in a similar study conducted by the researcher in 
early 1996.
Research Design
The focus of this investigation was to study the views of board members 
in the British Columbia college system. The intended outcome of the study, in 
addition to generally adding to the body of knowledge, was to essentially 
evaluate the shared governance structure and procedures in the province. Both 
views and attitudes toward shared governance in general and specific to the 
participants’ own institutions were sought. Accordingly, the technique selected by 
the researcher to best meet the requirements of the study was an explanatory 
survey by way of a questionnaire. Ary, Jacobs, & Razavieh (1990) noted “An 
explanatory survey is a form of causal-comparative research,...[it] seeks to
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explain attitudes and behaviour on the basis of data gathered at a point in time” 
(p. 407).The population under review encompasses the potential participation of 
seventeen institutions and approximately two hundred and fifty-five members. 
Therefore, the study included the entire population in the hope of obtaining an 
acceptable level of representation by college and constituency of board 
members from the questionnaire returns. It was felt by the researcher that even a 
moderate return through the survey process would provide a richness and 
breadth of information which could not be achieved using other techniques of a 
qualitative nature in association with a small sample of the population (Ary, 
Jacobs, & Razavieh, 1990, p. 421).
The researcher designed the questionnaire in a series of sections which 
explore the tenets o f the research questions. Each section of questions was 
contextual, starting with decision-making in general matters of board business, 
moving into financial matters and, finally, into labour relations. In each section, 
questions were asked about the three aspects of leadership selected as the 
focus of this study o f shared governance, namely sharing of power, the quality of 
the shared decision-making process, and how the issue of conflict of interest 
related directly to the status of the employee and student board members has 
been addressed. In addition, participants were asked to indicate from a list of 
suggested themes o f effective boardsmanship which, if any, were present in their 
own board’s culture. This approach to eliciting a wide array of information was 
considered appropriate in order to achieve a meaningful evaluation of the shared
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governance model, including its structure and procedures, from a number of 
different perspectives. Ary, Jacobs, & Razavieh (1990) opined that “The most 
challenging type of survey is one that seeks to measure intangibles, such as 
attitudes, opinions, values, or other psychological and sociological constructs"
(p. 408).
The study was endorsed by the Advanced Education Council of British 
Columbia in a similar manner to the earlier study in 1996. Such endorsement not 
only indicated the interest of this organization, which represents all college 
boards in the province, in the subject matter, but also served to encourage 
individual board members to participate. The Council has further expressed its 
interest in the area o f shared governance research by inviting the researcher to 
present findings from studies at several meetings and conferences.
The process o f administering the questionnaire and gathering the data 
was intended to be efficient and fair. It was important that the participants were 
fully aware of the purpose of the study and the nature of their participation in it. 
Accordingly, the researcher articulated procedures that not only clearly stated his 
intentions but also stressed the voluntary nature of taking part and the complete 
extent to which participants would enjoy personal anonymity. Furthermore, the 
researcher designed a process that facilitated participation, and while being 
mindful of their commitment of valuable time ensured that time was the only cost 
to the participants.
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Validity and Reliability
Huck and Cormier (1996) noted useful synonyms for validity and reliability. 
The former was called “accuracy" while the latter was called “consistency”. 
Therefore, the data from a study should be consistent throughout to accurately 
reflect the views of the participants. The means to achieve both these qualities 
were through the design and application of the measurement instrument and 
careful analysis of the resultant data.
This study utilized a questionnaire containing a series of questions that 
were intended to elicit clear, unambiguous answers from the participants. The 
questions focused only on the aspects of leadership in the contexts of board 
decision-making noted earlier. The purpose of the questionnaire was to facilitate 
measurement of the views of board members in the areas contemplated in the 
study and was intended to achieve the highest degree o f correlation between the 
accuracy and the consistency of the data obtained. In addition, the importance of 
presenting the findings of the study, based on the data obtained, in a form that 
attempts to answer the research questions cannot be overemphasized. The 
research questions are the raison-d’etre of the study, and the findings are 
directly related to the questions although, in the end, they may not provide the 
absolute answers. The findings will, nevertheless, contribute to the growing body 
of knowledge on the subject m atter-shared governance in the college setting.
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Data Collection
This quantitative study of board members’ views on aspects of their 
leadership role within certain contexts sought to determine if differences exist in 
those views between colleges, between the constituent members, and between 
the whole population compared to a similar population in an earlier study. The 
researcher strove for accurate and consistent data to be obtained from the 
measurement instrument because that was crucial to the integrity of the study. 
Therefore, the following sections describe how the appropriateness of the data 
was ensured.
Entry to the Population
The researcher is employed in the British Columbia post-secondary 
education system and serves as secretary to his institution’s board. Accordingly, 
he is familiar with the board structure in the province and the changes that have 
taken place as a result of the 1995 legislative amendment known as Bill 22. This 
study focused on all college board members in British Columbia and entry to the 
population was managed in two steps: (1) a general announcement at the 
annual conference of board members during a presentation o f the findings of the 
earlier study earned out by the researcher in 1996 in which this study was
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portrayed as a natural follow-up, and (2) a letter inviting voluntary participation 
was sent to every member of each board.
Selection of Sites/Subjects
In light of the size and diversity of the potential population and the fact 
that the diversity itself is the basis of one of the research questions, it was not 
considered necessary to adopt any sampling methods (Huck and Cormier,
1996). Accordingly, the study was open to the entire population of board 
members in the British Columbia college system, amounting to the potential of 
seventeen institutions and approximately two hundred and fifty-five members. 
The breakdown of members was one hundred and fifty-seven lay members 
appointed by the provincial government, seventeen elected faculty members, 
seventeen elected support staff members, thirty elected student members (there 
were four vacancies), seventeen ex-officio presidents of the colleges and 
university colleges, and seventeen chairs of education councils at each 
institution. Membership of college boards is fairly volatile. Not only are the 
student members subject to a one year term, but chairs of education councils 
who sit on the boards ex-officio also tend to serve fairly short terms, often again 
one year. In addition, in 1997 there was a much higher turnover of government 
appointees than usual, including the termination o f some members mid-term, 
due to a policy decision to introduce younger members onto boards. As a result
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of this increased volume o f membership changes, the researcher used both 
current board membership lists and former lists. Where a change had taken 
place in the two months around the time of the study, the questionnaire was 
directed to the former member on the basis that his/her greater degree of 
experience over the replacement would contribute to the richness of the data. It 
is possible, however, that the attitudes of recently departed members, 
particularly given the controversial nature of some of the changes, may have 
influenced willingness to participate and some of the responses.
Participation was entirely voluntary and the voluntary nature was stressed 
by the researcher even as he endeavoured to make potential respondents fully 
aware of the nature and importance of the study and the value of their 
participation.
The researcher followed the undemoted steps in facilitating participation 
in the study:
• June, 1997; the researcher presented a paper at the Advanced 
Education Council o f British Columbia Annual Conference on the 
results of his study undertaken in early 1996 related to a 
preliminary review o f the literature for this dissertation. He made 
attendees aware o f the upcoming study and its relationship to both 
the presentation and to the dissertation work;
• September, 1997, the researcher sent a package to every board 
member in the province (coming within the parameters of this
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study) containing a letter of explanation of the study and invitation 
to participate (with clear indication of its voluntary nature)—see 
Appendix A—, a questionnaire—see Appendix B—, and a 
statement of informed consent—see Appendix C—to be completed 
by each participant. The package also contained a mail-prepaid, 
addressed envelope for the return of the questionnaire and consent 
statement;
• October, 1997, a letter—see Appendix D—was sent to all board 
members in the province covered under this study thanking those 
who had already returned the questionnaire and inviting those who 
had not to do so or contact the researcher for another copy of the 
questionnaire;
• November, 1997, in light of a relatively low response rate at that 
stage (although very close to the sort of return predicted by Ary,
Jacobs, & Razavieh, 1990, p. 408), a letter—see Appendix E—was 
sent to the president and board chair of each college requesting 
their assistance in encouraging their members to participate;
The researcher takes the view that the data and, particularly, the analysis and 
conclusions will be of interest to the participants as well as to the researcher and 
will endeavour to make the information accessible to the population.
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Protection of the Subjects
Hawley (1993) noted “If research is to benefit the scientific community and 
society at large, each researcher must adhere to a strict code of ethics”. It is for 
that reason that this study had two levels of protection of subjects built into it. A 
protocol statement that detailed the proposed process of protection was 
submitted to the Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects, University of 
San Diego for approval and was subsequently granted. In addition, the protocol 
statement was also submitted, as a requirement o f the researcher’s own 
institutional policy, to the Research and Ethics Committee, Malaspina University 
College, British Columbia and received the necessary approval. Finally, the 
approved process was described in the statement o f informed consent which 
each potential participant was asked to endorse and return with his/her 
completed questionnaire.
The population of subjects consisted of lay persons appointed by 
the provincial government: faculty, support staff, and students elected by 
their constituencies: and the college president and chair o f the education 
council who hold ex-officio positions on each board o f governance. None 
of the participant groups, in the context of their involvement in shared 
governance, would appear to fall within the at-risk categories, however, 
every precaution was taken as follows:
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Level 1 (applied to all participants).
As an addendum to the questionnaire, subjects were asked 
to identify their college and constituency in order to facilitate two of 
the three areas of analysis. There is only one president, one chair 
of education council, one faculty member, and one staff member on 
each board and, therefore, by identifying themselves they became 
known to the researcher;
In the analysis of data, conclusions and recommendations, 
and any other product of the study, the researcher did/will not 
identify a college other than by an anonymous label and did/will not 
associate the member of any constituency with any college or 
otherwise serve to reveal his/her identity. Therefore, while identity 
might be known to the researcher, complete anonymity was/will be 
assured in the dissertation and any other report. The completed 
questionnaires (except as noted in Level 2) remained in the 
custody of the researcher throughout the process of analysis and 
writing of the dissertation. Upon completion of the latter, the 
questionnaires were destroyed.
Level 2 (applied only to the employee and student members of the 
Malaspina University College Board).
In view of the researcher’s position at Malaspina, special 
protection was afforded those board members who also have even
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
138
an indirect employment or student relationship with the researcher. 
Returned questionnaires from the special group, identified by 
unique marking, were received, processed, loaded into a computer 
program, retained, and ultimately destroyed by a special associate 
in Vancouver, BC. This practice permitted the researcher to 
manipulate the data and perform the analysis without ever knowing 
details of the responses from any member of the special group.
Instrumentation
The researcher developed a questionnaire for the study which was, 
in part, based on his instrument from a similar study carried out in 
1995/96. This allowed for comparison over the period of time on specific 
questions. In addition, questions in the form of statements were designed 
to obtain board members’ views and attitudes which would serve to 
answer the research questions posed in the study:
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain aspects of 
boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared 
decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of interest of 
employee and student board members has been addressed when it comes to 
decision-making in respect to general matters o f business, financial matters, and 
labour relations matters?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the constituency 
from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members; elected faculty; elected 
support staff; elected students; presidents; and education council chairs, in 
certain aspects o f boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the 
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived 
conflict of interest of employee and student board members has been addressed 
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of business, 
financial matters, and labour relations matters?
3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and those from 
an earlier study in respect to certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the 
sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and 
how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board 
members has been addressed when it comes to decision-making in respect to 
general matters o f business, financial matters, and labour relations matters.
The study is three dimensional in nature and, therefore, each 
research questions leads to three hypotheses. The following shows the 
assignment of questions contained in the questionnaire—see Appendix B- 
—to each hypothesis:
H1. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British 
Columbia colleges concerning the sharing of power in the shared governance 
model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial matters, and 
labour matters. (Survey questions 1-8, 22-23, 33-35, 44-45)
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H2. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British 
Columbia colleges concerning the effectiveness of the shared decision-making 
process in the shared governance model for decision-making in general matters 
of business, financial matters, and labour matters. (Survey questions 9-15, 24- 
32, 36-40)
H3. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British 
Columbia colleges concerning how real or perceived conflict of interest of 
employee and student board members is dealt with in the shared governance 
model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial matters, and 
labour matters. (Survey questions 16-21, 27-29, 41-43, 46)
H4. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board 
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn i.e. 
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students; 
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning the sharing of power in the 
shared governance model for decision-making in general matters of business, 
financial matters, and labour matters. (Survey questions 1-8, 22-23, 33-35, 44-
45)
H5. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board 
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn i.e. 
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students; 
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning the effectiveness of the 
shared decision-making process in the shared governance model for decision-
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making in general matters of business, financial matters, and labour matters. 
(Survey questions 9-15, 24-32, 36-40)
H6. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board 
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn i.e. 
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students; 
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning how real or perceived 
conflict of interest of employee and student board members is dealt with in the 
shared governance model for decision-making in general matters of business, 
financial matters, and labour matters. (Survey questions 16-21, 27-29, 41-43,
46)
H7. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the 
views to be elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning 
the sharing of power in the shared governance model for decision-making in 
general matters of business, financial matters, and labour matters. (Survey 
questions 4-8, 33-34)
H8. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the 
views to be elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning 
the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process in the shared 
governance model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial 
matters, and labour matters. (Survey questions 9-10, 25-26, 30-32, 37)
H9. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the 
views to be elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning
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how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board 
members is dealt with in the shared governance model for decision-making in 
general matters of business, financial matters, and labour matters. (Survey 
questions 16-20, 27, 29, 42, 46)
In addition, questions forty-seven to forty-nine on the questionnaire, which 
are multi-part in nature, explore the characteristics of power sharing, 
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how conflict of 
interest has been addressed within the participants’ own colleges.
The questionnaire consisted of nine pages, divided into six sections 
of data together with a final section containing personal details of each 
participant. The latter included information on the constituency group from 
which the participant was drawn, the name of their college, and the 
number of years spent on the board. This information, confidential in 
nature and carefully guarded throughout the study, was required to 
manipulate the data to correspond to the research questions.
The questions, numbered one to forty-nine but actually totaling 
sixty-seven including multi-part questions, were arranged into sections 
which again corresponded to the focuses of the research questions.
These sections included 1) Board decision-making on general matters, 
but excluding business related to financial matters and labour relations 
matters; 2) Board decision-making related solely to financial matters; 3)
Board decision-making related solely to labour relations matters; 4) Board
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effectiveness in the sharing of power; 5) Board effectiveness in shared 
decision-making; and 6) Board effectiveness in dealing with the real or 
perceived conflict of interest of employee and student members. The first 
three sections sought to obtain board members’ opinions, views, and 
values on typical board decision-making tasks in the context of the shared 
governance environment while the second three sections sought 
members’ views on the existence, or otherwise, of typical shared 
governance qualities within their own institutions. Thus, the first three 
sections were somewhat philosophical in nature while the second three 
sections were more practical. The blend of the two sets of data provided 
the foundation from which to address the research questions and 
generally evaluate the legislated shared governance model in British 
Columbia.
Participants were asked to respond to the questions, expressed in 
the form of statements, using a Lickert-type attitude inventory ranging 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree in the first three sections and 
from non-existence to strong-existence in the second three sections. The 
use of a Lickert-type attitude inventory was considered appropriate by the 
researcher because the large volume of data obtained in the study could 
be made readily quantifiable using this technique, thereby facilitating 
analysis of the date and determination of the findings (Huck & Cormier, 
1996, p. 556). Both Huck & Cormier (p. 557) and Ary, Jacobs, & Razavieh
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(1990, p. 421) discussed the ability to accommodate a high number of 
participants and a high volume of data through a Lickert-type 
questionnaire, but also noted its weakness was the possibility of 
misinterpretation of the questions by some participants. Accordingly, the 
researcher compiled the questionnaire using already tested question from 
the previous study together with questions which were intended to be 
clear statements related to the research questions. The questionnaire was 
reviewed in draft form by Dr. William E. Piland, Dissertation Chair, and Dr. 
Jerome Della Mattia, Executive Director of the Advanced Education 
Council Of British Columbia and several of their suggestions were 
incorporated into the final version.
Approach to Data Analysis
The structure of the measurement instrument was based on the matrix of 
aspects of leadership in shared governance and decision-making contexts. 
Participants responded to a series of questions in the form of statements with 
answers via a 5-point Lickert scale ranging from strongly disagree, disagree, 
neutral, agree, to strongly agree. Participants were also asked to indicate from a 
list of suggested characteristics of effective boardsmanship which, if any, were 
present in their own board’s culture. In addition, there was the option of not 
responding to any statement, for whatever reason.
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The data were entered by the researcher (except in the case of Level 2 
protection of subjects where independent data entry took place) and processed 
using the Statview SE+ Graphics Program on Apple hardware . The data were 
manipulated to produce the undemoted levels of analysis which permitted 
comparison: (1) among colleges, (2) among constituencies, and (3) with data 
collected in an earlier study. The selected techniques were standard to 
quantitative research and are discussed by Huck and Cormier (1996) and Ary, 
Jacobs, and Razavieh (1990):
Level A: Means and Standard Deviations for all Survey Questions 
This analysis revealed the mean score on each statement 
for the whole population. Where questions coincide with those 
included in the earlier study, a time comparison was able to be 
made.
Level B: Frequency Distributions
This analysis related to the demographics of the 
respondents. Consequently, a breakdown of returns by 
constituency and college was revealed.
Level C: One-Way ANOVA for each Question by Constituency 
The researcher established a level of significance of .05 as 
appropriate to this type of data analysis, meaning the chances of 
rejecting a true null hypothesis become equal to 5 out of 100. If a 
value of probability statement was revealed at less than .05 it
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indicated incidence of significant statistical difference between the 
views o f the different constituents on a particular question. Such a 
difference could be between at least the high and low mean scores. 
However, by doing a Post-Hoc Analysis using the Scheffe type 
paired contrasts technique, it was possible to determine if a 
significant difference emerged between any pair of the 
constituents. The analysis, therefore, revealed any differences 
between respondents according to constituency.
Level D: One-Way ANOVA for each Question by College
A level of significance of .05 was established. A value of 
probability statement at less than .05 revealed significant difference 
between the colleges on a particular question. Such a difference 
could be between at least the high and low mean scores. However, 
by doing a Post-Hoc Analysis using the Scheffe type paired 
contrasts technique, it was possible to determine if a significant 
difference emerged between any pair of the colleges. The analysis, 
therefore, revealed any differences between respondents 
according to college.
Level E: One-Way ANOVA for Assessment of Own Board 
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by Constituency
A level of significance of .05 was established. A value of 
probability statement at less than .05 revealed significant difference
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between the constituent groups on a particular statement. Such a 
difference could be between at least the high and low mean scores. 
However, by doing a Post-Hoc Analysis using the Scheffe type 
paired contrasts technique, it was possible to determine if a 
significant difference emerged between any pair of the constituency 
groups. The analysis, therefore, revealed any differences between 
respondents according to constituency.
Level F: One-Way ANOVA for Assessment of Own Board 
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by College
A level of significance of .05 was established. A  value of 
probability statement at less than .05 revealed significant difference 
between the colleges on a particular statement. Such a difference 
could be between at least the high and low mean scores. However, 
by doing a Post-Hoc Analysis using the Scheffe type paired 
contrasts technique, it was possible to determine if a significant 
difference emerged between any pair of the colleges. The analysis, 
therefore, revealed any differences between respondents 
according to college.
Level G: Two-Way ANOVA for a Pre/Post Test by Constituency 
Group Concerning the 1995/96 and 1997/98 Studies
A level of significance of .05 was established. A  value of 
probability statement at less than .05 revealed significant difference
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on a particular matched (between the two studies) statement as it 
related to the pre/post test and/or the constituency groups and /or 
the interaction between the two sources of study.
Background of the Researcher
Ary, Jacobs, and Razavieh (1990) noted that a research proposal should 
demonstrate that the researcher knows what he is looking for, how it will be 
recognized, and why it is worthwhile looking for it in the first place (p. 462). This 
researcher trusts that his background and the statements o f intent that were 
explicit in this study have satisfied the requirements called for above.
The researcher is vice president and bursar of a university college in 
British Columbia. He is an accountant with professional designations from the 
United Kingdom and Canada. In addition, he holds a master’s degree in 
education with a specialty in leadership. As a member o f his college’s senior 
management team and secretary to the board of governors, he has an interest in 
boardsmanship in general and a particular interest in the implications of the 
changes in governance which have been taking place over the last three years in 
British Columbia. The researcher has constantly sought to marry academic 
research with practical application in his professional capacity. Accordingly, he 
has conducted research, published, and presented on various aspects of 
governance including board/administration relationships and shared governance.
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Summary
This study has the clear purpose o f determining the views of board 
members (based on values and practices) on the impact of shared governance 
on certain aspects of leadership in prescribed contexts of decision-making. In 
order to make that determination, it was crucial that the research methodology to 
be used was sound and directly related to the issues in question. The structure 
of the survey instrument and the specific questions asked focused solely on the 
research questions and, consequently, provided accurate and consistent data to 
allow concise analyses and conclusions.
The process of gathering and processing the data was efficient while 
providing the appropriate level of integrity, protection, and information to the 
participants. A goal of the study was to make the participants happy to have 
played a part in it and to be able to place a value on the results which have 
ultimately been obtained. Reaction to the findings will confirm attainment of this 
goal.
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CHAPTER IV PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION 
OF THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Introduction
This chapter and its related appendices (F through O) detail all of the data 
obtained in this quantitative study; present the data in a format to permit both 
descriptive and comparative analyses; and discuss the conclusions to be drawn 
from the data in the context of the three research questions and the hypotheses 
for each question. Presentation and discussion of the descriptive statistics focus 
on the response to the questionnaires, analyzed by constituency group and 
college; the length of experience of board membership among the participants; 
and the grand mean and standard deviation values for all statements included in 
the questionnaire (see Appendix B). Presentation and discussion of the 
comparative statistics focus on the data related to the research questions 
analyzed by constituent groups and colleges relative to decision-making context, 
and aspect of leadership; and assessment of the participants’ own boards’ 
effectiveness in aspects of leadership, analyzed by constituent groups and 
colleges. Thereafter follows the practical significance of the study involving the 
merger of the hypotheses, data, and findings in an attempt to answer the 
question “What do the results mean?”.
150
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Presentation and Discussion 
of the Descriptive Statistics
Reference throughout this section of the chapter is made to the following 
appendices:
• Appendix F: Summary of Questionnaire Returns, by Constituent 
Group;
• Appendix G: Summary of Questionnaire Returns, by College;
• Appendix H: Summary of Board Experience, by Years and 
Percentage-Frequency Distribution;
• Appendix I: Summary of Data by Decision-Making Context,
Aspect of Leadership, and Percentage-Frequency Distribution; 
and
•  Appendix J: Summary of the Assessment of Own Boards’ 
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership and Percentage- 
Frequency Distribution.
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Appendix F shows the potential count of participants based on the 
established membership o f each board, the actual count o f participants, the 
percentage distribution of the actual count, and the actual count expressed as a 
percentage of the potential count. Further, the data were analyzed by 
constituent group and by the population of the study. The distribution of the 
actual count ranges from 58% for appointees to 6% for students. The actual 
count as a percentage of the potential count shows a range from 77% for 
presidents to 20% for students. Similarly, Appendix G shows the same data 
broken down by college. Colleges are named A through Q to protect their 
identity in this study. The distribution of the actual count shows a range from 
10% of the total count coming from College M to 3% from College B and 
College P. The actual count as a percentage of the potential count shows a 
range from 69% for College M to 21% for College P.
The timing of the study coincided, unfortunately, with an unusually high 
degree of instability of membership among the college boards in British 
Columbia. Colleges have been inconsistent in holding elections for employee 
and student members. Furthermore, education councils have also been 
inconsistent in the timing of electing their chairs. As a consequence, there were a 
number of instances in certain colleges where internal members had only very 
recently joined the boards. The researcher attempted, wherever possible, to
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include the former members of boards rather than new members in order to 
maximize the experience and knowledge base for the study. There was a 
potential downside to this approach, however, in that retired internal board 
members might have felt that their duty was over, or might have been upset by 
their tenure having come to an end and, consequently, might not have been 
motivated to participate in the study. The researcher concluded that the potential 
richness which the experience would bring to the study justified the risk of some 
non-participation. In a similar vein, the Ministry of Advanced Education, Training, 
and Technology announced an unusually high number of appointments just 
before the study was due to commence. While most of these appointees were 
replacing members who had reached the end of their normal aggregate term of 
six years, several were replacing members who had not served six years and 
could reasonably have expected to be routinely reappointed or just left alone 
depending on how many years they had served on their boards. This latter 
action came as a result of the adoption of new government policy aimed at 
increasing the number of young people on college boards. Consequently, this 
high turnover of appointed members presented the same problem as for internal 
members and persuaded the researcher to again attempt to include former 
members rather than new members. However, there also remained the 
downside of those retired members potentially lacking the motivation to 
participate in the study. In addition, the potential count of participants was 
already depleted before the study by several vacancies among appointed
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members (impossible to quantify due to the flexible approach of government 
toward the optimum number of appointees) and student members (amounting to 
four or 12% o f the potential participants).
All of these factors noted, in addition to the almost natural resistance to 
complete “yet another survey”, may have served to produce a return rate o f 40%. 
This rate was slightly lower than the return rate in the 1995/96 study conducted 
by the researcher in 1995/96 and was somewhat disappointing given the 
publicity this study had received within the provincial college system and the 
interest shown in it at several education forums. However, as Ary, Jacobs, and 
Razavieh (1990) noted, typically the return rate from studies adopting an 
explanatory survey instrument tends to hover around the 40% level (p. 408). 
What was crucial, however, to ensure that the study findings were reliable and 
could be generalized to any extent was a reasonable representation of 
responses across the constituent groups and colleges because these were two 
of the key lenses through which the research questions were examined. (The 
third lens, of course, was the matched statements in the two studies of 1995/96 
and 1997/98.) And, as Appendix F shows, fair distribution across the constituent 
groups was achieved ranging from 77% of presidents to 20% of students. The 
latter return was disappointing considering the presence of students on boards 
was identified in literature as being probably the most controversial ingredient of 
shared governance. And, the views of the students would surely have enriched 
the findings o f the study, however, at least six participants was better than none
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at all. The response from the other constituent groups—appointees, faculty, staff, 
and education council chairs—ranged around the 40% to 50% level and, 
thereby, offered good insight from each constituency. Similarly, as Appendix G 
shows, all colleges and university colleges in the study were represented in the 
returns. The response rate ranged from 69% of the membership o f College M to 
21% of College P. Most institutions rated in the 30% to 40% range and, 
therefore, permitted cautious generalization to the whole population within each 
institution and to the post-secondary system as a whole.
Summary of Board Experience
The data contained in Appendix H were gathered to provide a 
demographic background of the participants in the study. The data did not play 
any direct part in addressing the research questions of the study. Rather, the 
purpose of collecting the data was to determine the overall level o f experience 
among the board members and the extent of participation by retired appointed 
members, who would tend to have served six or close to six years on their 
boards. From the results, it would appear that relatively few retired members 
took the opportunity to participate and the absence o f their knowledge and 
experience was regrettable.
The mean experience of 2.909 years and the fact that 47% of the 
participants had less than three years experience underscored the high and
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frequent turnover o f board members of all constituencies. This is particularly true 
of elected students whose term is only one year and education council chairs 
whose term often only amounts to one year due to the high turnover of 
membership on education councils. In addition, elected faculty and staff 
members, who can serve a three year term, and presidents came onto boards in 
1995 with the introduction of shared governance and now, generally, were in 
their third year of membership. The present government of British Columbia, 
which conceived the legislation behind shared governance, has now been in 
power for almost seven years (after one re-election). As the sole authority for 
appointing members to boards, it had exercised that right to the extent that there 
were now very few, if any, members who were appointed by the previous 
government. This fact was significant to the study and contrasts with the situation 
when the researcher conducted a similar study in 1995/96 when at least one 
third of the membership had been appointed by the previous government. If one 
assumes that appointees, given that they are patronage appointments, generally 
share something of the same philosophies as the political party which has 
appointed them, one might reasonably conclude that the present composition of 
appointees on boards would have an impact on the views of shared governance 
in principle and, perhaps, in practice at their particular sites.
In the previous study in 1995/96, when shared governance was in its 
relative infancy in British Columbia, the researcher found that appointees and 
presidents, interestingly those who might be described as having had to concede
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power, were generally positive toward shared governance in principle and 
practice, while elected faculty, elected staff, and education council chairs, those 
who might be described as having gained power, tended to be somewhat 
negative, or at least cautious in their enthusiasm. Elected students had adopted 
a very neutral stance, as if sitting on the fence waiting to see what was going to 
unfold. The changes in the boards’ composition among the appointed members, 
together with the experience acquired by the elected groups might have 
suggested some shifting in the overall views on shared governance and this 
emerged in the study findings. What might not have been anticipated, however, 
was the dramatic change in the views of presidents with the passage of only two 
years and this was further examined in detail later in this chapter.
Summary of Data, by Decision-Making Context 
Aspect of Leadership, and Percentage-Frequency Distribution
Appendix I includes the grand mean and standard deviation values for all 
statements in the first three sections of the survey questionnaire 
(see Appendix B). These sections explored selected decision-making contexts— 
general matters o f board business, board financial matters, and board labour 
relations matters—and selected aspects of leadership—sharing of power, 
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process and how conflict of interest 
has been addressed. Further, the range of responses from strongly disagree
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though neutral to strongly agree were tabulated in a percentage frequency 
distribution.
General Matters of Board Business;
Sharing of Power
Responses suggested the overall population was reasonably positive 
toward this fundamental aspects of operationalizing a shared governance model. 
In particular, there was a clear tendency toward agreement on the existence of a 
climate of trust among all the constituents, notwithstanding their backgrounds, 
and this notably coincided with the statements in literature noted in Chapter II 
about such existence o f trust being absolutely crucial to successful shared 
governance. Positive views (evidenced by a low percentage of negative 
responses) on the contribution of ail constituency groups and the perception of 
equality among them spoke further to the emergence of collaborative cultures 
within the boards across British Columbia. These findings, to some extent, 
contradicted the conventional wisdom offered in literature where different 
constituents tended not to view themselves as equals (support staff frequently 
reported a sense of marginalization), constituents did not feel that they were 
making an equal contribution (a charge leveled at student members lacking the 
necessary background and experience), and climates of trust were frequently
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noted as being absent (perpetuating the traditional confrontation o f values and 
beliefs held by faculty and administration).
The appropriateness of the terms of office for appointed and elected 
board members—an aggregate of six years for appointees, three years for 
employee members, and one year for student members—also enjoyed general 
agreement with low incidence of negative responses, in these cases never rising 
above 25%. It might have been anticipated that the one year term for students, 
particularly given the fact that five of the seventeen institutions included in the 
study were four year schools, would be challenged but support for that term was 
solid among the overall population.
Remuneration brought some interesting, and for the first time contrasting, 
responses. Literature seemed to be divided as to whether internal board 
members (as opposed, in this case, to external appointed members) should 
receive monetary compensation but definitely leaned toward the notion that they 
should receive release time from their regular instructional or service duties. The 
results of this study suggested only very marginal agreement that the (currently 
modest) remuneration for appointees is appropriate. One would assume that the 
lukewarm support was due to the low level of the stipend rather than any 
suggestion that it was too high, which is explored later in this chapter. 
Interestingly, there was more solid agreement that the remuneration paid to 
students (which is the same as that paid to appointees) was appropriate and the 
relatively low number of students participating could not have accounted for the
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overall difference in views regarding payment to the two constituencies. There 
was general disagreement, with a solid 30% of responses in the strongly 
disagreement category, concerning the suggestion that faculty and staff 
members and education council chairs should also be remunerated in the form of 
a stipend like appointees and students. However, there was a clear tendency 
toward agreement that those employee members should be given release time, 
with 76% of the responses being in the neutral to strongly agree range. 
Accordingly, these two contrasting views on a stipend and release time were 
consistent with the common contentions in literature.
Board Financial Matters:
Sharing of Power
As Appendix I records, there was a solid tendency toward agreement that 
internal board members have an inevitable vested interest when dealing with 
budget issues, with 61% of participants expressing agreement or strong 
agreement. However, there was also weak agreement that, based on the 
participants’ own experiences, all board members have equal independence and 
disinterest with regard to the budget. Moreover, the weakness of the agreement 
was stressed by the fact that only 40% of the respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed. Finally, given the agreement in this study that internal members have 
vested financial interest and statements to the same effect in literature, the
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question of whether it is more difficult to balance the budget in the period of 
prolonged fiscal restraint which British Columbia has faced with boards 
composed of internal and external members was examined. Participants clearly 
disagreed with the assertion, 69% falling on the negative side.
It would appear, therefore, that the overall views on the sharing of power 
and the accepting of roles in the often turbulent arena of financial affairs were 
that they have been managed effectively by the boards. This, of course, bodes 
well for institutions which continue to face enormous financial pressures (some 
small colleges have been unable to balance their budgets as required by statute) 
in that united boards can play the leadership role expected of them.
Board Labour Relations Matters;
Sharing of Power
In spite of strong suggestions to the contrary in literature, participants in 
the study fairly clearly disagreed with a statement that shared governance as a 
broad goal is difficult to achieve in a unionized environment. The 1990’s has 
been a period of tense labour relations in British Columbia with a couple of 
faculty strikes, a good many others headed off at the eleventh hour, and 
significant power plays involving provincial unions and the provincial 
government. Much of this has left not only local boards and administrations but 
also local trade unions feeling marginalized and tending to direct their
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frustrations toward each other. However, the findings of the study were that, in 
general, the inclusion of internal members, often themselves trade union 
executives, had not caused division among the members of boards. This 
harmony might appear surprising and seemed to go against indicators emergent 
in the overall labour relations climate and experiences noted in literature. Grand 
means can, of course, mask wide divergences in opinion among constituencies 
which were explored in the study and were examined later in this chapter.
The role of student members in the boards’ involvement in labour relations 
was addressed in two statements of inquiry. This was particularly relevant given 
the Canadian Federation of Students’ assertion that student unions ought to be 
treated just like trade unions. The findings were clear agreement that not only 
should student members play a full part in decision-making on labour relations 
issues, but also that student members were, indeed, playing a full part in 
colleges throughout British Columbia. In both cases, around 60% of the 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statements and, therefore, it 
would appear that the students have achieved one of their stated goals since 
shared governance was first contemplated.
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General Matters of Board Business:
Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
The art of good boardsmanship is crucial to the effectiveness of boards. 
Participants were asked if the composition o f their boards, obviously including 
internal and external members, and the way in which their boards actually 
operate contribute to the effective governance of their institutions. The study 
recorded solid agreement with both statements with only 15% and 11%, 
respectively, registering disagreement or strong disagreement. Consequently, 
there was a very similar level o f agreement that the conduct of boards does, 
indeed, constitute good boardsmanship. It should be noted that the term “good 
boardsmanship” was not defined in the study and was left to the respondents’ 
own interpretation. Moreover, findings suggest that good boardsmanship had 
been practically exhibited because 82% of the participants agreed or strongly 
agreed that their boards had managed to make some difficult decisions in the 
last two years. The last few years have represented challenges for colleges in 
British Columbia and have required that difficult decisions be made in many 
facets of education. If boards were expressing a degree of satisfaction with the 
process and outcome of those decisions then it is something of a testimony to 
the arrival of shared governance.
The need for accountability in decision-making is constantly stressed in 
literature and in the political milieu which surrounds public education. It was
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noted, particularly in the literature, that the public-at-large was skeptical about 
college boards’ accountability and the arrival o f shared governance, if anything, 
had exacerbated that skepticism. It was interesting, therefore, to note that there 
was a tendency toward strong agreement with the statement that boards were 
being accountable for their decisions, both to the internal and external 
communities. Furthermore, there was even more positive contention on the part 
of the constituents that boards were fulfilling their general obligations under the 
College and Institute Act. Indeed, only 6% disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
this statement. Another set of perspectives on the degree of accountability of 
college boards, perhaps from the public-at-large, would offer a counterbalance to 
those of the board members themselves, but that is a topic for further research 
outside the scope of this study.
Finally, the tendency toward centralization of decision-making was 
explored. It has been noted extensively in literature that, across North America, 
there are clear trends o f states and provinces transferring decision-making 
power from local campuses to central control. And, this had occurred, ironically, 
during the same period when shared governance has taken root at the college 
level. Such a contradictory trend appears to be occurring in British Columbia.
And, this was confirmed in the study with only 13% disagreeing or strongly 
disagreeing with the statement that boards’ powers were being diminished as 
decision-making is increasingly centralized at the provincial level. It is not clear 
what impact the diminution of power was having on the acceptance of shared
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governance. Perhaps the advent o f the former actually makes it easier to 
achieve the latter. Although, there is certainly a school of thought to suggest that 
local decision-making, even if it is limited, is all the more complicated when other 
decisions have been made centrally. This would not necessarily provide a 
smooth path for the development of the shared governance model.
Board Financial Matters;
Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
The apparent Achilles heel of shared governance, as noted extensively in 
literature, was the conflict of interest faced by internal members. And, that 
inherent conflict of interest appeared to become most problematic in matters of 
finance and labour relations where vested interests were potentially closest to 
the surface. However, participants in the study tended solidly toward agreement 
with the statement that internal members have NOT shown bias toward their own 
constituency when dealing with budget issues. Furthermore, there were strong 
feelings that boards have effectively discharged their fiscal responsibilities under 
the College and Institute Act, as evidenced in Appendix I by 82% of the 
participants expressing agreement or strong agreement. In a similar vein, the 
boards’ fiduciary responsibility to all students (which is a matter o f legal 
contention on the grounds that boards assess and collect student union fees 
from all students) when dealing with student unions on financial matters was
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tested. Testing this fiduciary obligation was particularly relevant given the 
existence of students on boards who are commonly also student union 
executives. There was virtual agreement that this special responsibility was 
being discharged effectively by boards.
The boards’ role in the often dramatic theatre of budget preparation was 
examined in the context of the shared governance model. One of the contentious 
areas of boardsmanship which can be exacerbated in shared governance was 
the boards’ role vis-ei-vis that of administration. The statement that the boards’ 
role should be to approve the parameters and underlying assumptions of the 
budget, but otherwise should leave the assembly of the numbers to 
administration met with clear agreement, some 78% expressing agreement or 
strong agreement. Moreover, respondents solidly agreed that boards do ensure 
that all stakeholder groups have the opportunity for advisory input to the budget 
process and that all stakeholder groups have been adequately informed about 
financial matters. These last two findings were particularly positive because, 
while stakeholders may not seek an actual decision-making role in budgeting, 
there is often the accusation that they are also denied access to the process on 
an advisory or even information sharing basis.
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Board Labour Relations Matters:
Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
It was established earlier in this chapter that respondents confirmed the 
tendency toward centralization of decision-making in British Columbia. And, this 
had been particularly true in labour relations with the advent of centralized 
collective bargaining and overt and covert instances o f direct government 
intervention in affairs which legally and technically belonged at the campus level. 
Thus, it was suggested that this tendency of centralization would mean that 
boards might be spared any difficulties in decision-making due to the presence of 
internal members. However, participants were virtually split down the middle with 
equal numbers in agreement, neutral, and disagreement. The response begged 
for further research to determine if the relative absence of difficulties is due to the 
shifting in power or other more positive reasons within the boards’ culture. 
Additionally, there was clear agreement that boards had effectively discharged 
their labour relations responsibilities under the College and Institute Act.
The high level role o f the boards in determining the direction of the 
institutions’ labour relations policy and strategy, which was firmly established in 
literature, was examined in different contexts. A clear majority of respondents, 
62%, disagreed with the contention that boards would have adopted a different 
direction in policy and strategy had the boards not included internal members. 
However, there was marginal agreement that direction would have been different
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had provincial centralization of decision-making powers not been taking place. 
Finally, the suggestion was made that the boards’ direction would have differed if 
neither shared governance nor centralization had existed, however the 
suggestion was met with a tendency toward disagreement. It would appear, 
therefore, that board members fe lt that government control may have influenced 
their labour relations direction in a negative way, but that the arrival of internal 
members on their boards had no such negative affect.
General Matters of Board Business:
How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed
In this section o f the study, the unique status of the presidents and 
education council chairs was explored. The legislation, which established shared 
governance in British Columbia, designated non-voting ex-officio positions on 
college boards for the chief executive officer of the institution and the chair of the 
education council. The education council is a senate-like body in each institution, 
which was also introduced in the same legislative amendment, known as Bill 22. 
There was agreement and strong agreement, drawing 81% of the respondents, 
that the non-voting ex-officio status was appropriate for presidents. Indeed, 
reaction to the suggestion that presidents should be full-voting members was 
strongly negative with 82% of the respondents expressing disagreement or 
strong disagreement, the latter attracting 42%. Views on the role of the
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education council chairs mirrored those for the presidents, although not in such 
strong terms, amounting to 64% in favour of the non-voting ex-officio status and 
61% in disagreement with full-voting status. The noticeable difference between 
the strength of the views on the education council chairs compared to the 
presidents was interesting and perhaps suggested the possibility of voting status 
for the former in the future, presumably with the rationale that they can represent 
the academic community in general in the same way as faculty, staff, and 
student members represent their constituency. The complete anomaly that sees 
the presidents who are hired by and report to the boards sit on such bodies with 
the ability to fully participate except for voting remains just that...an anomaly.
From formal and informal feedback during the short life o f shared 
governance in the province, but particularly during its early days, the drafting of 
bylaws and policies on conflict of interest had been reported as being 
contentious at the college level. And, the fact that the Ministry o f Advanced 
Education, Training, and Technology eventually stepped in and ordered 
institutions to adopt prescribed language for their conflict of interest bylaw may 
have had an impact on the difficulties expressed by colleges. However, in the 
study it was found that participants were close to agreement that the resultant 
bylaw and policy, if colleges chose to adopt the latter, were generally accepted 
by all board members as fair and workable. Accordingly, some 56% of the 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their board had not experienced any 
problem with conflict o f interest in general matters of board business.
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Board Financial Matters:
How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed
The more focused issue of conflict in financial matters was examined in 
the context of board dealings with student unions on decisions pertaining to 
tuition fees and other items which were likely to produce friction between the two 
bodies. In particular, the fact that student board members were deemed not to 
be in conflict of interest in the provincially prescribed bylaw on such matters was 
explored. The findings were that the participants tended toward agreement that 
their boards have dealt effectively with the obvious conflict issue when it comes 
to decision-making. However, there was a lukewarm tendency toward 
agreement, involving only 47% of the respondents, as to the appropriateness of 
student board members being able to vote on proposed tuition fee increases. In 
a similar vein, there was relatively weak disagreement with the suggestion that 
student board members should be disqualified from simultaneously holding office 
in their respective student unions. It is fair to say that the provincial government 
gave students more licence than any of the other internal constituents in drafting 
the legislation around shared governance. The reason for this has never been 
exactly clear and could stem from recognition that education is all about students 
at the end of the day and, therefore, they should enjoy a relatively larger share of 
the shared governance pie or else the student population represented a 
considerable voter base to be cultivated.
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Board Labour Relations Matters:
How Conflict of interest has been Addressed
Bill 22, the legislative amendment which brought shared governance to 
British Columbia, included a few surprises for the education community and none 
more so than the introduction o f an oath o f office to which all board members 
were required to swear. The study found more than solid agreement that elected 
and ex-officio members, notwithstanding any other allegiance which they might 
hold or even have sworn an oath to, had lived upto their oath in dealing with the 
boards’ role in labour relations. Furthermore, 75% of the responses agreed or 
strongly agreed that boards had dealt effectively with the inherent conflict of 
interest of internal members in matters of administering collective agreements. 
However, one obvious way of dealing with such conflict, by confining decision­
making to some form of executive committee from which those in conflict might 
be excluded, appeared not to have been chosen as only 36% of the participants 
attested. Finally, in a statement similar to that directed at student board members 
vis-a-vis financial matters, there was weak agreement that elected employee 
members and ex-officio members should be disqualified from simultaneously 
holding office in their respective trade unions.
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Summary of the Assessment 
of Own Boards* Effectiveness 
in Aspects of Leadership 
and Percentaqe-Freauencv Distribution
In this section of the study, participants were asked to review lists of the 
characteristics of typical effective board leadership in a shared governance 
context. Further, they were asked to indicate the degree of presence of the 
characteristics in their own boards’ culture according to a Lickert-type scale 
ranging from non-existence through to strong existence. The characteristics were 
drawn from the themes which formed the basis of the exploratory statements in 
other sections of the questionnaire (see Appendix B). Thus, the study and the 
questionnaire were essentially divided into two parts, the first being a series of 
statements to elicit the views of the respondents based partly on their philosophy 
and partly on their practical experience, and the second being more of an audit 
of board cultures in British Columbia as expressed by the members themselves.
Sharing of Power
Appendix J shows that some 74% of the participants attested to the 
existence of a climate of trust among all board members within their colleges. 
Trust is, of course, the most fundamental requirement of any effective
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organizational culture and especially so in the case of a shared decision-making 
model given the disparate backgrounds of the board members and the 
perception, if not the reality, that members represent often competing 
constituencies. Perhaps as a consequence of the existence of a climate of trust 
in many of the colleges surveyed, there was confirmation that, generally, all 
members have contributed equally to the functioning of their boards in spite of 
the different values and expertise they brought to the role. The sharing of power 
was noted in literature as being the most basic and yet most inherently difficult 
element in the construction of a shared governance model. This was due to a 
number of factors including the background and sometimes competing 
philosophy of the board members and also, most importantly, their status within 
the organization. Many writers noted the difficulties expressed by staff and 
student members in terms of feelings of marginalization and tokenism and by 
faculty members in terms of their historical conflict with the institutional 
establishment represented by board members and administrations. All board 
members in British Columbia, irrespective of their constituencies, are expected to 
act as members-at-large with the common good of the institution as their 
overriding goal. A truly effective shared governance model would have a unified 
culture rather than one o f collective individualism and this was examined in the 
study. Alas, there was only confirmation of weak existence of all board members 
maintaining an independence from their individual constituencies when it came 
to practising boardsmanship. Furthermore, 51% of the respondents noted that
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board members were not bringing vested interests to the board table in their 
colleges. There was also similar existence (48%) expressed of board 
effectiveness in the sharing of power being enhanced because traditional 
(confrontational) labour/management relationships were not allowed to infiltrate 
the expanded boards’ culture.
Effectiveness of the Shared 
Decision-Making Process
There was strong existence, identified by 75% of the participants, o f clear 
rules of boardsmanship which were consistently applied in colleges where 
shared decision-making processes were considered effective. This characteristic 
was noted extensively in literature as being important for the orderly transition to 
and maintenance of shared governance, although there were differing views on 
how the rules should be drawn up. Similar strong expressions of the existence of 
accountability for board decision-making and board compliance with the 
obligations of the College and Institute Act were confirmed in boards which were 
considered effective. It was suggested that a further characteristic of effective 
boards would be their ability to cope with the tendency toward centralized 
decision-making at the provincial level. Subsequently, only 12% of the 
respondents recorded no existence o f this characteristic at their colleges, 
suggesting not only widespread recognition of the trend toward taking power
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away from the local boards but also that boards were dealing with the issue. This 
is a potential area of further research as institutions evolve from being 
hierarchical organizations with substantial local power to become democratic 
organizations within a hierarchical education system where the power resides 
elsewhere.
Strong existence was attested to of both the fact that no bias had been 
shown by employee board members in dealing with budget issues and the 
allocation o f resources and neither had bias been shown by student board 
members in the same tasks. The characteristic of members keeping their vested 
interests in check and acting for the common good of their institution was, of 
course, central to the success o f the shared decision-making model. And, the 
strong existence of this characteristic spoke well to the likely success of systemic 
change in the province. Further, some 63% of the participants recorded 
existence, within their boards’ membership, of an understanding of the distinction 
between leadership and management and a consequent acknowledgment of the 
respective roles of the boards and administrations. This confirmed the extent to 
which the influence of John Carver and his book Boards that make a difference: 
A new design for leadership in nonprofit and public orqanizations(2nd ed., 1997) 
has had on board philosophy in British Columbia. Finally, and one might have 
anticipated a different answer considering the generally positive responses in 
this section, there was only very moderate expression of existence of colleges 
having a history of informal shared governance before the legislation, which
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would have provided a natural launching pad to the formal model and would 
have tended to make the transition easier. However, the fact that the largest 
number of respondents, 35%, were neutral on a statement of historical fact might 
suggest more of a lack of knowledge on the part of the board members, 
particularly the new external members, than anything else.
How Conflict of Interest 
has been Addressed
There were a number of references in literature to the need for clear 
operating procedures and regulations within which the effective shared decision­
making model would function. Accordingly, some 74% of the participants noted 
the existence or strong existence of clearly understood and accepted (by all 
constituent groups) bylaws and/or policies on conflict of interest relating to the 
internal members at their institutions. Furthermore, the suggestion that effective 
boards in a shared governance environment would include internal members 
who act in an at-large capacity and did not represent their constituencies was 
recognized, the mean of responses here tending toward strong existence at their 
institutions. Some 59% of the respondents cited the existence of the oath of 
office as a factor which had prevented historical labour /management problems 
from surfacing among the constituencies of board members. And, only 25% 
admitted the existence of an executive committee, from which internal members
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might be excluded, as a possible vehicle to deal with the inherent conflict of 
interest faced by internal members by simply circumventing them. The apparent 
importance of the oath of office represented quite a cultural change in a short 
period of time. Such oaths are not part of the Canadian culture and their 
introduction was criticized not only on principle but also due to the practical 
problem that many unionized board members felt that they also owed a sworn or 
implied allegiance to their unions and should not be compelled to divide their 
loyalties. This dilemma, of course, illustrated the very difficulty of at-large 
membership versus representation in shared governance. One is, however, left 
to wonder how the dilemma of conscience had been resolved, given the finding 
that the oath of office to the board was viewed as an important characteristic of 
effective boards.
Finally, participants noted the strong existence of presidents and 
education council chairs, albeit with their non-voting status or perhaps even 
because of it, being able to make a full contribution to the execution of board 
affairs as other characteristics of effective boards in the shared governance 
model. There was more than a little anecdotal suggestion that, in some colleges, 
the president and the education council chair have taken their unusual roles 
within the shared decision-making model and used them to forge close working 
relationships which have not only contributed to the governance of the institution 
but also its management.
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Summary
It was important, in this study of potential differences in the views among 
constituent groups and among colleges, that both sectors were reasonably well 
represented in the questionnaire returns. Fortunately, this proved to be the case 
with all constituent groups covered, ranging from a 77% return rate for presidents 
to 20% for students, and all colleges covered, ranging from a 69% return rate 
from College M to 21% for College P. Furthermore, the mean years of 
experience at 2.909 years underscored the high turnover of board members and 
relative inexperience of the study participants.
In overall terms, the analysis of the grand means obtained in the study 
revealed positive views to be held by the board members about various aspects 
of shared governance. The participants were in agreement with the different 
lengths of term for constituents but differed on the issue of remuneration. 
Specifically, they were virtually neutral on the level of stipend currently received 
by appointees, against faculty, staff, and education council chairs receiving 
stipends, and in support of those three constituent groups receiving release time 
as well as students continuing to receive their current stipend.
Positive expressions were made about the contribution of all constituent 
groups to financial matters including the budget, and the presence of internal 
members was not seen as a problem in this context. Similarly, participants were 
positive about all constituents’ contribution to labour relations matters. There was
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strong support for student involvement in this area. Members felt that the newly 
constituted boards were fulfilling their fiscal, labour relations, and general 
obligations under the College and Institute Act and internal members were not 
showing any signs of bias in performance of their duties. Participants expressed 
clarity concerning the role of the board and its relationship to administration and 
other bodies within the institution.
There was feeling among the participants that the direction of labour 
relations at the college level has not been overly influenced by the presence of 
internal members on the boards, but that the provincial government has imposed 
change that would not have happened naturally. Respondents were in favour of 
the non-voting ex-officio status of the presidents and education council chairs on 
boards and strongly against changing to voting status, particularly with respect to 
presidents.
There were several confirmations that rules around conflict of interest 
have been effective and few problems had been experienced with this potential 
sore point of shared governance. The oath of office was also cited as an 
effective prevention of problems. There was disagreement with the suggestion 
that student members should be disqualified from simultaneously holding office 
in their respective student unions but slight agreement that employee members 
should be barred from holding trade union office. Finally, there was a consistent 
confirmation of the existence of the typical characteristics of effective shared 
governance among the participants’ own institutions.
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Analysis of the grand mean values establishes global trends in the 
findings and sets the scene for the more in-depth comparative analysis between 
constituent groups, colleges, and the studies of 1997/98 and 1995/96 that 
follows in this chapter.
Presentation and Discussion 
of the Comparative Statistics
In this section of the chapter, the data obtained from the survey 
questionnaire were analyzed to provide the three lenses through which the 
research questions, noted below, could be addressed:
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain aspects of 
boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared 
decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of interest of 
employee and student board members has been addressed when it comes to 
decision-making in respect to general matters of business, financial matters, and 
labour relations matters?
2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the constituency 
from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members; elected faculty; elected 
support staff; elected students; presidents; and education council chairs, in 
certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the 
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived
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conflict of interest of employee and student board members has been addressed 
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of business, 
financial matters, and labour relations matters?
3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and those from 
an earlier study in respect to certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the 
sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and 
how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board 
members has been addressed when it comes to decision-making in respect to 
general matters o f business, financial matters, and labour relations matters.
The data were, therefore, analyzed by constituency group—appointees, 
elected faculty, elected staff, elected students, presidents, and education council 
chairs—, by college (seventeen colleges and university colleges took part in the 
study), and through several matched questions comparison was possible 
between this study and a similar study earned out by the researcher in 1995/96. 
The presentation and discussion of the comparative statistics, which follow, 
focus on each statement of the questionnaire (see Appendix B) through the three 
areas of comparison, namely constituency, college, and the passage of time.
The data were sorted according to decision-making context and aspect of 
leadership to complete the three dimensional focus of the study, illustrated in 
Diagram 3 on page 23.
Reference throughout this section of the chapter is made to the following 
appendices:
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• Appendix K: Summary of Data by Constituent Group, Decision-Making 
Context, and Aspect of Leadership;
• Appendix L: Summary of the Assessment of Own Boards’ 
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by Constituent Group;
• Appendix M: Summary of Data by College (A to Q), Decision-Making 
Context, and Aspect of Leadership;
• Appendix N: Summary of the Assessment o f Own Boards’ 
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by College (A to Q); and
• Appendix O: Summary of Matched Statements in the 1995/96 and 
1997/98 Studies, by Constituent Group.
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Summary of Data by Decision-Making Context 
and Aspect of Leadership
In this section, there are nine combinations of decision-making context 
and aspect of leadership and forty-eight questions contained within them.
General Matters of Board Business:
Sharing.of Power
1...My board has established a climate of trust among all the 
members (irrespective of the constituency they come from).
While all constituents agreed with the statement, presidents were the least 
convinced, being barely over neutral, and contrasted with students and 
education council chairs who were the most positive. Among colleges, the one­
way ANOVA revealed a significant difference. However, when a post-hoc 
analysis was carried out, using the Scheffe technique, it failed to identify any 
significant difference between the pairs of colleges. (The Scheffe test is very 
conservative in nature and appropriate to this study given the relatively small 
population sizes at the college level.) However, the findings did reveal a range of 
views among colleges from disagreement to strong agreement. A  climate of trust 
is the most basic of requirements for effective shared governance and the 
disparity of views among constituents (relating to the presidents) and,
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particularly, among colleges is worthy of note. Negative views among the 
colleges were very likely rooted in particular local experiences rather than on any 
philosophical basis and may be an indicator of other issues of note to emerge 
later in the study.
2...Board members mav bring different values and expertise 
but all generally contribute equally to the functioning of the 
board.
This statement, like the previous one, brought a grand mean tending 
toward agreement but with wide variation among the constituents’ responses, 
falling short, however, of any significant difference. While appointees, staff, 
students, and education council chairs were solidly in agreement, faculty and 
presidents tended toward disagreement. In the analysis of college responses, it 
was again the same story as in the previous statement. Significant difference 
was revealed in the one-way ANOVA but no significant difference was found 
between any of the pairs of colleges in the post-hoc test. However, there was 
again a wide range of responses from almost strong agreement (College A, 
College G, and College K as they had indicated on the first statement) to 
disagreement (College P again). Clearly, even after only two statements, trends 
were beginning to emerge—constituents were generally positive except for 
presidents and colleges were showing a wide array of views with the same
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colleges positive toward the introduction of shared governance and the same 
colleges negative.
3...Board members view themselves as equals.
Again, the grand mean was a fairly solid agreement. Faculty were the only 
constituent group to disagree and the most interesting finding was that staff were 
the most positive of all the respondents. Yet, literature suggested that support 
staff often viewed shared governance in a cautious light and complained of 
feeling undervalued or token representatives. Colleges, on the other hand, 
behaved very much as they had in the two previous statements. Significant 
difference was revealed in the one-way ANOVA, which one might have expected 
to be between at the highest mean score and the lowest mean score. However, 
the Scheffe test did not identify any pairs of significant difference, probably 
because of the small population size of the extreme institutions. As before, there 
was quite a range from strong agreement (College A, College B, College K, and 
College N) to disagreement (College P). College P provided the fewest returns 
but, obviously, those who did respond had quite negative views on these very 
fundamental factors of shared decision-making.
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4...The six year term for appointed board members is
appropriate.
The grand mean and the responses from all groups but the students were 
solidly in agreement that the aggregate of six years was an appropriate term for 
appointed members. The term is not embodied in the College and Institute Act 
(uniike those of employees and students) but has generally been followed by 
government until, ironically, several appointments of less than six years were not 
renewed or merely canceled just immediately prior to the study. The views of 
some of these recently “retired” members may be included in the appointees’ 
responses, which were, nevertheless, solidly in agreement with the six year term. 
There was a slightly narrower range of responses among colleges compared to 
previous statements. College A and College K were, again, the most positive 
with mean scores tending toward strong agreement. College F and College M 
were the only ones to tend toward disagreement. This statement was also 
subjected to a two-way ANOVA to compare the data from the present study with 
that of a similar study undertaken by the researcher in 1995/96. Significant 
difference was revealed between the two studies and among the constituent 
groups, however, there was no significant difference in the interaction between 
the two sources o f data. The constituents’ means showed some interesting shifts 
over the two studies with faculty and, in particular, education council chairs
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acquiring a more positive view on the subject of the appointees’ term of office, 
while the students retained a negative view.
5...The three year term for elected board members is 
appropriate.
The grand mean was closer to agreement than for the appointees’ term 
and all constituent groups were in agreement. Staff were the most positive in 
responding to their own situation. Similarly, faculty were solidly in agreement. 
Colleges were also firm ly in agreement, save for one, College P, which was in 
disagreement. This college was clearly at odds with all the other institutions 
whose means scored in the upper reaches of agreement or strong agreement. 
Comparison of the two studies revealed no significant difference between the 
studies, among the constituents, or in the interaction between the sources of 
data. The means of the constituents showed remarkable consistency over the 
two-year period between the studies.
6...The one year term for student board members is 
appropriate.
For this statement, there was again generally positive response with the 
grand mean being virtually on agreement. The students were the least positive 
about their own term. One would assume that the concern was directed to the
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shortness of the duration of one year and the view was perhaps reflective of the 
fact that five of the seventeen reporting institutions were university colleges, four 
year schools, which may have fostered the notion of two or even three year 
terms as appropriate for students. Conversely, education council chairs were the 
most positive about the one year term, and this, perhaps, reflected the feeling 
noted in literature among faculty in general that students were not natural (or 
legitimate) partners in shared governance and, therefore, a one year turnaround 
was appropriate. Analysis of the colleges’ responses again revealed significant 
difference within the wide range of values. However, the post hoc test did not 
reveal significant difference between any of the pairs of institutions. College I 
was strongly in agreement, as were College N and College Q to a lesser extent, 
while College B, College F, College G, and College H all tended toward 
disagreement. The university colleges’ responses mirrored the overall 
responses, ranging from strongly agree to disagree, and, therefore, there was no 
discernible correlation between four year schools and calls for longer terms for 
students. Finally, there was no significant difference revealed in the two-way 
ANOVA between the studies, among the constituent groups, or in the interaction 
between the two sources of data. The views of the appointees, students, 
presidents, and education council chairs remained fairly consistent over the two 
years between the studies, however, faculty and staff both amended their views 
from strong agreement to a weaker tendency toward agreement. The response 
of the faculty might not support the earlier suggestion that the positive view of
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education council chairs reflected hesitance in seeing students as natural 
partners in shared governance.
7(a)...The remuneration for appointed board members is
appropriate.
The grand mean was a very weak tendency toward agreement, indeed it 
was closer to neutrality, which masked a fair range of responses. Staff and 
students were in agreement, while faculty and presidents ended up strictly 
neutral and appointees, the object of the question, and education council chairs 
tended toward disagreement. The stipends for board members and board chairs 
are very modest in comparison to similar remuneration levels for governors in 
other public sectors. Further research would be necessary, however, to 
determine if appointees and education council chairs had the same reasons for 
being negative toward the remuneration level of the former.
In a similar vein to responses to earlier questions, significant difference 
was revealed by the one-way ANOVA among colleges. However, the Scheffe 
test did not identify significant difference among any of the pairs of institutions. 
Responses ranged from agreement (College B, College I, and College Q) to 
strong disagreement (College D and College G). Stipends for appointees are 
controlled by the provincial government and are the same at each college 
irrespective of its size or mandate. The divergence of views among colleges was,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
190
therefore, probably only a personal reaction on the part of the participants honed 
into an institutional trend by discussion around the board table.
7(b)...The remuneration for student board members is 
appropriate.
The responses, overall, were slightly more positive toward the level of 
remuneration being appropriate for students compared to appointees. (Students 
and appointees receive the same level of stipend.) In this case, the views of the 
constituent groups were all very similar except presidents, who were slightly 
more positive in regard to students and education council chairs who moved 
noticeably from disagreement on appointees to agreement on students. 
Interestingly, students were in agreement with the level of stipend for both 
appointees and themselves, while appointees were in disagreement with both. 
Colleges again revealed a range of responses, without any significant difference 
from strong agreement (College I and College Q) to strong disagreement 
(College G). College I and College Q were consistent in their support of the 
levels o f remuneration for both appointees and students, while College G was 
consistent in its condemnation of the same.
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8(a)...Faculty and support staff members and the chairs of the 
education council should be remunerated by way of a stipend
The notion of the stipend being extended to faculty, staff, and education 
council chairs produced a grand mean solidly in the direction of disagreement. 
(These employee members of boards currently receive no compensation.) 
Interestingly, only students bucked the trend and were solidly in favour of the 
notion, however, faculty were mildly in favour and staff were strictly neutral. 
Perhaps, this was an example of the union solidarity that had been the stated 
goal of those constituents. Colleges were also fairly consistent in their 
disagreement with the suggestion. Only College E with a tendency toward strong 
agreement and College A, College C, and College F in strong disagreement 
were outside the main cluster of institutions.
8(b)...Faculty and support staff members and the chairs of the 
education council should be remunerated by way of release 
time.
The suggestion that faculty, staff, and education council chairs should be 
remunerated for their sen/ice to the board with release time from instructional or 
service duties brought a grand mean tending toward agreement, but the one-way 
ANOVA revealed significant difference among the constituent groups. A post-hoc 
analysis, using the Scheffe technique, indicated that the difference existed
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between appointees (agreement) and presidents (strong disagreement), staff 
(strong agreement) and presidents, and education council chairs (strong 
agreement) and presidents. Thus, the presidents were revealed to be totally out 
of line with all the other constituents in their opposition to release time. It should 
be noted that the presidents had also disagreed with the suggestion of a stipend 
for the same employee members. Interesting too was the strongly positive 
position of staff members on release time, because this is not the traditional form 
of remuneration for this group of employees. Colleges ranged widely from 
disagreement (College E, College I, and College P) to College B with a perfect 
mean score of 5.000 indicating strong agreement. The majority of colleges fell 
into the agreement range of values.
Summary
Generally, all constituent groups were positive toward elements of power 
sharing connected with general matters of board business. These elements 
included boards’ climate of trust, members’ contribution, members’ equity, and 
the various terms of office of the members. In addition, constituents were positive 
toward existing levels of remuneration for appointees and students. However, 
they were not all of one mind on the issue of remuneration for faculty, staff, and 
education council chairs. While generally negative toward the suggestion of a 
stipend for the employee members, all but the presidents were in agreement that
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the employees should be granted release time. The presidents were in strong 
disagreement causing significant statistical difference with three other constituent 
groups. There was usually a wide range of responses among colleges on each 
question with a fair bit of variation from question to question. However, in the 
area of sharing of power overall, College B, College K, and College L emerged 
as the most positive institutions while College F, College G, and College P were 
the least positive. In the comparison of the two studies, the only areas of 
significant difference emerged on the issue of the appropriateness of the six year 
term for appointees between the two studies and among the constituent groups. 
In conclusion, participants were generally positive toward the elements of 
sharing of power which contribute to an effective shared governance 
environment in the context of matters of general board business.
Board Financial Matters;
Sharing o f Power
22...AII members of my board have equal independence and 
disinterest when it comes to dealing with budget issues.
The grand mean on this statement showed a very weak tendency toward 
agreement and reflected similar tendencies from all constituents except 
presidents who were in solid disagreement. This result proved to be the second 
of a series of instances where the presidents expressed a negative view that was
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totally different from all of the other participants. The implications o f this trend on 
a value based question such as this are, indeed, troubling. While the views of the 
other respondents were not particularly positive, the highest being stafF with a 
mean score of 3.571, the fact that the presidents were suggesting that conflict of 
interest is affecting the budget process may be a harbinger of further issues to 
come. In a manner similar to the constituent groups, most colleges’ mean scores 
hovered around neutral and marginally toward agreement. However, College K 
stood out in absolute agreement whereas College L, College O, College P, and 
College Q tended toward disagreement.
23...Elected and ex-officio board members have an inevitable 
vested interest when dealing with budget issues.
This statement is really a matter of fact and was included to test the level 
of acknowledgment of such among the constituents. The outcome was general 
agreement except for the education council chairs who remained neutral. 
Interestingly, staff provided the most positive responses. Colleges’ means were 
far more widely dispersed than the constituents and included three colleges, 
College B, College H, and College L, which tended toward strong agreement 
while College Q came out solidly in disagreement. The disparity of responses on 
this question was quite surprising and may have influenced some o f the more 
value based questions to follow.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
195
33...The composition of the board has made it more difficult to
balance the budget fn these tight financial times.
The grand mean tended solidly toward disagreement, suggesting that the 
composition of boards in this shared governance era has not made it more 
difficult to balance budgets. Colleges in British Columbia have gone through five 
years of serious fiscal restraint and have found it increasingly difficult to balance 
budgets, so much so that in the current year several small colleges have had to 
request government intervention. Among the constituents, the presidents again 
stood out clearly by agreeing with the statement, while all the others tended 
toward disagreement or strong disagreement (the latter espoused by faculty and 
students). The one-way ANOVA signaled a significant difference but the post- 
hoc analysis did not reveal any significant statistical difference between the 
presidents and any of the other participants. In the case of the responses from 
colleges, most means tended toward disagreement, as would be expected from 
the value of the grand mean. However, College B, College E, College F, and 
College Q tended toward agreement and College 0, College G, College H, 
College J, College M, and College O tended toward strong disagreement.
Summary
The sharing o f power in the context of board financial matters was the 
beginning of consideration of the tension that most likely exists in any shared
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governance model according to literature. The reason for this, apart from the fact 
that financial affairs can be difficult at the best of times and can bring out 
extreme bahaviours, was the background and occasional agendas brought to the 
boards by the internal members. The participants in the study generally agreed 
that internal members have an inevitable vested interested in matters of the 
budget, however, all but the presidents agreed that all the constituents had 
demonstrated independence from their constituencies in actual decision-making 
and disagreed that the composition of the boards, specifically the inclusion of 
internal members, had made it more difficult to balance the budget. The 
presidents were very clearly at odds with their colleagues on the above 
statements and opined disagreement and agreement, respectively. This isolation 
of their views, while not amounting to significant difference, was an indicator of 
the kind of tension which authors noted in literature. However, what was absent 
in the study was anticipated concurrence with the presidents’ views by the 
appointees. The literature would have suggested that external members would 
have shared the caution about the sharing of power on financial decision­
making, but British Columbia appointees did not follow this trend and clearly 
concurred with the views of the internal members. Colleges continued to produce 
a wide array of responses on all three statements. Some suggestion of trends 
continued to emerge with College G, College J, and College K generally 
adopting the most positive stance on the issue of power sharing in the context of 
board decision-making on financial matters. Conversely, College B, College H,
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and College P were the most negative in this section. Looking at the trends over 
the two contexts reviewed so far, i.e. general board matters and financial 
matters, College A, College K, and College L emerged as the most positive 
colleges while College E, College F, and College P were consistently tending 
toward negative.
Board Labour Realtions Matters;
Sharing of Power
34...Shared governance as a broad goal is difficult to achieve in a 
unionized environment
The issue of shared governance in a unionized environment was 
discussed extensively in the literature with most authors identifying ensuing 
difficulties, although there were some views that the two can coexist and even, in 
some few instances, stimulate one another. The issue was, of course, 
particularly pertinent to the college system (and the school system) where 
unionism has established a strong foothold as opposed to the university system 
where shared governance has the established position over unionism. In the 
British Columbia college system, the unions had established a position of 
considerable strength long before shared governance. And additionally, the 
introduction of shared governance had coincided with a relative surge in the 
powers of the unions through the government orchestrated centralization of
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collective bargaining. Perhaps not surprisingly, the statement that shared 
governance is difficult to achieve in a unionized environment brought a grand 
mean tending toward disagreement, however, the one-way ANOVA indicated a 
significant difference with all constituent groups on the disagreement side except 
for the presidents. The post-hoc analysis revealed significant difference between 
faculty (strong disagreement) and presidents (agreement) and between 
appointees (disagreement) and presidents. The latter difference signaled the 
start of a trend in this study which was completely at odds with the findings in the 
1995/96 study. In the earlier study, the researcher found that appointees and 
presidents, those who might be considered to have conceded power with the 
advent of shared governance, were noticeably more positive toward the new 
governance model than the internal members, those who might be considered to 
have gained power. This alliance of appointees and presidents was not so 
surprising and was noted in literature as often being the backbone of a shared 
governance model. However, it was a very clear that a different pattern was 
emerging in this study with the internal members joining the appointees on the 
positive side while the presidents were beginning to stand alone on the negative 
side.
Colleges, again, reported differing values ranging from agreement 
(College A and College C) to strong disagreement (College G, College K, and 
College P). The majority o f colleges tended toward disagreement and one has to 
assume that their views would be largely built upon their own experiences within
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their own institutions. This statement had also been examined in the 1995/96 
study and permitted comparison through the passage of time. The two-way 
ANOVA revealed no significant difference between the two studies, significant 
difference among the constituent groups, and no significant interaction between 
the two sources of study. The trends over the passage of time among the 
constituents were interesting to note. While appointees and students shifted from 
positions of agreement to disagreement and faculty shifted from disagreement to 
strong disagreement, the presidents simply strengthened their agreement with 
the statement. Thus the movement in values between the two studies had begun 
to crystallize.
35...Labour relations, in particular the negotiation and administering 
of collective agreements, has caused division among the members 
of my board.
There was close to disagreement overall on the suggestion that labour 
relations has caused division among the board members in spite of their 
disparate backgrounds. But, as has been noted already as a trend, the 
presidents were out of step even in expressing very weak agreement in contrast 
to all the other constituent groups who expressed disagreement or strong 
disagreement in the case of the support staff. Again, in the analysis of colleges, 
there emerged the now familiar pattern of most colleges being clustered around 
the mean, in this case signifying disagreement with the statement, and a few
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colleges expressing extreme views. The latter included College C, College E, 
and College Q on the side o f neutrality or agreement and College G, College K, 
and College P on the side of strong disagreement. The last named college was 
absolute in its rejection of the statement scoring a mean o f 1.000.
44...Student board members should play a full part in decision­
making on labour relations issues.
There was almost universal support for the notion of student board 
members playing a full part in decision-making on labour relations issues. The 
Ministry of Advanced Education, Training, and Technology directed all colleges 
to adopt a prescribed conflict o f interest bylaw which provided for students to be 
involved in decision-making, notwithstanding any direct or indirect conflict of 
interest which they might be perceived to have. There was agreement from 
appointees, presidents, and education council chairs; tendency toward strong 
agreement from faculty; and totally strong agreement from students themselves 
(scoring a mean of 5.000). However, support staff were in disagreement with the 
suggestion and, presumably, that part of the legislation. This outcome was 
interesting and might be due to the somewhat traditional view o f labour relations, 
some would say an industrial view, which staff tend to hold as opposed to faculty 
who can be quite pragmatic. In that traditional view of labour relations, it was 
probably difficult to envision a presence for students.
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The one-way ANOVA of college responses revealed a significant 
difference, however, the Scheffe post-hoc test did not identify any significant 
difference among the pairs of colleges in spite of the divergent views. The grand 
mean, which indicated solid agreement with the statement, masked more 
extreme views including tendency toward strong agreement (College A, College 
C, College F, College J, College K, College L, and College P) and tendency 
toward disagreement (College B, and College I). This statement, therefore, 
brought a wider range of responses than most of the statements illustrating the 
relative uncertainty among institutions on the role of student board members.
45...Student members on my board do play a full part in decision­
making on labour relations issues.
This statement moved beyond the philosophical focus of the previous 
statement and rested on the actual role which student board members have 
assumed in the boards’ involvement in labour relations. Because it was based on 
the actual role of students, one might have assumed that the study would have 
revealed little dispersion from the mean among constituent groups but the 
possibility of wider dispersion among colleges depending on their practices. 
However, while the grand mean among constituents indicated solid agreement 
with the statement, there was a surprising range of responses from 
disagreement (from staff, and mirroring their philosophical views) to tendency 
toward strong agreement (from students).
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There was significant difference indicated among colleges’ responses but 
the post-hoc analysis failed to reveal any significant difference among the pairs 
of colleges. The views of colleges on this statement very much mirrored their 
responses on the previous statement suggesting that board members might be 
able to generally practise what they believe. Accordingly, College A, College C, 
College D, College J, College K, College O, and College P expressed tendency 
toward agreement while College B, College H, College I, and College Q came 
out on the disagreement side.
Summary
Three themes were seen to emerge among constituents on the issue of 
sharing power in the context of labour relations matters at the college board 
level. The strong view held in literature that shared governance is inherently 
difficult to introduce into a unionized environment was rejected by all the 
constituent groups except the presidents, who once again stood alone on this 
issue. In spite of the disparity in background of the constituencies, and 
particularly the often strong ties between employee members and trade unions, 
there was general agreement that labour relations has not caused any serious 
divisions at the board level. Close examination o f the student members’ role in 
labour relations brought interesting results with staff appearing to oppose the 
legislated role that students have been given while the other constituent groups
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values that staff hold toward labour relations compared to faculty.
Colleges continued to offer differing views depending on the subject but 
some trends did emerge on their views of the labour relations environment. 
College D, College K, and College P espoused generally positive views on the 
sharing of power, while College B, College I, and College Q were the most 
negative. In considering ail three contexts of power sharing, i.e. general board 
matters, financial matters, and labour relations matters, College D, College K, 
and College L emerged as most positive and College E, College F, and College 
P remained negative.
General Matters of Board Business;
Effectiveness of the Shared 
Decision-Making Process
9...The composition of my board makes an effective contribution to
the governance of the institution.
The grand mean of responses to this statement about the inclusion of 
both external and internal members on college boards tended solidly toward 
agreement. However, the one-way ANOVA indicated a significant difference 
among the constituent groups which the Scheffe test revealed to be between the 
students (strong agreement) and the presidents (weak tendency toward
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disagreement). The other constituents were also on the positive side leaving the 
presidents, once again, on their own. Most colleges were positive in their views 
with only two, College F and College P, tending toward disagreement. There was 
also strong agreement indicated by College G, College J, and College M.
The two-way ANOVA of matched statements in the 1995/96 and 1997/98 
studies revealed no significant difference between the studies or among the 
constituent groups, but significant interaction between the two sources was 
recorded. The interaction was likely due to the movement on the part of the 
students over the two studies. While the appointees, faculty, staff, and 
presidents all shifted from positions of strong agreement to agreement, the 
students shifted from a position of agreement to strong agreement.
1Q...The way my board operates makes an effective contribution to
the governance of the institution.
This statement made the distinction between the composition of boards 
and how they actually perform. As in the case of the previous statement, there 
was overall agreement that the way the boards operate makes a positive 
contribution to the governance of institutions. Again, there was also indication of 
significant difference among the constituents, but the post-hoc analysis did not 
identify any pairs where significant difference existed. There was, however, a 
noticeable range of responses from strong agreement on the part of students all 
the way to disagreement on the part o f faculty. The negative opinion expressed
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by the faculty was the first real indication that this group was not consistently 
supportive of shared governance in theory and in practice.
The one-way ANOVA of college responses also indicated significant 
difference among the colleges, but again the Scheffe test did not reveal anything 
among the pairs. However as usual, there was a fair range among the responses 
from strong agreement (College A, College D, College G, College J, College K, 
and College L) to disagreement (College E, College P, and College Q). The 
analysis of colleges over various statements seemed to consistently produce 
some quite varied results but also some discernible positive and negative trends 
on the part of certain institutions. The two-way ANOVA produced a similar set of 
results to the previous question with no significant difference between the two 
studies or among the constituents, however, there was significant interaction 
between the two sources of data. In this case, there was a good deal of shifting 
among the constituents over the two studies—students moving in a positive 
direction and appointees, faculty, staff, and presidents moving in a negative 
direction while education council chairs remained very constant. This interaction 
affect very much mirrored the affect on the previous statement which related to 
the composition of boards.
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11...The conduct of my board represents good boardsmanship.
This rather open question brought a response grand mean tending toward 
agreement and this was echoed by all the constituent groups, except the 
students who were even more positive with a strong agreement. Good 
boardsmanship, o f course, was not defined in the study and it was left to the 
interpretation of the participants. However, the researcher would assume that 
most participants would connect the kinds of qualities referred to in the study as 
the ingredients of good boardsmanship. These qualities would include instilling a 
climate of trust, making all board members feel equal, accommodating the 
different constituents’ backgrounds and dealing with their inherent conflict of 
interest in certain aspects o f board business, and being accountable as boards 
to the internal and external communities including government, ft was, therefore, 
reassuring that all constituency groups thought that their boards’ conduct was 
consistent with, at least, most o f these values. However, among colleges there 
was not the same universally positive view. Accordingly, the one-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant difference. Thirteen of the seventeen institutions 
expressed positive views with College A, College G, College J, College K, and 
College L espousing strong agreement. Of the remainder, one college was 
neutral and College F, College P, and College Q disagreed. However, the 
Scheffe test did not reveal significant difference between any o f the pairs of
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institutions. It should be noted that College F and College P had consistently 
expressed somewhat negative views so far in this analysis and, therefore, their 
low esteem concerning the conduct o f their boards was not altogether surprising.
12...My board has managed to make some difficult decisions in the 
last twq years.
This statement was intended to ascertain whether it was possible to 
attach some practical experience to the more philosophical side of making 
shared governance work. In other words, the effectiveness of the shared 
decision-making process has to be measured against actual outcomes. It is fair 
to say that recent years have been difficult for college boards, having to face the 
issues of fiscal restraint, inadequate funding, burgeoning demand for educational 
services, tense labour and governmental relations, and general questions about 
the relevancy and currency of college missions. Therefore, one would assume 
that all boards have had to face difficult decisions during this period when shared 
governance was being established in British Columbia. And the study found that 
all constituent groups were in agreement or strong agreement that their boards 
had managed to make some difficult decisions in this period with a grand mean 
score of 4.141. Alas, there was significant difference even within the overall 
positive response between the appointees (strong agreement) and the 
presidents (weakest of those in agreement). It was interesting to note that the 
students' responses came very close to absolute strong agreement, however
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they were not identified in the post-hoc test probably because of the relatively 
small population size. It may be the case that their lack of experience at the 
board level of decision-making would render questionable their interpretation of 
what would constitute difficult decisions.
In spite of trends emerging from previous statements to suggest 
inconsistency among colleges as to harmony among constituents and 
effectiveness of decision-making, all colleges were positive that difficult decisions 
have been managed at their board tables. Within the positive responses, eleven 
of the seventeen institutions tended toward strong agreement, indicating a high 
level o f board esteem in actual decision-making.
13...My board is accountable for its decisions to the internal and
external communities.
The Ministry of Advanced Education, Training, and Technology has been 
placing increased emphasis on the need for colleges to be held accountable, not 
only to their government funders but also to the public-at-large. This focus was 
prominent in the ministry’s strategic plan entitled Charting a New Course (1996). 
This issue elicited a grand mean of strong agreement, and all constituent groups 
expressed agreement or strong agreement. However, there was again significant 
difference between the appointees (strong agreement) and the presidents 
(weakest of those in agreement). This finding continued the emerging trend of a 
deep gulf between these two constituents, who had been noted in literature as
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natural partners and had been so philosophically close in the 1995/96 study 
undertaken by the researcher. Analysis of the college responses also indicated 
significant difference and, while the conservative Scheffe post-hoc test did not 
identify any pairs of colleges, it was clear that there was a wide range of 
opinions. Twelve of the seventeen institutions tended toward strong agreement 
and only one institution, College Q, was in disagreement. However College Q 
was in absolute disagreement (mean score of 2.000) and, clearly, that institution 
has a problem with its internal or external communications, at least as identified 
by a sample of board members.
14...I feel my board is fulfilling its obligations under the College 
and Institute Act
There was overall strong agreement that boards are meeting this 
fundamental requirement, however, again there was significant difference 
between two of the pairs of constituents. In this case, difference emerged 
between the appointees (tending toward strong agreement) and the presidents 
(again the weakest of those in agreement) and between the students (close to 
absolute strong agreement) and the presidents. Thus, the isolation of the 
presidents from the other constituent groups was continued on matters not only 
of a philosophical basis but also of a more practical basis. Responses among 
colleges very much mirrored those of the previous statement on accountability 
with all institutions expressing agreement or strong agreement except for College
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Q which was again in disagreement. Conversely, several colleges, including 
College A, College D, College G, College K, and College L, were very close to 
absolute strong agreement indicating that some boards are fully complying with 
the obligations of the College and Institute Act.
15...I feel the powers of the board are being diminished as more 
decisions are being centralized at the provincial level.
Much has been made in literature o f the tendency across North America 
for provinces and states to be taking decision-making powers away from 
institutional boards in favour o f locating them within the halls o f government. 
Ironically, this centralization trend has been occurring at the same time as the 
establishment of shared decision-making within the governance structures of 
colleges. On the face of it, these two trends tend to be somewhat self defeating, 
and there were signs that they are about to be repeated in British Columbia. The 
statement was intended to find out if board members were conscious of the shift 
of power and the affect on boards. The grand mean indicated solid tendency 
toward agreement among all constituents and, indeed, all of them did confirm 
that centralization is taking place. The one-way ANOVA of college responses, 
similarly, revealed that all colleges in the study either agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement. Accordingly, there appears to be clear evidence that the very 
thing which tends to undermine shared governance is happening in the province. 
One is left to wonder whether politicians consciously plan policies which are self
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defeating or whether they simply emerge accidentally from the labyrinth of 
political priority setting.
Summary
Three themes seemed to emerge from the examination of the shared 
decision-making process in the context of general board matters. The constituent 
groups were largely positive about both the composition and actions of their 
boards, although the enthusiasm of the presidents might be described as 
lukewarm. Furthermore, all constituents were positive about the boards’ 
achievements in making difficult decisions, the boards’ accountability to the 
internal and external communities, and their compliance with the obligations of 
the College and Institute Act. However, even within these positive responses, 
there emerged frequent significant differences between the appointees and the 
presidents with the former espousing strong agreement with the statements 
while the latter were, at best, lukewarm again. This section of the study really 
started to underline the gap between the values of the shared governance model 
held by the government appointed members of the boards and the institutions’ 
chief executive officers. Finally, all constituents confirmed that they felt the 
powers of the boards were being diminished as more decisions were being 
centralized at the provincial level.
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The analysis of colleges’ responses continued to produce a wide array of 
views within the overall positive outcomes to the questions. The issue of the 
shared decision-making process in the context of general board affairs revealed 
several very positive institutions, namely College G, College K, and College L. 
However, there also emerged several noticeably negative colleges where the 
workings of the boards has not been smooth sailing in the shared governance 
era. These colleges were College F, College P, and College Q. After four of the 
nine main sections to the study, it was evident that College G, College K, and 
College L were tending to consistently express positive views toward the aspects 
of shared governance, while College F, College P, and College Q were clearly 
less enthusiastic about the whole concept of shared governance.
Board Financial Matters:
Effectiveness of the Shared 
Decision-Making Process
24...I feel that elected and ex-officio board members have generally
NOT shown bias towards their own department area, or
constituency (trade or student union) when dealing with budget
issues,
The grand mean was close to agreement, however, a significant 
difference among the responses was indicated by the one-way ANOVA. Post- 
hoc testing failed to reveal significant difference between any of the pairs of
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constituents, but it was noticeable that the presidents ended up on one side, 
tending toward disagreement, while all the others were positive in agreement or 
strong agreement. The issue of whether internal members of boards show bias 
toward their own department or constituency in the budget process is one of the 
fundamental litmus tests o f the shared governance models. And, unfortunately, 
the presidents did not think that internal members had been displaying the 
necessary degree of independence. This was an important finding and was all 
the more troubling because none of the other constituent groups, notably the 
appointees, concurred with the presidents’ views. In addition, the strength o f the 
opposing views of the faculty, staff, and education councils made the presidents’ 
views all the more stark.
The one-way ANOVA of colleges’ responses brought the now familiar 
range of views contributing to overall agreement. College D, College K, College 
L, and College N were in strong agreement, while College A, and College E were 
tending toward disagreement. It was interesting to note that College A had, 
hitherto, been identified as one of the consistently positive institutions but was 
obviously troubled by the stance of internal members in budget matters.
25...I feel my board effectively discharges its fiscal responsibilities
under the College and Institute A ct
There was overall strong agreement that boards are meeting their 
legislated obligations in fiscal matters, however a significant difference among
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the responses was indicated. Subsequent post-hoc testing did not reveal any 
significant difference between the pairs of constituents who expressed strong 
agreement (appointees, faculty, and staff) or agreement (students, presidents, 
and education council chairs). In the case of colleges, significant difference was 
indicated among the seventeen reporting institutions, however, the conservative 
Scheffe technique did not reveal anything between the pairs of colleges. 
Nevertheless, responses ranged from strong agreement (College A, College B, 
College C, College D, College G—with a mean score of 5.000— College H, 
College I, College K, College L, College M, College N. College O, and College P) 
compared to the neutral stance adopted by College F and College Q, both of 
which had been previously targeted as colleges holding largely negative views of 
shared governance. A two-way ANOVA was carried out to examine the data 
from the matched question in the two studies. The analysis revealed no 
significant difference between the studies, significant difference among the 
constituents, and no significant interaction between the sources of data. The 
shifting views of the constituents was worthy of note with appointees, faculty, 
staff, and students becoming more positive over the passage of time, while 
presidents and education council chairs became more negative.
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26...My board discharges its fiduciary responsibility to all students 
from whom it collects student union fees when dealing with that 
organization.
This is a rather complex issue wherein, by virtue of the fact that college 
boards assess and collect student union fees from most, in not all, students, 
boards have a fiduciary responsibility in law to the students regarding the use of 
those fees. Therefore, when boards interact with student unions on financial 
matters, particularly those matters related directly to the fees collected from 
students, the boards have this unusual and awkward responsibility to take into 
account the interests o f students-at-large even though the students unions would 
claim that they, too, have the same responsibility. The arrival of student 
members on the boards, who commonly are student union executives, has just 
served to complicate an already complicated situation. The constituent groups 
agreed with the statement of fiduciary responsibility, although the student 
members remained neutral. It is not clear whether their neutrality was founded 
on lack of knowledge of the legal obligation of boards or reservation as to its 
appropriateness or reservation as to whether the boards had discharged the 
obligation.
Colleges, on the other hand, produced a range of responses among 
which there was significant difference. The Scheffe test did not reveal significant 
difference between any of the pairs of institutions. However, the range of
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responses extended from strong agreement (College A, College C, College D, 
College H, College I, College K, and College M) through to disagreement 
(College Q). Again, one was left with the unanswered question in the case of 
negative responses as to whether the board members believe they have not met 
the fiduciary responsibility or whether they do not believe they have the 
responsibility in the first place. Obviously, this question could only be answered 
with further research. The two-way ANOVA of responses to this matched 
statement in the studies of 1995/96 and 1997/98 revealed no significant 
difference between the studies, significant difference among the constituent 
groups, and no significant interaction between the two sources of data. In regard 
to the shift in opinions over the passage of time, faculty, staff, and education 
council chairs became more positive, presidents became more negative, while 
appointees and students basically maintained the same positions. Accordingly, 
over the two studies, appointees tended toward strong agreement and students 
tended toward disagreement, while the other groups were in agreement.
30...The board’s role is to approve the parameters and underlying 
assumptions of the budget but otherwise to leave assembly of the 
numbers to administration.
This statement spoke to the issue of leadership versus management 
which is never far from the centre of any discussion of boardsmanship in 
general, and in particular when considered in a shared governance context. The
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issue also touched on the often strong relationship between boards and their 
senior administrators which have come under closer scrutiny in the era of board 
decision-making shared with faculty, staff, and students. Prior to the study, one 
might have expected to find the appointees and the presidents with a more finely 
honed distinction of the leadership and management roles in the budget process 
than the less experienced internal members. And, that is how it turned out. There 
was general agreement with the statement among the constituent groups with 
the appointees and the presidents (along with staff) being noticeably more 
affirmative than the others. This proved to be one of the few instances where the 
appointees and presidents espoused similar strong views throughout the study.
Colleges were similarly positive toward the notion o f budget roles, with 
most colleges in the position of agreement or tendency toward strong 
agreement. However, College B disagreed with the statement and had, 
obviously, adopted a different board philosophy toward budget. The leadership/ 
management distinction was much in keeping with ends and means distinction 
espoused by John Carver (Boards that make a difference: A new design for 
leadership in nonprofit and public organizations [2nd ed.], 1997). Carver’s 
philosophy had been adopted by several, but not all, boards in British Columbia. 
Analysis of this matched statement in the two studies did not produce any 
significant difference between the two studies, among the constituent groups or 
any significant interaction between the two sources of data. There was 
somewhat marked movement in the views of the constituent groups over the two
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years between the studies. Accordingly, the appointees, faculty, students, and 
education council chairs appeared to become marginally less positive, while the 
staff and presidents became more positive.
31 ...My board ensures that all stakeholder groups have advisory
input into the budget process.
The budget process calls for a level of involvement and participation 
which often goes beyond even the principles o f a shared governance model. 
Many evaluations and studies of colleges, whether they are conducted internally 
or externally, cite the importance o f ensuring that all stakeholder groups have the 
opportunity to be informed about the budget and to provide input, if even on an 
advisory basis. The budget is simply the numerical representation of the 
institution’s plans, dreams, and fears. And, it is important that those who have a 
stake in the institution also have a stake in the exercise o f allocating the 
resources to pursue those plans.
The grand mean indicated tendency toward agreement with the statement 
that boards did ensure that stakeholder groups have advisory input into the 
budget process. Appointees and presidents were again the most positive of the 
constituent groups in agreement. And, only education council chairs were in 
disagreement. It was interesting that this particular constituent group chose this 
particular aspect of board activity to express a negative view because, by and 
large, it had tended to be positive on most aspects of board decision-making in a
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shared governance context. The colleges followed the same sort o f pattern as 
the constituent groups, with fifteen of the seventeen institutions expressing 
agreement or strong agreement. One college remained neutral, while College N 
tended toward disagreement.
32...I feel that all stakeholder groups are adequately informed about 
financial matter?.
This statement was the second half of the issue of involvement of 
stakeholders in not only the budget but all aspects of financial affairs. Literature 
had noted how stakeholders looked to the boards for reassurance that all is well 
in fiscal terms. Therefore, the boards face clear expectations on 
communications. The constituent groups in the study produced very similar 
results to those for the previous statement, however, there was a significant 
difference identified in the one-way ANOVA. Although the post-hoc analysis did 
not reveal any significant difference between the pairs of constituent groups, it 
was noticeable that the presidents tended toward strong agreement while the 
education council chairs tended toward disagreement. Thus, the latter continued 
their negative view on boards’fiscal accountability and access.
The two-way ANOVA of college responses revealed significant difference 
but further post-hoc analysis did not identify any pair o f institutions. The mean 
scores ranged from strong agreement (College A, College B, College C, College 
D, College G, College H, College I, College M, and College P) through to
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disagreement (College F) with the remainder o f the institutions tending to be 
around the weak end of agreement.
Summary
This section of the study focused on the effectiveness of the decision­
making process in the context of the boards’ role in financial matters. The 
College and Institute Act of British Columbia prescribes specific fiscal 
responsibilities for college boards, and, in addition, literature looks to boards to 
provide fiscal leadership for institutions, generally in association with their 
administrators. Hence, the importance of the financial environment at the board 
table was evident. However, the overlay of a shared governance structure likely 
has a significant impact on fiscal decision-making because the internal members 
bring different values to the board table. Employee and student members are far 
more affected by most financial decisions than external board members, whether 
it be in relation to their employment tenure, working conditions, cost of education, 
or program options. In addition, the internal members’ relationships to the 
constituencies from which they have been elected would also have a bearing on 
how they tend to react to boards’ fiscal decision-making.
The constituent groups were found to be fairly positive overall toward their 
boards’ financial processes. The lowest level of comfort was related to the most 
fundamental issue of whether internal members had shown bias toward their
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obvious affiliations when dealing with the budget. Although the grand mean 
tended toward agreement and faculty even tended toward strong agreement that 
internal members had NOT shown bias, the presidents tended weakly toward 
disagreement. This single assessment of the shared governance culture was 
very important because it touched on its integrity, and if that should be in doubt 
one could foresee extreme difficulties ahead. Further examination o f the boards' 
role in ensuring accessibility and openness to financial affairs found that it was 
generally endorsed by the constituents, but with two notable observations. The 
appointees and the presidents were found by the researcher in the 1995/96 
study to be the most positive about the fledgling shared governance model in 
British Columbia. However, in this study, a very noticeable gap had developed 
between the two constituents on a number of statements so far, with appointees 
remaining positive while presidents frequently expressed negative views. This 
new trend did not occur in these two statements related to the boards' ensuring 
openness of financial affairs, rather the appointees and the presidents were very 
positive on their boards’ performances. However, the education council chairs, 
who by and large were positive in this study about shared governance, 
expressed quite negative views on the openness issue. It is not clear what 
prompted this isolated negative assessment.
Colleges continued to show variable results on different sections of the 
study and even on statements within a particular section. This volatility was, no 
doubt, reflective of the specific nuances present in each institution’s board. In
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context of board financial matters, College D, College G, and College H 
appeared to be most positive about their performance, while college E, College 
F, and College Q were most negative. On an overall basis having examined five 
of the nine sections of the study, discernible trends had emerged from the 
volatile data to suggest that College D, College G, and College K were most 
positive toward the shared governance model. Conversely, College F, College P, 
and College Q had generally expressed the most negative views.
Board Labour Relations Matters:
Effectiveness of the Shared 
Decision-Making Process
36...Labour relations has largely become a centralized provincial 
issue, hence my board has not experienced any difficulties in 
decision-making due to the presence of elected and ex-officio 
members.
This opening statement in the section of the study on decision-making 
process in the context of board labour relations matters continued the 
exploration of the affects o f provincial centralization. The statement suggested 
that the presence of employee members possibly causing difficulty on boards 
due to their conflict of interest was a moot point anyhow because the 
centralization of collective bargaining had reduced the boards’ involvement. The
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grand mean was a very weak tendency toward disagreement, but really more of 
a neutral stance. The conclusions from this answer were somewhat ambiguous— 
-it could suggest disagreement that centralization had taken place, it could 
suggest that the internal members had caused difficulties, and it was unclear 
whether the two outcomes have been dependent upon one another. Further 
questions in this section attempted to unravel the mystery. Meanwhile, the 
constituents’ responses were clustered closely around the mean with no 
discernible trends to interpret. The one-way ANOVA of college responses 
revealed significant difference and, although the post-hoc test did not identify 
any pairs of institutions, there was a far greater dispersal from the mean than 
there had been for the constituent groups. College K, consistently one of the 
most positive colleges, strongly agreed with the statement. Thereafter, eight 
colleges tended toward agreement while eight colleges tended toward 
disagreement. Many of the mean scores on both sides of neutral were, 
nevertheless, very close to 3.000 and the general conclusion on this statement 
was that constituent groups and colleges were neutral.
37...I feel my board effectively discharges its labour relations 
responsibilities under the College and Institute A ct
In spite of the fact that much of the colleges’ labour relations had come 
under the control of the provincial government and was being transacted at a 
central table rather than at each campus, the College and Institute Act does
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clearly lay out responsibilities for boards. The researcher would suggest that the 
centralization tendency has made the boards' tasks more difficult rather than 
easier, and it was with that underlying premise that this statement was explored. 
There was strong agreement that legislative responsibilities have been 
discharged by boards. However, the one-way ANOVA indicated significant 
difference among the responses. The post-hoc analysis did not reveal significant 
difference between pairs of responses, but it was clear that the constituents fell 
into two camps. The appointees and students tended toward strong agreement 
while the other groups all tended toward agreement.
All colleges expressed agreement or strong agreement with the exception 
of College Q which remained neutral. This suggested, very clearly, that 
notwithstanding the provincial centralization taking place, both constituent 
groups and colleges were more than satisfied that boards were fulfilling their 
obligations in an effective manner. The two-way ANOVA of the data from the 
present study and the earlier study conducted in 1995/96 indicated no significant 
difference between the studies, but there was significant difference among the 
constituent groups and significant interaction between the two sources of study. 
The strong interaction confirmed much position shifting among the constituents 
over the passage of time. Faculty and education council chairs became 
marginally more positive over the period, staff and students became notably 
more positive, while appointees retained just about the same views and 
presidents became notably less positive. Therefore, the very general trend
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emerging in the study of the presidents losing confidence in the shared 
governance model manifested itself in this important assessment o f boards’ 
performances.
38...I feel my board would have generally adopted a different 
direction in labour relations over the last two years if the board did 
not include elected and ex-officio members.
The issue of the possible interaction between the centralization of the 
boards’ powers of decision-making on labour relations matters and the impact of 
local shared governance on such decision making continued to be explored in 
the next three statements. There was a solid tendency toward disagreement with 
suggestion that boards’ may have pursued different policy on labour matters if 
their membership had not included employees. However, the one-way ANOVA 
indicated significant difference among the constituents’ responses. The Scheffe 
test revealed significant difference between the appointees ( tending toward 
strong disagreement) and the education council chairs (tending toward 
agreement). This was an interesting opinion from the latter, who were joined on 
the agreement side by the staff group, because it also was at variance with the 
views of the faculty group. Most, but not all, education council chairs are elected 
from the faculty.
Colleges were emphatic in their disagreement with the suggestion that 
internal members had influenced boards’ direction in labour relations. Only
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College C remained neutral, while thirteen institutions tended toward 
disagreement. What was more notable was the fact that three colleges (College 
K, College L, and College P) expressed strong disagreement and the mean 
score of the last named was 1.000. Clearly, there no evidence in the minds of 
those board members that the boards’ integrity toward labour relations had been 
compromised through shared governance.
39...I feel my board would have generally adopted a different 
direction in labour relations over the last two years if provincial 
centralization had not taken place.
This statement explored the second potential influence on the direction in 
labour relations adopted by colleges. Centralization has amounted to the 
creation of two-tier collective bargaining in which the main issues, including all 
monetary items, were moved from local tables to a provincial setting and an 
increase generally in the influence of the government and provincial unions to 
the exclusion o f college boards and union locals at the campus level.
There was the weakest tendency toward agreement with the statement, 
really not amounting to more than a neutral position. However, there was 
significant difference among the constituents. And, this proved to be between 
faculty (tending toward strong disagreement) and presidents (tending toward 
agreement) and between faculty and education council chairs (also tending 
toward agreement). Again, the disparity between faculty and education council
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chairs was interesting. As was the analysis of the other constituents—the 
provincially appointed members disagreed with the statement about government 
influence, while the unionized stafF and students agreed with it. Colleges, again, 
provided a wide array of responses, albeit without any significant difference. 
College B had a mean score of 4.000 indicating absolute agreement and was 
joined by seven other institutions tending toward agreement. Conversely, while 
two colleges were neutral, six tended toward disagreement and College P 
tended toward strong disagreement. The reason for the difference between 
College B and College P not being of statistical significance was probably due to 
the small population sizes.
40..I feel my board would have generally adopted a different 
direction in labour relations over the last two years if the board did 
not include elected and ex-officio members and if provincial 
centralization had not taken place.
The final statement in this section of the study pieced together the two 
factors which potentially had influenced labour relations at the board level. The 
contention that the direction adopted by boards would have been different if both 
the influences had been absent was not supported, the grand mean tending 
toward disagreement. However, there were significant differences, this time 
again being between faculty (tending toward strong disagreement) and 
presidents (tending toward agreement) and between faculty and education 
council chairs (tending toward agreement). College patterns were somewhat
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similar to the previous statement with three institutions in agreement, two 
remaining neutral, and twelve on the negative side with College P again in strong 
disagreement. The conclusion, therefore, appears to be that neither shared 
governance nor provincial centralization had affected the direction that boards 
had set in relation to their labour relations.
Summary
The board members’ overall views on how boards had met their 
obligations under the College and Institute Act were positive. This finding was 
important because boards have a key role in labour relations, the most notable 
aspect of which is the fact they are the employers of reference under the 
provincial labour code. Two factors were suggested by the researcher as having 
had a significant impact on how boards deal with labour matters, namely the 
trend toward centralization by the provincial government and the presence of 
employee members on boards as a result of shared governance. The overall 
responses were fairly firm rejection of the suggestions, however, both the 
presidents and the education council chairs agreed that boards might have taken 
a different direction if either or both of the factors had not been present. That 
said, the other constituent groups were quite clear that boards would not have 
changed their approach to labour relations in the different circumstances 
contemplated. Colleges tended to follow the patterns that had been established
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in earlier sections of the study. Consequently, College G and College K, two of 
the three most positive institutions toward shared governance throughout the 
study, were most positive in this section also, along with College P. Similarly, 
College E and College F, two of the three least positive institutions, were least 
positive here along with College M.
General Matters of Board Business:
How Conflict of Interest 
has been Addressed
16...The president should be a non-voting ex-officio member of the 
baaed,
This final part of the study looked at conflict of interest as it might affect 
the internal members in the shared governance structure. In this section, the 
unusual status of the presidents and the education council chairs, which was of 
course legislated, was examined. In regard to the non-voting ex-officio status of 
presidents, there was strong agreement, overall, with education council chairs 
being the most enthusiastic and the presidents, themselves, being the least 
enthusiastic, although still in agreement. Colleges were similarly supportive of 
the status quo with all institutions either agreeing or strongly agreeing. College G 
and College P had mean scores of 5.000 signaling absolute strong agreement. 
Finally, the two-way ANOVA of responses from the two studies did not reveal
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any significant difference between the studies, among the constituent groups, or 
in the interaction between the two sources of data. These latter findings 
suggested that there had been no material shifts in views with the passage of 
time and, obviously, the experience gained of seeing the presidents function 
within their prescribed status. However, it is fair to note that appointees, faculty, 
staff, students and presidents all showed marginal movement toward 
disagreement with the status, but not to any significant effect.
17...The president should be a full voting member of the board.
This statement was, of course, the opposite of the previous statement and 
the researcher anticipated the opposite responses. And indeed, that was the way 
it turned out, with strong disagreement from all but the presidents, who 
nevertheless did disagree. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that the 
constituent groups support the status quo as far as the presidents’ role on the 
boards is concerned. The colleges responded in much the same manner as the 
constituent groups with all mean scores being in the disagree and strongly 
disagree range. Two colleges, College F and College O, were in absolute 
disagreement. Interestingly, they were not the institutions which had been in 
absolute agreement on the previous statement. Finally, there was no significant 
difference indicated in the comparison between the 1995/96 study and the 
1997/98 study. However, appointees, staff, students, and presidents expressed
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very marginal movement toward agreement with the statement and education 
council chairs actually moved in the opposite direction, although again not in any 
statistically significant way.
18...The chair of the education council should be a non-voting ex­
officio member of the board.
Attention now turned to the education council chairs. And, the outcome 
very much mirrored that of the presidents, albeit with less enthusiasm. The grand 
mean and the means of most the constituents were in the agreement range, but 
the education council chairs actually tended toward disagreement. The colleges 
were a little less emphatic on this statement than they had been toward the 
presidents. Within an overall tendency toward agreement, there were four strong 
agreements, including a mean score of 5.000 from College P (as it had in regard 
to presidents). However, there were also two colleges, College J and College Q, 
which disagreed with the status quo in this case. The two-way ANOVA of 
responses from the two studies revealed significant difference between the two 
studies amounting to a discernible weakening in the degree of overall 
agreement, but no significant difference among the constituent groups or in the 
interaction between the two sources. Faculty, staff, students, presidents, and 
education council chairs all expressed less positive views with the passage of 
time.
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19...The chair of the education council should be a full voting 
member of the board.
The grand mean on this suggestion that education council chairs should 
be full voting members of boards was a solid disagreement, but again it was 
nowhere near as emphatic as it had been for the presidents. All constituent 
groups were in disagreement except the education council chairs who tended 
toward agreement. It was noted that the chairs clearly advocated full 
membership for themselves and non-voting status for the presidents. It would be 
interesting, in a follow-up study, to ascertain the rationale for the distinction.
The analysis of the colleges revealed some extreme views along with the 
general opinion of disagreement (expressed by nine institutions). College Q, a 
not infrequent provider of extreme views, was in absolute agreement with the 
statement, while College J and College K tended toward agreement and College 
I remained neutral. On the negative side, College D, College F, and College Q 
tended toward strong disagreement, while College G was in absolute 
disagreement. Therefore, colleges differed greatly in their views on this issue, 
although not with any statistical significance, again probably because of the 
population sizes. Comparative analysis of this matched question in the two 
studies revealed significant difference between the studies amounting to a 
discernible weakening in the degree of overall disagreement, but no significant 
difference among the constituent groups or in the interaction between the two
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sources. All of the constituents, with the exception o f the presidents, expressed 
marginally more positive views over the passage o f time on the notion of voting 
status for the education council chairs.
2Q...The bylaw and/or policy regarding conflict of interest adopted 
at my institution is generally accepted by all board members as fair 
and workable.
When shared governance was introduced into British Columbia by way of 
Bill 22, colleges immediately set about drawing up bylaws to manage their 
process and, in particular, to address the inherent conflict that internal board 
members brought to the table. Under the College and Institute Act, bylaws are 
required to be approved by the Minister of Advanced Education, Training, and 
Technology. Subsequently, government decided to hand down a prescribed 
bylaw for all institutions to adopt which limited the circumstances in which 
employee members could be considered in conflict of interest and, virtually, 
absolved student members in all circumstances. Why the government chose this 
approach is not known by the researcher, but one can only assume that it was 
receiving informal feedback from interested parties when colleges were 
attempting to draft their own bylaws. In any case, a number o f colleges felt that, 
although the government’s intentions were clear in its bylaw, the language had 
ambiguities. Consequently, a few colleges developed custom policy to expand
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the position on conflict of interest contained in the bylaw. College policies do not 
require approval o f the Minister.
The one-way ANOVA of responses from the constituent groups produced 
a grand mean indicating solid agreement with the suggestion that the bylaw, and 
policy if appropriate, on conflict of interest was fair and workable. Significant 
difference was suggested among the constituents, but the post-hoc analysis 
failed to reveal any matched pairs. However, while all constituents gave positive 
responses there was a wide range o f convictions from the appointees (tending 
toward strong agreement) to the presidents (with the weakest tendency toward 
agreement). It was notable that the students, who had been given something of 
a “carte blanche” in the bylaw, were not particularly enthusiastically in agreement 
either.
This statement brought a wide array of views from colleges and, for the 
first time in the study, the post-hoc analysis revealed several significant 
differences between pairs of institutions. Responses ranged from tendency 
toward strong agreement to tendency toward disagreement. Specifically, 
significant difference was identified between College A (strong agreement) and 
College M (disagreement); between College D (strong agreement) and College 
M; between College G (strong agreement) and College M; between College I 
(strong agreement) and College M; between College K (strong agreement) and 
College M; between College L (strong agreement) and College M; and between 
College N (strong agreement) and College M. It is not known by the researcher
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which colleges had developed policy to augment their bylaw and whether this 
would have had a bearing on the responses. Moreover, further research in this 
area would be warranted to determine if the negative views o f College M, and 
College P which expressed similar opinions, were based on actual experiences 
with the bylaw or just in principle.
This was a matched statement in the two studies and allowed for a two- 
way ANOVA. No significant difference was revealed between the studies, among 
the constituent groups, or in the interaction between the sources of data. 
However, it was noted that the constituents experienced differing shifts of 
opinion between the studies. Appointees, faculty, and education council chairs 
became more positive about the suggestion that the bylaw was fair and 
workable, while staff, students, and presidents became less positive. This issue 
is obviously still volatile within constituent groups and within particular colleges 
four years after the bylaw was handed down by the provincial government.
21 ...Conflict of interest has not been a problem with my board.
Many authors in literature reviewed in Chapter II suggested that the issue 
of conflict of interest which is attached to the internal members of boards was the 
single greatest threat to successful shared governance. This final statement in 
this section of the study was plain and simple. Had conflict o f interest been a 
problem? The grand mean of responses from the constituent groups was a fairly
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solid tendency toward agreement that conflict of interest had NOT been a 
problem. Four of the constituents—appointees; faculty; staff; and education 
council chairs—signaled agreement, while students and presidents tended 
toward disagreement. The disparity between the appointees and the presidents, 
as the “independent reporters” on potential “unionized members’ conflict of 
interest”, was interesting. Of course, presidents, even without any union 
affiliation might also be considered as internal members with conflict of interest. 
But somehow, at least in literature, the presidents were seen to be on a higher 
ground solely in pursuit of the common good. It all depends how they are 
perceived by their board colleagues. The position of the students was equally 
interesting and worthy of further study to determine the nature of the problem 
they had acknowledged.
The one-way ANOVA of colleges’ responses indicated significant 
difference within the wide range of opinions. The Scheffe test revealed 
significant difference between College K (strong agreement) and College M 
(strong disagreement). Both colleges had, of course, differed on the previous 
statement concerning the fairness and workability of their bylaw on conflict of 
interest. Consequently, the difference on de facto conflict of interest was perhaps 
not so surprising. Three other colleges were in the strong agreement range, 
seven colleges were in agreement, two colleges were neutral, two colleges were 
in disagreement, and one other college was in strong disagreement. Hence, 
there was a very wide range of responses indicating very differing climates at
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campuses. This volatility was subsequently examined in the financial and labour 
relations environments.
Summary
In this section, clear, unanimous support was found for the non-voting 
status of the presidents on college boards in preference to any contemplation of 
voting status. In contrast, there was less emphatic support for similar treatment 
of the education council chairs, and that support was changing overtim e 
suggesting that we may not be far away from the point where voting status would 
be advocated. Indeed, the education council chairs, themselves, had shifted over 
the two studies to now be in support of full voting status. All constituent groups, 
with varying degrees of enthusiasm, agreed that their bylaw, and policy if it 
existed, on conflict of interest was considered to be fair and workable. However, 
only four of the constituents agreed that conflict of interest has not been a 
problem in their institutions. Students and presidents suggested that there had 
been problems. And, that suggestion also emerged among colleges. Four 
institutions strongly disagreed on the statement and significant difference was 
revealed between College M (among the four) and seven colleges which agreed 
with the statement. This polarization of opinions on one of the most contentious 
aspects of shared governance would be further explored later in the study to 
seek reasons for the different outcomes on certain campuses.
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In this section, the most positive colleges were College G, College N, and 
College P and, taking into account all the data so far, College A, College G, and 
College K had emerged as the most positive institutions toward shared 
governance in general. In contrast, the most negative colleges, in this section, 
were College J, College M, and College Q, while overall College E, College F, 
and College Q were as the most negative. Thus, several colleges were having 
different experiences on conflict of interest in general board decision-making 
matters. Perhaps this was due simply to their culture and history or perhaps it 
was also due to the prescribed nature of the conflict of interest bylaw under 
which each institution must operate. The application of this regulation in the more 
volatile environments of financial affairs and labour relations matters was further 
explored in this study.
Board Financial Matters:
How C onflict o f Interest 
has been Addressed
27...My board has dealt effective ly w ith the issue o f co n flic t o f 
interest as it  relates to  student board members w ith respect to  
financial m atters between th e board and the studen t union, such as 
tu ition  and other fees.
The government prescribed bylaw on conflict of interest stated that 
student board members were not to be considered in conflict of interest and
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should be allowed to vote on tuition fee issues. The rationale for this clause was 
that tuition decisions affect all students, not just the student board members 
themselves. In addition, many student board members are also student union 
executives which makes for a potentially difficult time when boards are engaged 
in discussions with student unions over financial matters, including potential 
tuition fee increases. (It should be noted that tuition had been frozen in British 
Columbia by the provincial government for the last two years for reasons 
including heavy lobbying by the Canadian Federation of Students.) This potential 
area of tension for boards was examined in this question. The grand mean 
indicated solid agreement with the suggestion that boards had handled the 
situation effectively. Furthermore, all constituent groups were in agreement 
including the appointees, who tended toward strong agreement. Given the 
expansive nature of the conflict of interest bylaw in terms of student members’ 
rights, it was somewhat surprising that all board members felt that they had 
effectively dealt with the issue of conflict of interest.
Colleges were also positive about how the student situation had been 
handled. Five colleges expressed strong agreement, while nine colleges 
expressed agreement. Further, two colleges remained neutral, and one college, 
College Q, tended toward disagreement. The two-way ANOVA of data from the 
two studies indicated that there was no significant difference between the 
studies, among the constituent groups, or in the interaction between the two 
sources of study. The individual groups reported very marginal shifts in their
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views between the two studies, although some moved in a positive direction and 
others toward negative.
28...The College and Institute Act provision that students may vote
on proposed tuition fee increases is appropriate.
This question was a straight forward exploration of views o f the 
appropriateness of the government prescribed bylaw which allows student board 
members to vote on tuition issues. This provision appeared to fly in the face of 
accepted standards of conflict of interest with regard to pecuniary interests in an 
issue to which board members were being asked to vote. The study found very 
modest agreement overall with the appropriateness of the provision. The one­
way ANOVA, however, indicated significant difference among the respondents. 
And, the post-hoc analysis revealed the difference between appointees (showing 
solid tendency toward agreement) and the presidents (tendency toward strong 
disagreement). Thus, the erstwhile joint proponents of shared governance in the 
previous study and the natural allies according to the literature appeared once 
again to be headed in different philosophical directions. Furthermore, staff also 
disagreed with the statement and, hence, not for the first time in this study sided 
with the presidents. Faculty, students, and education council chairs were all fairly 
solidly in agreement.
The one-way ANOVA of colleges’ responses also revealed significant 
difference, but this could not be pinpointed among any pairs of institutions in the
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post-hoc analysis. However, the analysis revealed a range o f responses from a 
tendency toward strong agreement (College K and College L) to a tendency 
toward disagreement (College E, College H, College M, College N, and College 
O) and strong disagreement from College F. Therefore, this issue produced a set 
of fairly polarized responses to what was a question of principle but may have 
been answered based on particular experiences at individual campuses.
29...Elected student board members should be d isqualified from 
sim ultaneously ho ld ing office in the ir respective student unions 
because o f the perceived co n flic t o f interest on f inancial matters.
This final question in this section on conflict of interest in the context of 
financial decision-making was, again, an issue of principle, although the 
responses were always likely to be influenced by particular experiences at the 
local board level. The Canadian Federation of Students, the parent body of some 
but not ail local student unions, made it very clear from the minute that shared 
governance was contemplated in British Columbia that it saw the opportunity to 
unite with the trade unions in order to wrest power away from appointed boards, 
and probably administrators as well. In addition, it was clear that the Federation 
saw its board members as being representative of the union movement rather 
than in pursuit of the common good. Consequently, a large number of student 
board members are also student union executives. The study found a weak 
tendency overall toward disagreement with the notion that students should be
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disqualified from simultaneously holding office in both organizations. However, 
again staff and presidents went against the tide to agree with the statement. 
Perhaps the former felt the way they did through a sense of what is appropriate 
based on old fashioned union values of labour and management roles. That 
would be tested in a later question. Other constituent groups were all in 
agreement with the statement.
The one-way ANOVA of colleges’ views again indicated significant 
difference, but the conservative Scheffe test did not reveal any differences 
among the matched pairs of colleges, probably due to small population sizes. 
However, the analysis did produce a wide range of responses from tendency to 
strong agreement (College H) and agreement (College P and College Q) through 
to disagreement (10 colleges) and strong disagreement (College K). The two- 
way ANOVA of responses from the two studies revealed no significant difference 
between the studies, among the constituent groups, or in the interaction between 
the two sources of data. However, the means indicated that staff and presidents 
had experienced modest movement toward agreement with the statement over 
the two studies, while students and education council chairs had experienced 
modest movement in the opposite direction.
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Summary
This section on conflict o f interest in the context of the boards’ financial 
decision-making concentrated on the role of the student members. Weak 
agreement overall was recorded on the appropriateness of students being able 
to vote on matters concerning tuition, a provision prescribed by the provincial 
government. This issue brought out significant difference between the oft cited 
allies, appointees and presidents, with the latter being in strong disagreement. 
Similarly, there was weak disagreement with the notion that student members 
should be disqualified from simultaneously holding office on the boards and 
student unions. However, both staff and presidents dissented from the general 
views on both the issue of voting and dual office. All constituent groups felt that 
boards had effectively handled the de facto conflict of interest of student 
members when dealing with the student unions on financial matters.
Colleges continued, in this area of examination of conflict of interest, to 
exhibit trends which reflected the overall trends in the study to a large extent. 
Accordingly, two of the three most positive colleges in this section (College A 
and College K) were also the most positive overall. Further, College L emerged 
as positive here but College G remained, on average, more positive overall. On 
the negative side, College F, College M, and College Q emerged in this section 
with College F and College M continuing their trend over all sections so far. 
College E had also shown consistent negative trends overall.
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Board Labour Relations:
How Conflict o f Interest 
has been Addressed
41 ...The elected and ex-officio board members have lived up  to their 
oath of office to the board in contributing to my board’s role in 
labour relations.
The inclusion of an oath of office for all board members to swear was a 
controversial and surprising element of Bill 22, the legislation which introduced 
shared governance to British Columbia. Oaths of office are not a big part of 
Canadian culture, being more common in American public life. No doubt, 
however, the insertion of an oath into the college governance environment was 
intended to head off problems faced by the new internal members with their 
almost inherent perceived conflict of interest. What the oath did not really 
address was the fundamental ethical dilemma of whether a person can serve two 
causes when they might be in competition with one another. That point was not 
lost on some union executives who expressed concern with the need to swear 
allegiance to their boards (as well as to their unions).
The study found that there was overall tendency toward strong agreement 
that the elected and ex-officio board members had lived upto their oath of office 
in contributing to their boards’ role in labour relations. However, there was a 
significant difference among the responses and the Scheffe post-hoc test
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
245
revealed it to be between the appointees (strong agreement) and the presidents 
(very weak tendency toward agreement) and between the faculty (strong 
agreement) and the presidents. Thus, the presidents extremely lukewarm 
acknowledgment of the internal members’ honouring of the oath set the chief 
executive officers aside from ail the other constituent groups and continued to 
demonstrate their diminishing values of shared governance in general and the 
ethical performance o f the internal members in particular.
The one-way ANOVA of responses by colleges also indicated significant 
difference. However, the post-hoc analysis did not reveal any difference between 
the matched pairs of colleges, all of which were in agreement or strong 
agreement with the exception o f College F which remained neutral. Eleven of the 
institutions indicated strong agreement with the statement, suggesting clear 
compliance with the oath of office at those campuses.
42...My board has dealt effectively with the issue of conflict of 
interest as it relates to elected and ex-officio board members with 
respect to matters of administering collective agreements.
This question built on the oath of office issue and really approached 
conflict of interest from another angle, namely have boards taken adequate 
steps to eliminate conflict of interest from decision-making on labour matters? 
The constituent groups produced a grand mean which tended solidly toward 
agreement with the statement. However, once again there was significant
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difference between the appointed members, tending toward strong agreement, 
and the presidents, tending toward disagreement. Accordingly, the once strong 
allies were again tom apart on a fundamental issue surrounding shared 
governance, demonstrating the philosophical and practical gulf which had 
developed between the two constituents.
Responses from the colleges produces a number o f significant differences 
reflecting the varying experiences at the campus level. The differences were 
between College A (strong agreement) and College Q (strong disagreement), 
between College D (strong agreement) and College M (disagreement), Between 
College D and College Q, between College I (strong agreement) and College Q, 
between College K (strong agreement) and College M, between College K and 
College Q, and between College L (strong disagreement) and College Q.
Clearly, College M and College Q, in particular, had developed very tense labour 
relations environments in the context of shared governance. The two-way 
ANOVA of responses from the 1995/96 and current studies revealed no 
significant difference between the two studies, among the constituent groups, or 
in the interaction between the two sources of data. The means of the constituent 
groups over the two studies showed that there had been very marginal positive 
and negative shifts among the respondents.
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43...My board has employed a personnel or labour relations 
committee from which some board members are excluded on the 
basis of their perceived or real conflict of interest
One possible avenue available to boards within the provisions of the 
College and Institute Act and the provincially prescribed conflict of interest bylaw, 
should they wish to isolate internal members from labour relations decision­
making, was to create an executive committee for that purpose. For, the 
composition of that committee would be at the discretion of the majority of board 
members. The findings of the study were disagreement with the statement that 
the option had been taken. Strangely though, there was a range to the 
responses of what was a question of fact, with faculty tending toward agreement 
and students remaining neutral.
Local differences in approach to this issue were always more likely to be 
revealed in the analysis of colleges’ responses. And, that emerged in the 
findings with significant difference between College I, in strong agreement, and 
College M, in strong disagreement. In addition, two other institutions indicated by 
their strong agreement that they had adopted the executive committee model. 
The vast majority of colleges indicated, however, that had not gone that route.
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46...Elected employee members and ex-officio members should be 
disqualified from simultaneously holding office in their respective 
trade unions.
This final question in the section on labour relations was similar to that 
concerning student members in financial affairs in that it suggested employee 
members should be disqualified from simultaneously holding office on boards 
and trade unions. The grand mean indicated weak tendency toward agreement 
but consisted of an even split in views between appointees, students, and 
presidents (in agreement) and faculty, staff, and education council chairs (in 
disagreement). Accordingly, the results meant that staff had favoured student 
disqualification but not their own, while students had favoured staff 
disqualification but not their own. Interesting too, was the agreement on the part 
of the three non-trade union constituent groups as to the proposed 
disqualification of the three trade union groups.
Colleges’ responses were well spread out, with College M indicating 
strong agreement and seven institutions in agreement. Conversely, in addition to 
two neutral colleges, six colleges were in disagreement and College K strongly 
disagreed. Therefore, this philosophical issue, which may well have been 
influenced by local experiences, produced quite a split among the colleges. The 
two-way ANOVA of responses from the two studies did not reveal any significant 
difference between the studies, among the constituent groups, or in the
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interaction between the two sources of data. There was very little movement on 
the constituents’ views over the two studies with the exception of students who 
changed from disagreement to agreement and education council chairs who 
changed in the opposite direction.
Summary
This was the ninth and final section of the study to explore decision­
making and aspects of leadership by constituent group and college. In this case, 
labour relations matters and how conflict of interest has been addressed were 
the areas of focus. Constituent groups were in strong agreement that the internal 
members have lived upto their oath of office when being involved in decision­
making concerning labour relations and, in particular, their own collective 
agreements. Further, the constituents were in agreement that boards had dealt 
effectively with the inherent conflict of interest faced by internal members in the 
same area of board business. However, both statements once again brought out 
significant difference in the views between the appointees and the presidents, 
with the latter very weakly agreeing with the first statement and disagreeing with 
the second statement. These findings were final confirmation of the extreme 
reservation, and at times outright disagreement, about the ability o f the internal 
members to lay aside their personal agendas in favour of the pursuit of the 
common good. These fundamental weaknesses in the shared governance
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infrastructure appeared to exist in principle and in practice according to the 
presidents. There was disagreement among the constituents that boards have 
chosen to adopt executive committees, which would exclude those members 
deemed to be in conflict o f interest, as the vehicle for dealing with labour 
relations matters. And, this was confirmed in the analysis of college returns 
where it was suggested that only three colleges had formed such committees 
while fourteen colleges had not. Finally, there was weak agreement among the 
constituents that internal employee members should be disqualified from 
simultaneously holding office on boards and trade unions. This view contrasted 
with the view on student members in regard to student unions which met with 
weak disagreement. However, the statement firmly divided the constituents with 
the non-trade union members—appointees, students, and presidents—being in 
favour and the trade-union members—faculty, staff, and education council chairs 
(the latter most likely drawn from faculty)—being against the notion. The 
alignment of the students on this issue was surprising and out of character with 
the rest of the findings in the study.
Analysis of the colleges’ returns revealed consistency of responses over 
the statements concerning conflict of interest in the labour relations context, but 
in patterns which were not necessarily totally consistent over the entire study. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the impact of shared governance on aspects 
of leadership and decision-making contexts was situational and affected different 
colleges differently, both in principle and in practice, to a certain extent.
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However, there were also discernible trends o f generally positive views and 
negative views. College G, College K, and College L were the most positive 
colleges with regard to addressing conflict of interest in labour relations, and they 
proved also to be the most positive institutions overall. Conversely, College H, 
College I, and College Q were the least positive, with the last named also being 
one of the three least positive overall. College E and College F were the other 
two institutions to fall into the category of least positive throughout this entire 
section of the study.
Summary of the Assessment 
of Own Boards’ Effectiveness 
in Aspects of Leadership
In this section of the study, participants were asked to indicate the extent 
of the existence in their own boards’ culture o f various themes, which the 
researcher contended would contribute to a board’s effectiveness in certain 
aspects of leadership within a shared governance model. A range of responses 
was possible from non-existence, minimal existence, neutral, moderate 
existence though to strong existence. The aspects of leadership covered were 
the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, 
and how conflict o f interest has been addressed.
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The themes suggested by the researcher in this section of the study were 
drawn from the first section. So, in effect, the first section of the study was 
somewhat philosophical in nature and called for responses from the participants 
which were both value and experience based. And, in the second section, 
participants were asked to reflect on the actual existence of selected themes in 
their own particular boards.
Throughout this section of the chapter relating to own boards’ 
effectiveness, reference should be made to the following appendices:
• Appendix L: Summary of the Assessment o f Own Boards’
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by Constituent Group; and
• Appendix N: Summary of the Assessment o f Own Boards’ 
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by College (A to Q).
Sharing of Power
The undemoted themes were suggested as contributing to a board’s 
effectiveness in the sharing o f power in a shared governance model:
• A climate of trust among all board members;
• Equal contribution by all board members;
• Independence of all board members from their constituency;
• Board members not bringing vested interests to the board table; and
• Management/labour relations not infiltrating the board culture.
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The grand means o f constituent groups indicated moderate existence of all the 
themes within their own boards’ cultures. There were no significant differences 
among the constituents and, in fact, relatively few examples of any notable 
dispersion from the mean. Exceptions to the trend included education council 
chairs who noted strong existence of the climate of trust and faculty who noted 
minimal existence o f equal contribution by all members. Additionally, both faculty 
and presidents cited minimal existence of independence of members from their 
constituencies. Constituents, therefore, appeared to be relatively comfortable 
with the existence o f contributors to effective power sharing at the local level.
These sentiments were largely shared by the colleges. The one-way 
ANOVA indicated a significant difference among colleges only on the issue of a 
climate trust. However, the post-hoc test did not identify any matched pairs. As 
in the case of the analysis of constituent groups, there was relatively little 
dispersion from the means of moderate existence on all themes, indicating 
homogeneity among colleges which might not have been forecasted. However, 
there were exceptions as always. Seven institutions noted a strong existence of 
a climate of trust and, conversely, two institutions expressed minimal trust. On 
the question of equal contribution, three colleges cited strong existence but four 
colleges opted for minimal existence as the descriptor for their own experience. 
Similarly, the theme of independence had strong existence at one institution, yet 
minimal existence at five other institutions. Two colleges noted minimal existence 
of members not bringing vested interests to the table, while two colleges were
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split on the issue o f management/ labour relations with one citing strong 
existence and the other citing minimal existence. There was, therefore, 
confirmation of the moderate existence across the colleges of the themes that 
contribute to effective sharing of power. If strong existence of these themes is 
characterized as evidence of colleges which are positive toward shared 
governance in general, the section on sharing of power indicated that College A, 
College D, and College G emerged as the most positive while College F, College 
O, and College Q were the least positive.
Effectiveness of the Shared 
Decision-Making Process
The undemoted themes were suggested as contributing to a board’s 
effectiveness in the shared decision-making process in a shared governance 
model:
• Clear rules of boardsmanship, consistently applied;
• Accountability for board decision-making;
• Meeting obligations of the College and Institute Act;
• Coping with the tendency toward centralized (provincial) decision­
making;
• No bias shown by employee board members in dealing with budget 
issues and distribution of resources;
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•  No bias shown by student board members in dealing with budget 
issues and distribution of resources;
• Understanding the distinction between leadership and management 
and acknowledging the role o f the board and administration; and
• The college having a history o f informal shared governance thereby 
easing the introduction of legislated shared decision-making.
All of the responses from the constituent groups were positive overall in this 
section of the study. Moderate existence was noted for all themes except for 
meeting legislative obligations, which rated a strong existence and would be of 
comfort to the provincial government. No significant differences were revealed 
among the constituents, illustrating again the commonality of the views on 
shared governance in actual practice as opposed to any philosophical 
differences identified earlier in the study. In the case of clear rules, consistently 
applied, both appointees and staff expressed strong existence and those two 
constituent groups noted the same for accountability. The grand mean for 
meeting legislative obligations was strong existence although students, 
presidents, and education council chairs were slightly less positive, each citing 
moderate existence. In the case of no bias being shown by employee board 
members, only staff, who expressed strong existence, differed from the rest of 
the groups. And finally, faculty and education council chairs noted only minimal 
existence of a history of informal shared governance in contrast to the other 
constituents who cited moderate existence. So, again there was a sense of
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general comfort with the shared decision-making processes adopted at local 
campuses with virtually no indication of problem areas.
The findings from the one-way ANOVA of colleges’ responses suggested 
slightly less unified views with four o f the eight themes revealing significant 
differences among the institutions. However, the Scheffe test did not identify any 
significant difference at all between the matched pairs. There was a fair range of 
responses on some of the themes as might have been expected, given the 
uniqueness of the institutions and the looseness of the shared governance 
legislation. In the case o f clear rules, consistently applied, seven colleges noted 
strong existence, while two colleges leaned toward only minimal existence. 
Similarly, the same seven institutions expressed strong existence of 
accountability, while one institution again expressed minimal existence. That 
latter college was only neutral on meeting legislative obligations unlike all the 
other colleges which identified moderate or strong existence. In the case of 
coping with the tendency toward centralized decision-making, one college noted 
strong existence, fifteen colleges noted moderate existence, while one college 
(College Q) maintained its negative views in this section by noting only minimal 
existence. Four colleges cited strong existence of no bias being shown by 
employee board members, while all the other colleges cited moderate existence. 
The similar theme of no bias being shown by student members was noted in 
moderate existence by all colleges, except one which noted strong existence 
and an other which noted only minimal existence. The theme of understanding
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roles brought a slightly more dispersed response with five institutions expressing 
strong existence, nine institutions expressing moderate existence, one institution 
remaining neutral, and two institutions expressing minimal existence. Finally, two 
colleges cited strong existence of a past history o f informal shared governance, 
while three colleges cited minimal existence. Thus, there again was fairly 
consistent reporting among the colleges toward solid existence of the themes 
which would contribute to effective shared decision-making processes. There 
were very few instances of minimal existence expressed, except consistently 
from College Q whose reporting members obviously were not supportive of the 
practices in effect at their institution. This section on decision-making process 
revealed College G, College K, and College L as the most positive toward 
shared governance at the local level, while College B, College F, and, as 
previously noted, College Q were revealed as the least positive. Over the two 
sections relating to sharing of power and decision-making process, College D, 
College G, and College L appeared to be most positive in contrast to College F, 
College O, and College Q, which were the least positive.
How Conflict of Interest 
has been Addressed
The undemoted themes were suggested as contributing to a board’s 
effectiveness in addressing conflict of interest in a shared governance model:
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• A clearly understood and accepted bylaw and/or policy on conflict of 
interest having been developed by the board;
• Elected board members as members-at-large and not representing 
their constituencies;
• The oath o f office, sworn by each member, preventing 
management/labour problems among board members;
• A personnel or labour relations committee, with restricted membership, 
preventing management/labour problems among board members;
• The president being able to make a full contribution to board affairs; 
and
• The education council chair being able to make a full contribution to 
board affairs.
In this section on conflict of interest, grand means ranged from minimal existence 
to strong existence according to the theme discussed. The clearly understood 
and accepted bylaw elicited a grand mean of moderate existence, a view shared 
by all the constituents except students who noted strong existence. Both the 
members-at-large and oath themes resulted in all constituents citing moderate 
existence, however, the labour relations committee brought a minimal existence 
response from all constituents except students who remained neutral. And 
finally, both themes concerning full participation by presidents and education 
council chairs, respectively, elicited responses of strong existence from all 
constituents except presidents who accorded both themes moderate existence
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and faculty who gave presidents only moderate existence. The one-way ANOVA 
identified significant difference in the case of the presidents’ contribution, 
however, the post-hoc analysis did not identify any o f the matched pairs. There 
was considerable consensus among the constituent groups in this potentially 
volatile area of boardsmanship in contrast to the first section of the study where 
participants were expressing their personal values to a greater extent.
The one-way ANOVA o f colleges’ responses revealed an anticipated 
wider array of views than for the constituent groups with four of the six themes 
indicating significant difference, one of which was confirmed by the Scheffe test. 
The most volatile theme, by far, in this section for colleges was that o f a clearly 
understood and accepted bylaw. The grand mean was moderate existence, but 
views ranged from absolute strong existence (mean score of 5.000) all the way 
down to tendency toward non-existence. The post-hoc analysis revealed the 
following significant differences: between College A (strong existence) and 
College M (non-existence): between College A and College Q (non-existence): 
between College C (strong existence) and College M; between College D (strong 
existence) and College M; between College D and College Q; between College 
E (strong existence) and College M; between College G (strong existence) and 
College M; between College I (moderate existence) and College M; between 
College J (strong existence) and College M; between College K (strong 
existence) and College M; between College L (strong existence) and College M; 
between College L and College Q: between College M and College N (strong
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existence); between College M and College O (moderate existence); and finally 
between College N and College Q. Accordingly, the large number of significant 
differences were due to the extreme views, focusing on College M and College 
Q, both of which tended to non-existence of an understood and accepted bylaw. 
The members-at-large theme, in contrast, elicited a response of moderate 
existence from all the colleges, with exception of one college which cited minimal 
existence. The oath of office theme produced an array of responses, with 
significant difference indicated. However, the post-hoc test did not reveal any 
significant difference between the pairs of institutions. Nevertheless, the range 
was considerable with five colleges citing strong existence, ten colleges citing 
moderate existence, one college citing minimal existence, and one college citing 
non-existence. Clearly, the oath has had different impacts at different institutions. 
The theme of an executive committee produced an obvious split between the 
institutions, with three colleges noting moderate existence and all the other 
noting minimal and non-existence. Finally, the two themes of contribution to 
boards by the presidents and the education council chairs, respectively, elicited 
the same kind of responses from colleges as they did from the constituent 
groups. All institutions were positive, citing either moderate or strong existence 
with the exception of one college which remained neutral on both themes. This 
section on how conflict has been addressed produced more extreme views than 
the other two aspects of leadership. Accordingly, College A, College G, and 
College L emerged as the most positive toward shared governance in this
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section in contrast to College B, College M, and College Q which were the least 
positive. Taking the three aspects of leadership overall, the most positive 
institutions were College A, College D, and College G, while the least positive 
were College F, College H, and College Q. Thus, College M's noticeable 
difficulties with the conflict of interest were not repeated elsewhere.
Summary
Analysis of the data from both the constituent groups and the colleges 
appeared to confirm the existence at the local campuses of all of the themes 
identified by the researcher as contributing to effective shared governance. 
Among the constituents, there was considerable consensus on the moderate 
existence of most themes and there was next to no instance of extreme views or 
any trends in views away from the mainstream.
Colleges, inevitably, were a little more disparate in their views, but really 
aside from the extreme negative views of College F and College Q, in general, 
and College M, in relation to the conflict of interest issue, there was a fair degree 
of consensus among the institutions as well. These findings bode well for the 
future of shared governance in British Columbia based on the actual trends to 
date.
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Practical Significance of the Study
Shared governance will only be successful as a leadership model in the 
college setting if all the constituent groups believe what they are doing is 
important and is contributing to a common good of scholarship and student 
learning success. Furthermore, it will only be successful if the constituents 
practise diligently all of the characteristics of open, honest, effective shared 
decision making. As Fife (1998) remarked “shared governance...has a purpose 
and a mission. With shared governance there must be shared values and vision 
for the organization” (p. 2). Thus, a governance structure, and in particular how it 
functions, reflects the culture of a college. And if the structure is truly to be one of 
shared governance, then the culture must be collegial with all constituents on a 
board of governors—appointees, faculty, staff, students, presidents, and 
education council chairs—willing to work together in pursuit of common goals.
This study sought the views of the board members themselves. So, it is a 
one-dimensional perspective, which could in time be augmented by the views of 
other stakeholders. But, it is likely to be a very important indicator of how 
successful shared governance is, and will be, in British Columbia. For, it is an 
expression of the views of the very participants who can make shared 
governance successful or unsuccessful. Government can legislate shared 
decision-making, but it cannot legislate successful shared decision-making. The 
study was focused on the following desired outcomes:
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• Obtaining board members’ views of how boards are constituted and 
how they operate, on both a philosophical and practical level and over 
studies two years apart, the study sought to determine if the 
commitment and the accomplishment of members was in evidence to 
assure effective shared governance;
• Analyzing the considerable amount of data derived from the sixty- 
seven statement questionnaire as well as nineteen matched 
statements from the previous study, the study sought to reveal findings 
of significant difference and other findings of comparative value in 
order to chart the progress of shared governance and provide some 
prediction of its future development;
• Individual board members and constituent groups will be able to 
ascertain how they compare to their colleagues. Such information, and 
the ramifications of their values and actions to date, may serve to tailor 
their own future behaviour and thereby influence the direction and 
effectiveness of shared decision-making in the post-secondary 
education sector;
• Interested and associated parties, such as the Government of British 
Columbia, the Canadian Federation of Students, and faculty and staff 
unions at both the local and provincial level may be able to evaluate 
the affect of their influence on shared decision-making through the 
views and actions of their appointees and elected members. Such
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evaluation may serve to focus future influence on pursuit of the 
common good and to the betterment of all parties associated with 
higher education.
Colleges, in common with universities and schools, are organizations of varying 
democratic degree, depending upon their history and the nature of the 
relationships among their constituent groups. However, irrespective o f whether 
any particular college falls into the very democratic or the not-so democratic 
variety, it is probable that it has a governance structure that is more open and 
accessible if not participative than its counterparts in business, industry, and 
government. Such is the nature of the shared governance environment. And yet, 
colleges are coming under increasing pressure from the outside to act like 
businesses rather than the self-serving, non-accountable, gourmands of the 
public trough that they are all too frequently perceived to be. Unfortunately, if 
colleges are to become corporations, they are in danger of having to abandon 
their democratic cultures. As Newquist (1998) noted “Collegiality, which means 
shared governance or shared authority, is a casualty of applying corporate 
management concepts to universities [and colleges]" (p. 1). This changing 
environment in which colleges find themselves was the backdrop to how the 
institutions in British Columbia entered the era of shared governance. In addition, 
they faced the compounding pressures of a government set on transferring 
power from the local campuses to the capitol and significant change occurring 
rapidly in the deeply rooted labour relations of the province.
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Thus, legislated shared governance was bom. The legislation, itself, was 
alternatively loose and highly prescriptive. That ambiguity, together with colleges’ 
natural propensity to develop things like governance structures to suit their 
individual identities and cultures provided the distinct likelihood o f differing 
results of success and failure. The study, therefore, was further focused on the 
following outcomes:
• Identifying colleges’ views, on both a philosophical and a practical 
level, the study sought to determine the degree of commonality among 
the institutions of British Columbia;
• Analyzing the comprehensive data, the study sought to reveal findings 
of significant difference and other differences of comparative value in 
order to chart the progress of shared governance and to provide 
indicators as to the future development of shared governance at the 
institutional level;
• In spite of the anonymity afforded them in the findings, college board 
members probably have a sense of which boards are doing well in 
their governance development and which are not doing well. The 
results of more successful institutions emerging in this study, 
particularly in terms o f their identified strengths, may stimulate others 
to change their approach based on philosophy and themes of 
effectiveness; and
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• As noted previously, associated bodies, such as the government of 
British Columbia and the unions, may be able to draw on the findings 
from college to college to shape the kind of influence they will have in 
the future in regard to institutional governance.
The overriding purpose of the study, therefore, was to provide the beginnings of 
an evaluation process that will serve to further strengthen the governance 
structure and process throughout the post-secondary system. The findings will 
provide as many questions as they do answers, but will, hopefully, generate the 
stimulus among all the players to seek continuous improvement. Furthermore, 
the findings will contribute to the growing body of knowledge which will have 
some application beyond the province of British Columbia.
Summary
This chapter contained analysis of the considerable volume of data 
derived from the study. The descriptive statistics section revealed adequate 
representation from the six constituent groups and seventeen colleges and 
university colleges in terms of questionnaire returns to permit meaningful findings 
to be extracted from the data. These findings not only served to explain the 
British Columbia situation under review but also allowed additions to the body of 
knowledge and some generalization to post-secondary systems throughout 
North America.
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The summary of board experience showed that there has been 
considerable turnover in all areas of constituent membership and, therefore, the 
relative inexperience of board members would have had some impact on the 
responses offered. However, the volume and quality of actual responses would 
suggest that the steep learning curve in college boardsmanship is fairly 
manageable and board members seemed to feel comfortable and qualified in 
completing the questionnaire judging by the comments attached to many 
submissions.
Analysis of the comparative statistics was divided into two sections. The 
first section tracked three aspects of leadership, namely sharing of power; the 
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process; and how conflict of interest 
has been addressed, within three distinct board decision-making contexts, 
namely general matters; financial matters; and labour relations matters. The 
three dimensional focus of the study was completed by comparing data among 
the constituent groups, among the colleges, and among the constituent groups in 
certain matched statements contained in the current study and in a similar study 
earned out by the researcher in 1995/96. The second section contained the 
participants’ assessments of their own boards’ effectiveness in the same three 
aspects of leadership noted above. The data were analyzed by constituent 
groups and colleges.
The comparative data produced a great number of differences among the 
constituents and among the colleges, and between the two studies which served
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to explain the varied evolution o f shared governance in British Columbia and to 
provide pointers to its future development. In addition, a good number of 
statistically significant differences were revealed throughout the findings. In fact, 
the diagram below illustrates that significant differences were found in fourteen of 
the twenty-seven areas of the three dimensional model o f inquiry.
Diagram 4: Location of Significant Differences 
in the Study
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These significant differences, which are fully explored in Chapter V, provide the 
basis for evaluating the development of the shared governance model in
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colleges in British Columbia over the past four years. In addition, the significant 
differences suggest the areas that are going to be contentious as boards 
continue to refine their structures and methods of operating. However, there is 
also information in the findings to suggest that the introduction o f shared 
governance has been successful and has contributed to the ongoing 
effectiveness o f the institutions and enriched their cultures. It is hoped by the 
researcher that the findings of the study will not only serve as simple results but 
will also be seen as tools which can be used to further develop the governance 
structure in the province.
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CHAPTER V SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
In this chapter, the summary, conclusions, and recommendations are 
presented. The summary is a condensed version of the contents o f Chapter I, II, 
III, and IV containing discussion of the problem under review in this study, a 
review of literature germane to the research questions prompted by the problem, 
details of the methodology adopted by the researcher to provide the data from 
which the findings could be elicited, and, finally, discussion of the findings in the 
context of the research questions. The conclusions were based on an in-depth 
exposure of the study findings to the nine hypotheses, spawned from the 
research questions, and are discussed in the context of generalizability to the 
post-secondary education system of British Columbia and beyond to that of 
North America. Finally, the recommendations take the form of two sets of 
practical suggestions. The first set includes recommendations to the colleges 
and university colleges of British Columbia on how their shared governance 
development could be enriched and enhanced through the knowledge gained 
from the findings o f the study. And, the second set of recommendations relates 
to that body of knowledge which has been accumulated through this study and
270
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offers suggestions as to how and where that body o f knowledge might be 
enlarged through additional research. Thus, the culmination of this study 
represents not the beginning of the end, but, rather, the end of the beginning of 
building a body of knowledge which will inform and support the continuous 
improvement process in relation to governance of the province’s public colleges 
and university colleges.
Summary
This study focused on the legislated shared governance system which 
was introduced to post-secondary education in British Columbia in early 1995. 
Change within institutions touched the composition and powers of the governing 
boards and spawned the creation of education councils (which are senate-like 
bodies) to assume some of the former powers of boards and to share with 
boards in decision-making in certain areas. The study concentrated on the 
boards and how they have dealt with this significant change according to the 
perceptions of the board members themselves. It examined the impacts of 
change through selected aspects of leadership—sharing of power, the 
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how conflict of interest 
has been addressed—in the context of selected areas of decision-making— 
general board matters, financial matters, and labour relations matters.
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The legislative amendment to the College and Institute Act o f British 
Columbia, known as Bill 22, was a mixture o f heavily prescribed elements, such 
as the rules on how to consider internal members’ real or perceived conflict of 
interest, and loosely described elements, such as the new powers of the boards 
in relation to education councils and the Ministry of Advanced Education,
Training, and Technology. Accordingly, the legislation deliberately allowed 
colleges to develop their own variations on the shared governance model. 
However, there was no real mechanism to carry out systemic evaluation of the 
new governance structure with all its potential local differences and this study 
sought to begin that process.
In addition to the potential uniqueness of the shared governance model 
on each campus, it should also be noted that the new legislation came about 
during a period of volatility and change in the provincial post-secondary 
education sector. Fiscal restraint, labour relations unrest, labour relations 
centralization, centralization of individual college boards' powers in general, and 
an open alliance between trade unions and student unions to wrest power away 
from appointed boards and administrations all served as a backdrop to the arrival 
of shared governance. And, all of these ingredients provided much of the focus 
for the study and constituted the basis for the research questions to be explored:
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain 
aspects of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness 
of the shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
273
of interest o f employee and student board members has been addressed 
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of 
business, financial matters, and labour relations matters?
2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the 
constituency from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members; elected 
faculty; elected support staff; elected students; presidents; and education 
council chairs, in certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of 
power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how 
real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board 
members has been addressed when it comes to decision-making in 
respect to general matters of business, financial matters, and labour 
relations matters?
3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and 
those from an earlier study in respect to certain aspects of 
boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the 
shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of 
interest of employee and student board members has been addressed 
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of 
business, financial matters, and labour relations matters.
The study was limited to the views of board members by design and 
encountered several factors along the way which placed further limitations on its 
scope. These factors included an unusually high instance o f turnover of board
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membership just around the time of the study and the exceptional occurrence of 
five of the potential seventeen participating college presidents announcing their 
retirement or resignation during the same period. All of these limitations may 
have had a positive or negative affect on the study and its results, but it is 
extremely difficult to quantify the affect. In addition, the closeness of the 
researcher to the subject matter on account of his position and the highly 
charged political nature of the subject matter also may have had some impact on 
the study.
An extensive review of literature revealed a wealth o f information about 
the gradual evolution of shared governance, initially in the university setting and 
later in the college setting. Shared governance may be seen as the epitome of 
democracy in higher education and its path to the present day appears to have 
been as rocky as that of societal democracy. This was particularly true of 
colleges and the passage of time since shared governance became topical in 
the community college context has made interesting reading in the considerable 
amount of literature available on the subject. It seems that the tentativeness and 
philosophical diversity of the 70’s was replaced by a dogged determination to 
make shared governance work in the 80’s and that, in turn, has been replaced 
by a period of reflection and, not a little, doubt in the 90’s. Throughout the three 
decades, authors have divided into proponents, standing on the side of 
inclusiveness and even moral justification, and detractors, citing the very real
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issue of self-interest on the part of board members who coincidentally are 
members of the faculty, support staff, and student constituencies.
There has been much questioning of the role of boards of governance in 
colleges. And, if one is to accept that the role is one of adopting the high level, 
long term perspective in setting the direction of colleges (a view which is not 
universally shared), and one is prepared to acknowledge the moral right of the 
stakeholders to be included in such direction setting, then most authors 
concluded that the notion of shared governance is appropriate. However, it was 
noted that the combination of internal, usually elected, members and external, 
appointed or elected, members does not necessarily make for a marriage made 
in heaven. A clear and ongoing, if not permanent, clash of values between the 
internal and external members was cited in terms of commitment to the board 
mission, knowledge of boardsmanship, philosophical foundation, and actual 
behaviour at the board table. In addition, it was suggested that the very 
existence of shared governance has been instrumental in undermining the office 
of the presidents, regardless of their actual role in shared decision-making.
The consistent message that emerged from literature was that for shared 
governance to stand any chance of operating effectively in a college, there must 
be clear, accepted, and consistently applied procedures on shared decision­
making that firmly establish responsibilities and roles. In addition, the issue of the 
inherent conflict of interest faced by the internal members must be addressed if 
the governance model is to have integrity. The importance of these requirements
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has been stressed since the inception of shared governance and yet they seem 
to be still cited today, across the continent, as problematic and the barrier to 
effective and harmonious institutional democracy. Authors noted that students 
have really made little progress in becoming accepted as equal members of the 
governing family, while support staff suffer from a form of inferiority complex 
when it comes to interaction with faculty and external members. Staff, and to 
some degree faculty, have had difficulty dealing with the overlapping interests of 
boards and trade unions which is a more prominent issue in colleges than 
universities due to the firm foothold which unions have established in the former. 
Pursuit of self interest rather than that of the common good has long been the 
charge leveled at internal members and this, perhaps, has been the greatest 
challenge to the general acceptance of shared governance. The areas where 
friction has been most pronounced have been financial affairs and labour 
relations, two areas where personal gain for internal members might be seen as 
most likely. These challenges to the notion of democratic governance which 
abounded in literature became the main focus of inquiry in this study.
The methodology adopted for the study was intended to provide a 
rigorous examination of shared governance in British Columbia, based on a 
three dimensional model o f inquiry. The model allowed forevaluation o f the 
governance experience through three lenses, namely three aspects o f board 
leadership in three decision-making contexts examined by constituent group, 
college, and through the passage o f time between two similar studies carried out
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by the researcher. The study centred around a sixty-seven item questionnaire 
based on a Lickert-type attitude inventory, which included statements related to 
nine hypotheses drawn from the three research questions. The researcher’s 
familiarity with the provincial post-secondary education system facilitated access 
to the board member population and, consequently seventeen colleges and 
university colleges and two hundred and fifty-five members were included in the 
study. The participants’ personal identity and the identity of the colleges were 
protected in the study process and all subsequent reports. A protocol statement 
that detailed the proposed process of protection was submitted to the Committee 
on the Protection of Human Subjects, University o f San Diego for approval and 
was subsequently granted. In addition, the protocol statement was also 
submitted, as a requirement of the researcher’s own institutional policy, to the 
Research and Ethics Committee, Malaspina University College, British Columbia 
and received the necessary approval. Finally, the approved process was 
described in the statement of informed consent which each potential participant 
was asked to endorse and return with his/her completed questionnaire. Special 
additional protection was afforded the internal members of the researcher’s own 
college in order to avoid any sense of pressure emanating from his position in 
the organization.
All o f the data from the surveys was processed using the Statview SE+ 
Graphics Program on Apple hardware. Manipulation of the data permitted one­
way ANOVA statements to be produced by constituency group and college.
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Furthermore, a two-way ANOVA of matched statements from this study and the 
1995/96 study was prepared. The structure of the survey instrument and the 
specific questions asked focused solely on the research questions and, 
consequently, provided accurate and consistent data to allow concise analyses 
and conclusions.
The return rate o f questionnaires was 40% with all constituent groups 
represented, ranging from 77% of the presidents to 20% of the students. In 
addition, all colleges were represented with the range extending from 69% of the 
College M membership to 21% of the College P membership. The mean of years 
of experience on boards came in at 2.909 underscoring the high turnover rate of 
board membership and the relative inexperience of participating members.
Analysis of the data produced a great many trends, both of a positive and 
negative variety toward shared governance, and also a substantial amount of 
differences, many of a statistically significant nature, among constituent groups 
and colleges, and between the two studies. Colleges tended to vary a little in 
specific areas but, overall, clear trends emerged as to several consistently 
positive institutions and several consistently negative institutions in regard to 
shared governance from a philosophical standpoint. And, these views were 
essentially repeated when participants assessed their own particular boards’ 
characteristics in shared decision-making. The most positive institutions were 
College D, College G, College K, and College L and the least positive institutions 
were College E, College F, and College Q.
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The grand means of the constituent groups generally tended toward 
positive attitudes on all of the aspects of shared governance, however there 
were several areas where one or another of the constituents had dissimilar views 
and there emerged a very obvious trend of presidents espousing no more than 
lukewarm responses and occasional very negative responses. The presidents 
were particularly concerned about the lack of independence from their 
constituencies shown by internal members, the impact of the heavily unionized 
environment on the governance environment, the actions and accountability of 
the democratized boards, internal members showing bias in relation to the 
budget process, the (legislated) ability of student members to vote on tuition 
issues, and the questions as to whether the internal members have lived up to 
their oath of office. The last concern struck at the very integrity of the 
governance process and coincided with the contentious issues raised in 
literature. The presidents’ dramatic shift in their views was noted as one of the 
changes between the two studies. In 1995/96, presidents and appointees were 
noted as being clearly positive about the fledgling governance structures, while 
students were neutral and faculty, staff, and education council chairs were 
decidedly cautious. Little more than two years later, appointees had largely been 
joined by all the constituents, except the presidents, on the positive side while 
the presidents stood alone, generally neutral and frequently negative. The very 
stark gulf in philosophical and practical values between the appointees and the
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presidents in the current study appeared to contradict the traditional alliance 
noted in literature as crucial to the success of shared governance.
Other less dramatic trends to emerge included overall concern about the 
diminution of the boards’ powers as a result of governmental centralization, 
general unease around the government prescribed treatment of conflict of 
interest, and the widespread practice of internal members simultaneously holding 
office in their respective trades and student unions. On a more narrow focus, 
staff seemed to have trouble with aspects of the students’ approach to 
governance, in particular their role in labour relations, and education council 
chairs were quite negative toward the democratized boards’ openness and 
accountability on financial matters. Generally, all constituent groups assessed 
that their own particular boards were demonstrating moderate existence of the 
various qualities identified by the researcher in this study as contributing to the 
effectiveness of governing boards. Confirmation o f the existence of these 
qualities, while it might have flown in the face of some of the philosophical values 
espoused, did suggest reasonable progress had been made in the development 
of shared governance in British Columbia.
The significance of this study was the attempt to understand the values, 
commitment, and actions of board members in the shared governance structure 
in order to evaluate the progress to date and to provide some prediction for the 
future of shared decision-making in the province. In addition, the identification of 
views and practices within constituent groups and colleges might serve to
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influence the behaviour of not only the direct governance players, the members 
themselves, but also the indirect players which have an influence on the 
outcomes, such as government and the trades and student unions.
Conclusions
This study focused on three specific questions in order to assess how 
shared governance has been developed in British Columbia. Those three 
questions each spawned three hypotheses for a total of nine hypotheses.
Further, each hypothesis existed in three decision-making contexts resulting in 
twenty-seven variables within the three-dimensional model of inquiry. This 
section o f the chapter condensed all of the findings into the structure of the 
primary research questions.
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain aspects 
of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the 
shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of 
interest of employee and student board members has been addressed 
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of 
business, financial matters, and labour relations matters?
Analysis of the data found that there were no significant differences 
among colleges on the sharing of power in any one of the three decision-making 
contexts. The null hypothesis was, therefore, tenable. Local differences and
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nuances notwithstanding, it was reasonable to conclude that all colleges were 
generally comfortable with the fundamental requirement of distributing authority 
in a fair and equitable manner. This level of comfort, which is crucial to the 
existence of shared governance, seemed to extend beyond decision-making on 
general matters to the more contentious areas of financial matters and labour 
relations matters.
No significant differences were found among the colleges concerning the 
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process. Accordingly, it could be 
assumed that colleges were generally comfortable with the processes of shared 
decision-making which have evolved in each of the three contexts under review.
In the context of general matters of board business, significant difference 
was found among eight colleges on the issue of whether the conflict o f interest 
bylaw was generally accepted by all board members as fair and workable. There 
was, also, significant difference between two colleges on whether conflict of 
interest in this decision-making context has been an actual problem at the 
campus level. Further, there were no significant differences among colleges 
relating to conflict of interest in the context of financial decision making.
However, there was significant difference among eight colleges on whether 
boards had dealt effectively with the inherent conflict of interest of internal 
members in decision-making on labour relations matters. And, in addition, there 
was significant difference between two colleges on whether an executive 
committee, excluding internal members, should be adopted to deal with labour
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relations matters. Furthermore, there was significant difference among thirteen 
colleges on whether an executive committee had actually been adopted at the 
local site. On the basis of finding powerful disparities among colleges in two of 
the three decision-making contexts, it was reasonable to reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that conflict of interest had caused differences among 
the institutions.
It can be concluded that there was no discernible difference among 
colleges in two of the aspects of board leadership, namely the sharing of power 
and the creation of effective shared decision-making processes. However, there 
was significant difference with profound undertones among the colleges on how 
conflict of interest has been addressed. The importance of the third aspect of 
leadership is such that it must be concluded that there was, indeed, far-reaching 
difference among colleges, overall, even though it was not evident in the other 
two aspects. The rationale for this conclusion is that dealing with conflict of 
interest has been noted in the literature in Chapter II as fundamental to the 
success of shared governance and lack of consensus among the colleges as to 
how it has been addressed represents a serious division within the post- 
secondary education system.
2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the 
constituency from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members; 
elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students; presidents; and
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education council chairs, in certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely 
the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making 
process, and how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and 
student board members has been addressed when it comes to decision­
making in respect to general matters of business, financial matters, and 
labour relations matters?
Analysis o f the data revealed significant difference on the issue of power 
sharing in the context of decision-making on general matters between 
appointees and the presidents and between support staff and the presidents.
This occurred in the matter of whether employee board members should get 
release time as compensation for board service and showed staff to be in strong 
agreement, appointees in agreement, and presidents in strong disagreement. 
There was no significant difference among the constituent groups on sharing of 
power in financial decision-making. Finally, significant difference was revealed 
between appointees and presidents and between faculty and presidents in terms 
of labour relations. This occurred in the proposition that shared governance is 
inherently difficult in a unionized environment with presidents expressing 
agreement, appointees expressing disagreement, and faculty expressing strong 
disagreement. On the basis of the differences revealed, chiefly involving 
appointees and presidents, it was reasonable to reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that there was difference among constituent groups on the sharing of 
power.
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Four separate instances of significant difference were found among 
constituent groups in the context of the shared decision-making process on 
general matters. Student board members differed with the presidents on the 
contention that the (democratic) composition of boards makes a contribution 
toward effective governance, with the former in strong agreement and the latter 
in strong disagreement. There was significant difference between the appointees 
(strong agreement) and the presidents (weak agreement) on the question of 
whether the newly constituted boards had managed to make some difficult 
decisions during the last two years. Furthermore, there was again difference 
between the appointees and the presidents on whether boards had been 
accountable to their internal and external communities. On this issue, appointees 
again expressed strong agreement while presidents again offered only weak 
agreement. Finally, there was significant difference on the question of whether 
boards had fulfilled their general obligations under the College and Institute Act 
between appointees and presidents and between students and presidents with 
the positive constituents expressing strong agreement and the presidents, with 
considerable reserve, noting only weak agreement. There were no significant 
differences on the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process in the 
context of financial matters. This result was somewhat surprising given the 
suggestion in Chapter II that shared governance commonly comes under threat 
in the financial decision-making area. However, there were three examples of 
significant difference related to labour relations matters. On the issue of whether
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boards would have adopted a different labour relations direction had there been 
no internal members, appointees and education council chairs differed with the 
former disagreeing and the latter agreeing. There was significant difference 
between the faculty and presidents and between the faculty and education 
council chairs on the contention that boards would have adopted a different 
labour relation direction had the tendency toward provincial centralization of 
decision-making not been in evidence. This difference was revealed as strong 
disagreement from faculty and agreement from presidents and education council 
chairs. Lastly, the suggestion that boards would have adopted a different 
direction in labour relations had neither internal members nor centralization of 
decision-making existed brought significant difference again between faculty, in 
strong disagreement, and presidents and education council chairs, both in 
agreement. The overwhelming evidence of significant differences in both general 
board matters and labour relations matters substantiated the conclusion that the 
null hypothesis should be rejected and that difference among constituent groups 
was considerable in relation to the effectiveness of the shared decision-making 
process in the shared governance model.
There were no significant differences among the constituent groups in 
how conflict of interest had been addressed in the area of general decision­
making. However, in the financial context, the issue of the appropriateness of the 
student members being able to vote on tuition matters revealed difference 
between appointees and presidents, with the former agreeing but the latter
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strongly disagreeing. There were two instances of significant difference in the 
area of decision-making on labour relations, the first of which concerned whether 
internal members had lived upto their oath of office. This issue which strikes at 
the very integrity of the shared governance model revealed appointees and 
faculty to be in strong agreement but presidents expressed only weak 
agreement. Appointees and presidents also differed on whether boards had 
dealt effectively with the conflict of interest inherent to internal members with the 
former espousing strong agreement in contrast to the presidents’ disagreement. 
In light of yet another series of examples of significant difference between 
appointees and presidents, it appears prudent to reject the null hypothesis in 
favour of a conclusion that there was, indeed, noticeable difference among 
constituents on how conflict of interest had been addressed.
It can safely be concluded that there was profound and widespread 
difference among the constituent groups relative to shared governance in British 
Columbia. The consistent divergence between appointees and presidents and 
the frequent isolation of the latter in contrast to all the other constituent groups 
served to underscore the sense of deep division that appeared to exist. 
Furthermore, the largely negative opinions of the titular educational leaders, that 
the presidents represent, does not bode well for the future success of shared 
governance in the province nor, perhaps, for education in general.
In contrast, however, most of the other constituent groups consistently 
reported positive views toward the aspects of shared governance, in particular
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the appointees and the faculty members. The concurrence of views among the 
appointees and internal members in general is somewhat surprising given the 
trends suggested in Chapter II and may be attributable to the fact that the 
government in power, which is making the appointments, would be described as 
left-of-centre and more likely to have philosophies parallel to those of the internal 
members than might a right-of-centre government.
3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and 
those from an earlier study in respect to certain aspects of boardsmanship, 
namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision­
making process, and how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee 
and student board members has been addressed when it comes to 
decision-making in respect to general matters of business, financial 
matters, and labour relations matters.
Analysis of the data confirmed that there was significant difference 
between the 1995/96 study and the current study on the sharing of power in 
general board matters, and more specifically in relation to the appropriateness of 
the six year aggregate term for appointees. The 1997/98 study showed a 
generally more positive response from all constituents within the area of 
agreement. Furthermore, the same statement resulted in significant difference 
among the constituent groups over the two studies with appointees, staff and 
presidents expressing agreement, faculty and education council chairs remaining
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neutral, and students expressing disagreement. There were no significant 
differences in relation to the sharing of power on financial matters. However, 
there was significant difference relative to labour relations on the contention that 
shared governance is inherently difficult to develop in a unionized environment. 
The difference was among the constituents over the two studies and extended to 
agreement (presidents and students), disagreement (appointees, staff, and 
education council chairs) and strong disagreement (faculty). The existence of 
significant difference in two of the three decision-making contexts was 
considered sufficient to suggest that the null hypothesis should be rejected. 
Consequently, it would appear that there was difference between the two studies 
on the sharing o f power, mainly relating to the relationship among the constituent 
groups.
Areas of significant difference were discovered in all three decision­
making contexts relative to the effectiveness of the shared decision-making 
process. In the case of general board matters, there was significant interaction 
among the constituents on the contention that the new composition of boards 
made a contribution toward effective governance. While four of the constituent 
groups moved in a negative direction between the two studies, students and 
education council chairs moved in a positive direction thereby causing the 
interaction affect (see Appendix Q). Similarly, there was significant interaction on 
the companion statement that the manner in which boards operated made a 
contribution to effective governance (see Appendix R). In this case, the same
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four groups moved in a negative direction over the two studies while students 
again moved in a positive direction. There were two significant differences within 
the financial decision-making context. The first was among constituents over the 
two studies on whether boards had fulfilled their fiscal obligations under the 
College and Institute Act. Students and education council chairs, who expressed 
weakish agreement, contrasted with the other groups’ strong agreement. The 
second instance of difference was again among constituents on the contention 
that boards had discharged their fiduciary responsibilities to the student 
population at large in relation to matters concerning fees collected. With the 
exception of student members who were in disagreement, all other groups 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. In the case of decision-making on 
labour relations matters, there were two significant differences related to the 
question of whether boards had fulfilled their labour relation obligations under the 
College and Institute Act. In the first difference, among the constituent groups 
over the two studies, appointees were in strong agreement while all the other 
groups were in agreement. In addition, there was significant interaction with 
presidents adopting a more negative position in the later study while all the other 
groups adopted a more positive position (see Appendix S). The extent of the 
significant differences and interactions prompted the researcher to conclude that 
this null hypothesis should be rejected, and, rather, that it was reasonable to 
infer that there was discernible difference between the findings of the two studies
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in relation to the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process and its 
impact on shared governance.
Analysis of the data revealed two significant differences between the 
studies on how conflict of interest has been addressed in relation to general 
board decision-making. The first occurred on the contention that education 
council chairs should be non-voting members of boards, as they are currently 
legislated. The grand mean of responses moved from 3.916 in the earlier study 
to 3.578 in the current study signaling a noticeable shift in thinking on the matter. 
In a similar vein, there was also significant difference on the contention that 
education council chairs should be full voting members. In this case, the grand 
mean shifted from 2.075 to 2.485 indicating change of opinion which was the 
reciprocal of the previous statement. There were no significant differences in 
either financial matters or labour relations matters. As a consequence of these 
findings, it would appear that this hypothesis was tenable and, indeed, there was 
no difference between the studies on how conflict of interest had been 
addressed.
There were a considerable number of significant differences and 
interactions in the leadership aspects of power sharing and ensuring the 
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process to outweigh the relative 
absence of differences in how conflict of interest had been addressed. 
Consequently, the researcher would argue that there was a marginal overall 
difference in the findings from the two studies. And, on balance, the general
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direction o f the findings was toward a more positive attitude, overall, on shared 
governance emerging in the current study. This direction was established in spite 
of the fact that the presidents’ views had clearly moved from a positive position in 
1995/96 to a negative position in 1997/98.
The following findings from the study fell short of statistical significance 
but were, nevertheless, worthy o f note because they underscore the main 
conclusions that have been reached in relation to the research questions:
1. All differences, both significant and otherwise, among colleges tended to 
establish identifiable trends which separated colleges with generally positive 
attitudes toward shared governance from colleges with less than positive 
attitudes. Those trends are tabulated in Appendix P.
2. Similarly, Appendix P also illustrates how all the differences among 
constituent groups conformed to very clear patterns. The most stark 
observation from this table is the consistent placement of the presidents as 
the least positive of the constituent groups. In addition, the following trends 
were noted:
• Appointees and presidents were generally far apart on philosophical 
matters unlike the findings in the 1995/96 study which placed them 
close together and positive toward shared governance.
• Support staff and presidents shared some general skepticism toward 
the role of students on college boards in relation to the students’ ability
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to vote on tuition matters and their right to simultaneously hold office 
on boards and student union executive committees..
• Although not causing significant statistical difference, presidents 
believed that budgets were more difficult to balance in a shared 
governance environment. They also disagreed with the suggestion that 
internal members had not shown bias in financial matters, thereby 
striking at the integrity of the shared decision-making ideal.
• Education council chairs were quite negative toward boards having 
ensured access of stakeholders to financial information and boards 
having kept stakeholders adequately informed about financial matters. 
This negativity was, however, largely out of character for this 
constituent group.
• Faculty and education council chairs frequently differed even though 
the latter are most commonly also faculty members.
3. There was only one significant difference in the assessment of own boards’ 
effectiveness in aspects of leadership, pertaining to thirteen colleges and the 
existence of a clearly understood and accepted bylaw on conflict if interest. 
Further, in spite of widely differing philosophies on the characteristics of 
effective shared governance revealed among colleges and constituent 
groups, there was almost total agreement that colleges were actually 
exhibiting those characteristics in practice. This particular set of findings
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would be very appropriate to test against the views of other stakeholder 
groups.
In conclusion, the findings of the study were that material differences 
existed between both colleges and constituent groups, and to a lesser extent 
between the two studies, in relation to all three important aspects of board 
leadership. The sharing of power was marginally less problematic than the 
effectiveness o f the shared decision-making process and how conflict of interest 
had been addressed. In addition, there were also material differences among the 
three decision-making contexts, but, surprisingly, financial matters appeared to 
be noticeably less problematic than general matters and labour relations matters. 
The degree o f differences, as expressed in the number with statistical 
significance, would appear to present clear warning to everyone associated with 
education in British Columbia. And, that warning would be that, although much 
progress has been made, the development of shared governance is not 
proceeding as smoothly and evenly as might have been desired. But then again, 
it might be concluded that the progress to date is conforming very closely to the 
pattern throughout North America as evidenced in thirty years of literature.
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Recommendations
This final section of the chapter contains practical suggestions for 
implementation and further pursuit o f the findings from the study and 
suggestions for areas of further research to build upon those findings.
A study which is evaluative in nature should be expected to produce 
findings which can be applied in a practical way to improve the subject under 
review. And, that is the case with this study of shared governance in the British 
Columbia post-secondary education system. There were clear messages to 
emerge from the findings and these should be directed back to the system from 
which they were drawn. First, it is important to note that shared governance has 
been relatively well introduced to the province. That was confirmed by the board 
members in noting the moderate existence at each college site of most of the 
qualities associated with successful shared decision-making. However, not all 
qualities were recognized at all campuses and, in addition, there were very 
different philosophical views expressed by constituent groups and colleges. It is 
in this area of personal values that most attention should be paid because these 
personal values held by board members are likely to become the actual 
characteristics of tomorrow’s governing boards. There are clear divergences of 
values held by the presidents of institutions and in certain colleges.
Conflict of interest in principle, directed at the internal members, is an 
obvious problem area, as is the shared decision-making process which is often
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affected by conflict of interest. The fundamental sharing of power appears not to 
be such a great problem, although the role o f students did come under some 
critical scrutiny. Problems were detected in two of the decision-making areas, 
namely general matters and, in particular, labour relations matters. Somewhat 
surprisingly, financial matters did not seem to be such a problem, but must 
inevitably be impacted by the conflict o f interest issue noted earlier.
Suggestions for Implementation and Further Pursuit 
of the Findings o f the Study
1. College trustees should study the results of this evaluation carefully.
Notwithstanding the anonymity, boards can probably relate their own known 
culture to the findings. Colleges should use the findings as building blocks for 
the future, starting with structured evaluation of their own performance. And, 
the evaluation would be most effective were it to include all stakeholder 
groups including the public-at-large and perhaps even representatives o f the 
provincial government. In this case, the Advanced Education Council of 
British Columbia could assume a leadership role in facilitating the 
development of common evaluation tools to assist boards. This evaluation 
task should be separate from the all-encompassing, and relatively ineffectual, 
five-year self studies which colleges presently undertake.
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2. Out of the evaluation should come, as a minimum, action plans to draw up 
clear rules of operating and responsibilities including policy on conflict of 
interest, even if the universal conflict o f interest bylaw cannot be changed 
immediately. The bylaw should, however, be subjected to rigorous review as 
it clearly is a bone of contention and, perhaps, the Achilles heel of shared 
governance right now. The more clarity that can be instilled in board 
objectives and procedures, the less likelihood there is of ongoing problems.
3. If colleges can establish cultural norms of shared governance, not only might 
some of teething problems, currently being experienced, tend to diminish but 
also the problems of frequent turnover of the memberships may be alleviated. 
Orientation of new members, and this is just as important for internal 
members as external members, would be an effective tool in creating and 
sustaining a democratic culture. Again, AECBC would appear to have a role 
to play whether it is in focusing more on the issues of shared governance in 
the orientation sessions which it sponsors in Vancouver or assisting in the 
development of orientation packages which can be used at the local board 
level where all members are more likely to be in attendance.
4. Finally, it would appear that boards need to revisit their relationships with the 
constituencies that have impact on them, including education councils; the 
Ministry o f Advanced Education, Training, and Technology, and other 
branches of government; and student and trade unions, on both a local and 
provincial level. Development of those relationships would surely lead to
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better definition of the roles of internal members on college boards and, 
thereby, address one of the fundamental weaknesses of shared governance 
which was identified in literature and is now manifesting itself in British 
Columbia. That weakness relates to the tendency of internal members to 
pursue the interest of their constituencies rather than that of the common 
good. One obvious solution to the problem might lie in consideration of the 
notion that employees and students serving simultaneously as board 
members and union officials is an impossible and undesirable clash of 
interests and loyalties.
5. The presidents have to regroup and consider what would improve their views 
and actions in shared decision-making. Clearly, given the power of their 
office, shared governance will not fully prosper if they continue to see it in a 
negative light. However, the governance structure is sufficiently well 
established already to suggest that change will not come about if the 
presidents take a back seat. It would appear that some presidents, at least, 
have adopted what was identified in literature as bury-one’s-head-in-the-sand 
response to the perception of having their power changed in shared 
governance. The presidents need to reassess this inactivity and explore the 
value of taking charge, of assuming a leadership role in engaging the other 
constituents to work together in pursuit of a common good. This engagement 
resonates with the notion of collaborative leadership espoused by Rost 
(1993) and Scherr (1994). Arguably, the presidents have the station and the
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reputation for independence to provide the spark for true democratization of 
all the players and the pursuit o f the advantages of shared decision-making. 
The current structure in British Columbia which sees the Council of Chief 
Executive Officers and the Council of Board Governors meet individually and 
jointly under the auspices of AECBC would provide the ideal vehicle for initial 
exploration o f the kind of governance development envisaged. And, it would 
also present the opportunity to start to close the gap which has emerged 
between the presidents and provincially appointed members in particular. Key 
players among the presidents group could well be the five newly hired 
presidents who should bring a fresh perspective and, thus, start to turn 
around an apparently deteriorating situation.
Suggestions for Areas of Further Research
Shared governance is an evolving concept, even with thirty years 
experience in some provinces and states. Its continued evolution is very 
dependent upon the changes going on in education as a whole as well as the 
real world outside of education. This study merely scratches the surface as 
others have done before. And, it poses more questions at its conclusion than it 
does provide answers.
1. In terms of a total perspective on shared governance in British Columbia, 
there is a fruitful field of research possible in examining the subject through
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other stakeholder groups, individually or as a whole. The views of the general 
populations of faculty, staff, and students as well those of the public-at-large, 
media, and government would provide a rich and, in all probability, 
contrasting picture to augment the findings of this study.
2. In addition, a follow-up on this study in approximately three years, which 
could include both current board members and former members, would 
expand the knowledge base of this study and determine if patterns of views 
and behaviours are still in a fluid mode. Such a study would also serve to 
allay any concerns about the relative inexperience of the current study’s 
participants, expressed in a grand mean of 2.909 years.
3. The apparent extreme negative views of the college presidents toward 
shared governance would suggest that a more intensive qualitative study of 
their views might reveal what can be done to bring the presidents on-side. 
One would imagine that the provincial government might be interested in 
sponsoring such research given the importance of the presidents at the heart 
of the education system.
4. Conflict of interest is well documented as perhaps the greatest barrier to truly 
effective shared governance. Consequently, this issue represents a 
potentially fruitful area of research, particularly in examining where there has 
been successful introduction o f shared governance into a highly unionized 
environment elsewhere in North America.
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5. The findings of this study revealed colleges which were positive toward 
shared governance, both philosophically and in practice, and colleges which 
were negative. A case study of one or more of the positive colleges may well 
reveal the cultural characteristics and established procedures which could be 
developed as standards for the less positive colleges to adopt. This would, of 
course, require some colleges to waive the anonymity which they were given 
in this study.
Several specific areas were identified during the analysis o f the data in the 
study which prompted the need for further research. This research could be done 
independently or be part of the basis for a follow-up study.
• The participants were firmly split down the middle (positive, neutral, and 
negative) on whether the tendency toward provincial centralization of boards’ 
decision-making powers had spared the boards, to any extent, difficulties in 
decision-making due to the inclusion of internal members. Further research 
should be undertaken to determine if the absence of difficulties, where noted, 
was due to the centralization or any other positive factors within a board’s 
culture.
• Since most colleges reported that they had been able to deal with the trend 
toward provincial centralization and, consequent, diminution of their powers, 
further research might reveal how institutions are evolving from being 
hierarchical organizations with substantial local power to become democratic 
organizations within a hierarchical education system where power
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within the Ministry of Advanced Education, Training and Technology and 
other ministries. This type of inquiry would lend itself to a qualitative study.
• Appointees and education council chairs tended toward disagreement that 
the remuneration of the former was appropriate. It would be interesting to 
determine if the two constituents had the same reason for their negative view 
toward the level of remuneration.
• The issue of boards meeting their fiduciary obligations to the student 
population in terms of dealing with student unions when two students are 
frequently members of both bodies prompted the need for more information 
than was forthcoming in the study. Student respondents were neutral and it 
would take further research to determine if the reason for neutrality went 
along with a lack of knowledge of the boards’ legal fiduciary obligations, 
reservation as to the appropriateness of those obligations, or reservation as 
to whether boards had, indeed, discharged the obligations.
• Finally, the general disquiet around conflict of interest, which permeates the 
findings of this study, would naturally prompt further questions:
• Two colleges disagreed that the bylaw was accepted as fair and 
workable. Further research to determine if the opinions were founded 
on principle only or on practical experiences at their particular 
campuses might provide new information which would assist colleges 
in dealing with this major issue. Such findings might form the basis of
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new local policies to codify the responsibilities and expectations of 
internal members.
• Similarly, the students stood out in isolation in disagreeing with the 
contention that conflict o f interest had not been a de facto problem at 
campuses. It would interesting to find out more about the problems 
observed by this unique group of board members.
Consequently, the questions posed above would appear to confirm that the 
quest for information on the shared governance concept is not yet at an end.
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As a current member of the board of a community college or university college, 
you are invited to participate in my research study on shared governance in the 
British Columbia post-secondary system. In addition to my position as Vice 
President and Bursar of Malaspina University College, I am a doctoral student at 
the University o f San Diego and this study will form the basis of my dissertation.
Enclosed with this letter, you will find a form of consent to act as a research 
subject, a questionnaire, and a postage paid, return envelope. The consent form 
serves two purposes. Firstly, more information about the purpose and 
procedures of the study is detailed. Secondly, should you agree to participate, 
and I want to stress strongly that participation is entirely voluntary, you are 
requested to indicate to that affect on the form and return it with the completed 
questionnaire in the envelope provided as noted below.
It is my hope that this study will not only provide the basis for the completion of 
my degree but will also contribute to the body of knowledge which will assist 
governance in particular, and post-secondary education in general, areas in 
which we share a common interest. I should add that I have received every 
encouragement in my endeavor from the Advanced Education Council of British 
Columbia and look forward to sharing the results of the study with members in 
various forums.
This field of research is entirely grounded in the knowledge and views which you 
are acquiring as a board member, and I sincerely hope that you will volunteer to 
participate. If you have any questions or comments please contact me at my 
home ([250]-758-3853) or office ([250]-755-8730) or my dissertation director, Dr. 
William E. Piland, Professor of Education, San Diego State University ([619]-594- 
3071).
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Completed consent forms and questionnaires should be returned in the envelope 














As a recent member of the board of a community college or university college, 
you are invited to participate in my research study on shared governance in the 
British Columbia post-secondary system. In addition to my position as Vice 
President and Bursar of Malaspina University College, I am a doctoral student at 
the University of San Diego and this study will form the basis of my dissertation.
Enclosed with this letter, you will find a form of consent to act as a research 
subject, a questionnaire, and a postage paid, return envelope. The consent form 
serves two purposes. Firstly, more information about the purpose and 
procedures of the study is detailed. Secondly, should you agree to participate, 
and I want to stress strongly that participation is entirely voluntary, you are 
requested to indicate to that affect on the form and return it with the completed 
questionnaire in the envelope provided as noted below.
It is my hope that this study will not only provide the basis for the completion of 
my degree but will also contribute to the body of knowledge which will assist 
governance in particular, and post-secondary education in general, areas in 
which we share a common interest. I should add that I have received every 
encouragement in my endeavor from the Advanced Education Council of British 
Columbia and look forward to sharing the results of the study with members in 
various forums.
This field of research is entirely grounded in the knowledge and views which you 
have acquired as a board member, and I sincerely hope that you will volunteer to 
participate. If you have any questions or comments please contact me at my
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home ([250J-758-3853) or office ([250]-755-8730) or my dissertation director, Dr. 
William E. Piland, Professor of Education, San Diego State University ([619]-594- 
3071).
Completed consent forms and questionnaires should be returned in the envelope 














As a current or recent, elected or ex-officio member of the board of Malaspina 
University College, you are invited to participate in my research study on shared 
governance in the British Columbia post-secondary system. As you know, in 
addition to my position as Vice President and Bursar of Malaspina University 
College, I am a doctoral student at the University of San Diego and this study will 
form the basis of my dissertation.
Enclosed with this letter, you will find a form of consent to act as a research 
subject, a questionnaire, and a postage paid, return envelope. The consent form 
serves two purposes. Firstly, more information about the purpose and 
procedures of the study is detailed. Secondly, should you agree to participate, 
and I want to stress strongly that participation is entirely voluntary, you are 
requested to indicate to that affect on the form and return it with the completed 
questionnaire in the envelope provided as noted below.
Please be aware that I have included additional safeguards in the study process 
to protect your anonymity given our close on-going relationship. Your envelope 
containing the completed consent form and questionnaire will be directed 
unopened to a consultant in Vancouver who is responsible for the processing of 
all data. The consultant, not I, will input your data and process it along with all 
the other data which I will input. When I receive the processed data, it should be 
virtually impossible for me to identify your input. Therefore, not only will your 
anonymity be maintained in my dissertation and any other reports (as will that of 
other participants), in your case I will also not be personally aware of any of the
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content. In addition, your questionnaire will be retained in Vancouver and 
ultimately disposed of once the study has been concluded.
It is my hope that this study will not only provide the basis for the completion of 
my degree but will also contribute to the body of knowledge which will assist 
governance in particular, and post-secondary education in general, areas in 
which we share a common interest. I should add that I have received every 
encouragement in my endeavor from the Advanced Education Council of British 
Columbia and look forward to sharing the results of the study with members in 
various forums.
This field of research is entirely grounded in the knowledge and views which you 
are acquiring or have acquired as a board member and I sincerely hope that you 
will volunteer to participate. If you have any questions or comments please 
contact me at my home ([250]-758-3853) or office ([250]-755-8730) or my 
dissertation director, Dr. William E. Piland, Professor of Education, San Diego 
State University ([619J-594-3071).
Completed consent forms and questionnaires should be returned in the envelope 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Section 1 : Board decision-making on general matters, but excluding business 
related to financial matters and labour relations matters. 
1. .. My board has established a climate of 
trust among all the members (irrespective 
of the constituency they come from). 
2 ... Board members may bring different 
values and expertise but all generally 
contribute equally to the functioning of the 
Strongly . 
board. 1 
3 ... Board members view themselves as 
equals. 
4 .. .The six year term for appointed board 
members is appropriate. 
5 ... The three year term for elected board 
members is appropriate. 
6 ... The one year term for student board 
members is appropriate. 
7 ... The remuneration for appointed and 
student board members is appropriate. 
(a)----appointed members 







8 .. . Faculty and support staff members and 
the chairs of the education council should 
be remunerated by way of: 
( a )----a stipend 
(b )----release time. 
9 ... The composition of my board makes an 
effective contribution to the governance of 
the institution. 
10 ... The way my board operates makes an 
effective contribution to the governance of 
the institution. 
11... The conduct of my board represents 
good boardsmanship. 
12 ... My board has managed to make some 
difficult decisions in the last two years. 
13 ... My board is accountable for its 
decisions to the internal and external 
communities. 
14 .. .I feel my board is fulfilling its 
obligations under the College and Institute 
Act. 
15 .. .I feel the powers of the board are being 
diminished as more decisions are being 
centralized at the provincial level. 
Strongly 
Disagree 






16 ... The president should be a non-voting Strongly 
ex-officio member of the board. Disagree 
1 2 3 
1 7 ... The president should be a full voting Strongly 
member of the board. Disagree 
1 2 3 
18 .. . The chair of the education council Strongly 
should be a non-voting ex-officio member Disagree 
of the board. 
1 l 3 
19 ... The chair of the education council 
should be a full voting member of the 
board. 
1 2 3 
20 .. .The bylaw and/or policy regarding Strongly 
conflict of interest adopted at my institution Disagree 
is generally accepted by all board members 
as fair and workable. 1 l 3 
21...Conflict of interest has not been a Strongly 
problem with my board. Disagree 
1 
Section 2 : Board decision-makin~ related solely to financial matters 
22 ... All members of my board have equal Strongly 
independence and disinterest when it comes Disagree 
to dealing with budget issues. 































23 ... Elected and ex-officio board members 
have an inevitable vested interest when 
dealing with budget issues. 
24 .. .1 feel that elected and ex-officio board 
members have generally NOT shown bias 
towards their own department, area, or 
constituency (trade or student union) when 
dealing with budget issues. 
25 .. .I feel my board effectively discharges 
its fiscal responsibilities under the College 
and Institute Act. 
26 ... My board discharges its fiduciary 
responsibility to all students from whom it 
collects student union fees when dealing 
with that organization. 
27 ... My board has dealt effectively with the 
issue of conflict of interest as it relates to 
student board members with respect to 
financial matters between the board and the 
student union, such as tuition and other 
fees. 
28 ... The College and Institute Act 
provision that students may vote on 
proposed tuition fee increases is 
appropriate. 
29 .. . Elected student board members should 
be disqualified from simultaneously 
holding office in their respective student 
unions because of the perceived conflict of 
interest on financial matters. 
30 ... The board' s role is to approve the 
parameters and underlying assumptions of 
the budget, but otherwise to leave assembly 














31 ... My board ensures that all stakeholder 
groups have advisory input into the budget 
process. 
32 .. .I feel that all stakeholder groups are 
adequately informed about financial 
matters. 
33 ... The composition of the board has 
made it more difficult to balance the budget 
in these tight financial times. 





Section 3 : Board decision-making related solely to labour relations matters 
34 ... Shared governance as a broad goal is Strongly 
difficult to achieve in a unionized Duagree 
environment. 
1 2 5 
3 5 ... Labour relations, in particular the Strongly Strongly 
negotiation and administering of collective Disagr.ee Agree 
agreements, has caused division among the 
members of my board. 
36 ... Labour relations has largely become a 
centralized provincial issue, hence my 
board has not experienced any difficulties 
in decision-making due to the presence of 1 5 
elected and ex-officio members. 
3 7 .. .I feel my board effectively discharges 
its labour relations responsibilities under 
the College and Institute Act. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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38 .. .1 feel my board would have generally 
adopted a different direction in labour 
relations over the last two years if the board 
did not include elected and ex-officio 1 2 3 4 5 
members. 
39 .. .1 feel my board would have generally 
adopted a different direction in labour 
relations over the last two years if 
provincial centralization had not taken 
place. 
40 . .I feel my board would have generally 
adopted a different direction in labour 
relations over the last two years if the board 
did not include elected and ex-officio 
members and if provincial centralization 
had not taken place. 
41.. .The elected and ex-officio board Strongly 
members have lived up to their oath of Agree 
office to the board in contributing to my 
board's role in labour relations. 
42 ... My board has dealt effectively with the 
issue of conflict of interest as it relates to 
elected and ex-officio board members with 
respect to matters of administering 
collective agreements. 
43 ... My board has employed a personnel or 
labour relations committee from which 
some board members are excluded on the 
basis of their perceived or real conflict of 1 2 3 4 5 
interest. 
44 ... Student board members should play a Strongly 




45 ... Student members on my board do play 
a full part in decision-making on labour 
relations issues. 
46 .. . Elected employee members and ex-
officio members should be disqualified 
from simultaneously holding office in their 
respective trade unions. 
Section 4 : Board effectiveness in the sharing of power 
4 7 .. . The undernoted themes can be 
considered to contribute to a board's 
effectiveness in dealing with the sharing of 
power in a shared governance model. 
Please indicate the degree to which these 
themes contribute to your board's success: 
(a) ... A climate of trust among all board 
members; 
(b ) ... Equal contribution by all board 
members; 
(c) .. .Independence of all board members 
from their constituency; 
( d) ... Board members not bringing vested 
interests to the board table; 
(e) ... Management/labour relations not 
infiltrating the board culture; and 





E · tence 
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Sections : Board effectiveness in shared decision-making 
48 .. .The undernoted themes can be 
considered to contribute to a board's 
effectiveness in ensuring appropriate 
shared decision-making process. Please 
indicate the degree to which these themes 
contribute to your own board' s success: 
(a) ... Clear rules of boardsmanship, 
consistently applied; 
(b ) ... Accountability for board decision-
making; 
(c) ... Meeting obligations of the College and 
Institute Act; 
(d) ... Coping with the tendency toward 
centralized (provincial) decision-making; 
(e) ... No bias shown by employee board 
members in dealing with budget issues and 
distribution of resources; 
(f) ... No bias shown by student board 
members in dealing with budget issues and 
distribution of resources; 
(g) ... Understanding the distinction between 
leadership and management and 
acknowledging the roles of the board and 
administration; 
(h) ... The college having a history of 
informal shared governance, therefore, the 
introduction of legislated shared decision-
making was not difficult; and 
(i) ... Other themes (pleasy list). 
333 
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Section 6: Board effectiveness in dealing with the real or 12erceived conflict of interest of 
em12loyee and student board members 
49 ... The under noted themes can be Non- Strong 
considered to contribute to a board' s Existence Existence 
effectiveness in dealing with the real or 
perceived conflict of interest of employee 
and student board members in a shared 
governance model. Please indicate the 
degree to which these themes contribute to 
your board' s success: 
(a) ... A clearly understood and accepted 
bylaw and/or policy on conflict of interest 
having been developed by the board; 1 2 3 4 5 
(b) ... Elected board members as members-
at-large and not representing their 
constituencies; 1 2 3 4 5 
(c) ... The oath of office, sworn by each 
member, preventing management/ labour 
problems among board members; 1 2 3 4 5 
( d) ... A personnel or labour relations 
committee, with restricted membership, 
preventing management/labour problems 
among board members; 1 2 3 4 5 
I': 
(e) ... The president being able to make a full 
contribution to board affairs; 1 2 3 4 5 
(f) ... The education council chair being able 
to make a full contribution to board affairs; 
and 1 2 3 4 5 
(g) ... Other themes (please list). 
--------------------------------------------------- I 2 3 4 5 




Status of board membership Check Where Applicable
Appointed _____
Elected - Faculty________________________________________
- Support Staff _____
- Student _____
President
Chair of Education Council
Name of Institution
Number of Years on Board of Current Institution
IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR THE PARTICIPANT :
Details concerning your status and the name of your institution are crucial to this study 
because two of the main focuses are to look at comparisons between members of different 
status and between institutions. The researcher is aware that there is only one faculty 
member, one support staff, one president, and one education council chair on each board 
and by giving the above information your identity may be revealed. However, the 
researcher undertakes to all participants to maintain complete anonymity of person and 
institution in the study findings, dissertation, and any other paper or presentation resulting 
from the study. For more information on this issue, please refer to the Consent to Act as a 
Research Subject form or contact the researcher, Edwin Deas, at [250J-758-3853 or 
[250J-755-8730 or his dissertation director, Dr. William E. Piland, at [619]-594-3071.
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UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO 
CONSENT TO ACT AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT
Edwin Deas, a doctoral student in the School of Education at the University of 
San Diego, is conducting a research study of shared governance in the British Columbia 
post-education system. The purpose o f this study is to examine three aspects of 
leadership through shared governance, namely the sharing of power, the quality of the 
shared decision-making process, and the dealing with real or perceived conflict of interest 
on account of the employment or student status of some of the board members. These 
aspects of leadership will be studied in three particular contexts; board decision-making 
in general matters of business, in financial matters, and in the field of labour relations.
The impact of the change in membership of the boards as a result of the legislative 
amendment. Bill 22, will be ascertained through the views and experiences of board 
members. The researcher will seek to find if differences emerge among colleges and 
board members, the latter according to their status. Finally, the results of the study will 
be compared with a similar study conducted by the researcher in early 1996 to see if the 
passage of time since Bill 22 has changed board members’ views.
As a participant in this study, I understand that I will be completing a survey 
questionnaire containing forty nine questions. The duration of the exercise for me should 
be between thirty and forty five minutes and only one such exercise will be required of 
me. Participation will not involve any added risks or discomforts to me other than the 
commitment of time. I can benefit from the opportunity to be part of the study by 
contributing what I have learned during my tenure as a board member and by receiving 
the analysis of the data collected from around the province which may assist my 
boardsmanship in the future.
My participation in this study is totally voluntary and I understand my choice to 
participate is completely unrelated to my status as a board member and, where applicable, 
to my status as an employee or student of a college or institute included in this study. 
Further, I understand that I may refuse to participate by simply not completing the 
questionnaire and I may withdraw at any time without jeopardy by inform ing the 
researcher, whereupon my questionnaire and all data from it will be removed from the 
study and destroyed.
I understand that my questionnaire will be kept completely confidential and all 
data derived from it will not reveal my name or that of my institution or any other 
information that would purport to be attributable to me personally. All questionnaires 
will be destroyed at the conclusion o f the study. I acknowledge that my identity may be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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known to the researcher and accept his assurance that I shall enjoy complete anonymity in 
all reports of this study. [N.B. In the case of elected employee and student members and 
ex-officio members of the Malaspina University-College board, special arrangements will 
be made so that even their identity is not revealed to the researcher.]
Further information on this study, or on any aspect of participation in it, will 
readily be made available by Edwin Deas at his home ([250]-758-3853) or office ([250]- 
755-8730), or by his dissertation director, Dr. William E. Piland, Professor of Education. 
San Diego State University ([619]-594-3071 ).
There are no other agreements, written or verbal, related to this study beyond that 
expressed on this consent form, and I have received a copy of this consent document.
I, the undersigned, understand the above explanations and, on that basis, I give 
consent to my voluntary participation in this research.
Signature of Subject Date Signature of Researcher Date









In September 1997, I wrote to you to invite you to participate in my research 
study on shared governance in the British Columbia post-secondary system. In 
addition to my position as Vice President and Bursar of Malaspina University 
College, I am a doctoral student at the University of San Diego and this study will 
form the basis of my dissertation. It is my hope that this study will not only 
provide the basis for the completion of my degree but will also contribute to the 
body of knowledge which will assist governance in particular, and post­
secondary education in general, areas in which we share a common interest.
Because of the nature of the study process, I have no way of knowing whether or 
not you have participated. However, if you have participated I would like to thank 
you sincerely for taking the trouble. If you have not yet done so, for whatever 
reason, I would like to ask you one more time to consider volunteering. Your 
views and knowledge of shared governance are important and can contribute to 
the richness of the study. Participation is entirely voluntary but I hope you will 
give it serious consideration. Should you wish to discuss the study or need 
another consent form and questionnaire, please contact me at my home ([250]- 
758-3853) or office ([250]-755-8730).
Completed consent forms and questionnaires should be returned in the envelope 
provided no later than October 31,1997. Thank you very much.
Yours sincerely,
Edwin Deas
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Memo
To: Board Chairs and College & Institute Presidents (as noted below)
From: Edwin Deas, Vice-President Administration
D ate: March 20,1998
Ra: Research Study of Shared Governance in the BC Post-Secondary Education System
I want to take the opportunity to provide a progress report on my study and with it extend thanks to all 
those board members who have participated to date. As of October 31, 1997, the original deadline, 
questionnaire returns have been received from the undemoted institutions:
Name of College/Institute Number of Returns
Camosun College 4
Capilano College 1
College of New Caledonia 5






North Island College 3
Northern Lights College 5
Northwest Community College 5
Okanagan University College 7
Selkirk Community College 6
University College of the Cariboo 7
University College of the Fraser Valley 2
Vancouver Community College 3
Unspecified J.
TOTAL 74
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Naturally, I am a little concerned about the number of returns at this stage which amounts to 
approximately 28% of the total board member population. The overall richness of the study will be 
enhanced by greater participation. In addition, the diversity of analysis by institution and constituency 
membership will also be enhanced and more meaningful through larger numbers.
To that end, I would like to request that you emphasize the importance of participation to the 
members of your board, and encourage those who have not already done so to complete and submit a 
questionnaire. In the event that a board member needs a questionnaire, the quickest approach would 
be to call me at 250-755-8730 (office) or 250-758-3853 (home). We are now facing the possibility of a 
postal strike in the coming days; therefore, I would suggest that completed questionnaires and consent 
forms should be sent by fax transmission to 250-741-2730. In order to encourage further participation, 
the deadline for submissions has been extended to November 30,1997.
Thank you for your assistance.
ED/dvb

















Summary of Questionnaire Returns, by Constituency Group
Constituency Group Potential Count Actual Count
Percentage Distribution 
of Actual Count
Actual Count as Percentage 
of Potential Count
Appointees 153 59 58% 39%
Elected Faculty 17 7 7 42






























Summary of Questionnaire Returns, by College (A to Q)
College Potential Count Actual Count
Percentage Distribution 
of Actual Count
Actual Count as Percentage 
of Potential Count
A 16 5 5% 31%
B 13 3 3 23
C 16 5 5 31
D 16 8 8 50
E 15 5 5 33
F 15 4 4 27
G 15 5 5 33
H 16 6 6 38
I 15 10 9 67
J 13 5 5 38
K 14 6 6 43
L 15 7 7 47
M 16 11 10 69
N 15 8 8 53
0 16 7 7 44
P 14 3 3 21
Q 15 4 4 27




















Summary of Board Experience, by Years and Percentage-Frequency Distribution
Experience Count Percentage-Frequency Distribution
Less than two years* 26 27%
Between two and three years 20 20
Between three and four years 18 18
Between four and five years 12 12
Between five and six years 19 19





1. Not all participants responded to this question.




















Summary of Data by Decision-Making Context,





Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree
Strongly
Agree
General Matters of Board Business: Sharing of Power
1 My board has established a climate of trust 
among all members (irrespective of the 
constituency they come from).
3.730 1.004 2% 10% 25% 39% 24%
2 Board members may bring different values and 
expertise but all generally contribute equally to 
the functioning of the board.
3.406 1.124 4% 21% 24% 33% 18%
3 Board members view themselves as equals. 3.644 1.054 2% 15% 23% 37% 23%
4 The six year term for appointed board members 
is appropriate.
3.574 1.306 12% 8% 20% 31% 29%
5 The three year term for elected (employee) 
board members is appropriate.
3.784 1.087 6% 6% 19% 43% 26%
6 The one year term for student board members is 
appropriate.
3.520 1.210 7% 16% 18% 36% 23%
7a The remuneration for appointed board members 
is appropriate.
3.050 1.366 19% 17% 20% 28% 16%
7b The remuneration for student board members is 
appropriate.
3.263 1.290 14% 14% 23% 31% 18%
8a Faculty and support staff members and the 
chairs of the education council should be 
remunerated by way of a stipend.
2.772 1.513 30% 19% 12% 22% 17%
8b Faculty and support staff members and chairs of 
the education council should be remunerated by 
way of release time.



















Board Financial Matters: Sharing of Power
22 All members of my board have equal 
independence and disinterest when it comes to 
dealing with budget issues.
3.146 1.187 9% 21% 30% 25% 15%
23 Elected and ex-officio board members have an 
inevitable vested interest when dealing with 
budget issues.
3.604 1.011 2% 15% 22% 43% 18%
33 The composition of the board has made it more 
difficult to balance the budget in these tight 
financial times.
2.224 1.145 31% 38% 14% 13% 4%
Board Labour Relations Matters: Sharing of Power
34 Shared governance as a broad goal is difficult to 
achieve in a unionized environment.
2.627 1.342 24% 29% 17% 18% 12%
35 Labour relations, in particular the negotiation 
and administering of collective agreements, has 
caused division among the members of my 
board.
2.376 1.190 26% 36% 19% 12% 7%
44 Student board members should play a full part in 
decision-making on labour relations issues.
3.653 1.204 8% 9% 21% 34% 28%
45 Student members on my board do play a full 
part in decision-making on labour relations 
issues.
3.626 1.282 9% 10% 22% 26% 33%
General Matters of Board Business: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Ma dug Process
9 The composition of my board makes an 
effective contribution to the governance of the 
institution.




















10 The way my board operates makes an effective 
contribution to the governance of the institution.
3.735 1.014 2% 9% 29% 33% 27%
11 The conduct of my board represents good 
boardsmanship.
3.743 0.997 2% 7% 32% 32% 27%
12 My board has managed to make some difficult 
decisions in the last two years.
4.141 0.926 0% 9% 9% 40% 42%
13 My board is accountable for its decisions to the 
internal and external communities.
4.049 0.999 1% 10% 12% 38% 39%
14 I feel my board is fulfilling its obligations under 
the College and Institute Act.
4.137 0.955 2% 4% 16% 35% 43%
15 I feel the powers of the board are being 
diminished as more decisions are being 
centralized at the provincial level.
3.696 1.097 4% 9% 29% 29% 29%
Board Financial Matters: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
24 I feel that elected and ex-officio members have 
generally NOT shown bias towards their own 
department, area, or constituency (trade or 
student union) when dealing with budget issues.
3.594 1.168 7% 11% 22% 36% 24%
25 I feel my board effectively discharges its fiscal 
responsibilities under the College and Institute 
Act.
4.200 0.910 1% 5% 12% 37% 45%
26 My board discharges its fiduciary responsibility 
to all students from whom it collects student 
union fees when dealing with that organization.
3.938 0.938 2% 3% 25% 39% 31%
30 The board’s role is to approve the parameters 
and underlying assumptions of the budget, but 
otherwise to leave the assembly of the numbers 
to administration.




















31 My board ensures that all stakeholder groups 
have advisory input into the budget process.
3.762 1.167 1 5% 12% 17% 34% 32%
32 I feel that all stakeholder groups are adequately 
informed about financial matters.
3.755 1.085 4% 11% 18% 41% 26%
Board Labour Relations Matters: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
36 Labour relations has become a centralized 
provincial issue, hence my board has not 
experienced any difficulties in decision-making 
due to the presence of elected and ex-officio 
members.
2.980 1.101 9% 27% 28% 29% 7%
37 I feel my board effectively discharges its labour 
relations responsibilities under the College and 
Institute Act.
4.059 0.830 1% 3% 17% 48% 31%
38 I feel my board would have generally adopted a 
different direction in labour relations over the 
last two years if the board did not include 
elected and ex-officio members.
2.307 1.129 28% 34% 21% 13% 4%
39 I feel my board would have generally adopted a 
different direction in labour relations over the 
last two years if provincial centralization had not 
taken place.
3.052 1.084 9% 23% 27% 36% 5%
40 I feel my board would have generally adopted a 
different direction in labour relations over the 
last two years if the board did not include 
elected and ex-officio members and if provincial 
centralization had not taken place.




















General Matters of Board Business: How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed
16 The president should be a non-voting ex-officio 
member of the board.
4.188 1.255 8% 6% 5% 22% 59%
17 The president should be a full voting member of 
the board.
1.755 1.278 65% 17% 4% 5% 9%
18 The chair of education council should be a non­
voting ex-officio member of the board.
3.578 1.595 19% 11% 6% 20% 44%
19 The chair of education council should be a full 
voting member of the board.
2.485 1.610 42% 19% 7% 11% 21%
20 The bylaw and/or policy on conflict of interest 
adopted at my institution is generally accepted 
by all board members as fair and workable.
3.853 1.075 4% 10% 13% 44% 29%
21 Conflict of interest has not been a problem with 
my board.
3.424 1.348 10% 20% 14% 29% 27%
Board Financial Matters: How Conflict of Interest has >een Addressed
27 My board has dealt effectively with the issue of 
conflict of interest as it relates to student board 
members with respect to financial matters 
between the board and the student union, such 
as tuition and other fees.
3.887 0.988 2% 5% 27% 34% 32%
28 The College and Institute Act provision that 
students may vote on proposed tuition fee 
increases is appropriate.
3.188 1.369 17% 15% 21% 27% 20%
29 Elected student board members should be 
disqualified from simultaneously holding office 
in their respective student unions because of the 
perceived conflict of interest on financial 
matters.




















Board Labour Relations Matters: How Conflict of Interest bas been Addressed
41 The elected and ex-officio board members have 
lived upto their oath of office in contributing to 
my board’s role in labour relations.
4.102 0.891 | 0% 6% 16% 39% 39%
42 My board has dealt effectively with the issue of 
conflict of interest as it relates to elected and ex- 
officio board members with respect to matters of 
administering collective agreements.
3.900 1.096 4% 10% 11% 42% 33%
43 My board has employed a personnel or labour 
relations committee from which some board 
members are excluded on the basis of their 
perceived or real conflict of interest.
2.753 1.554 29% 25% 10% 14% 22%
46 Elected employee members and ex-officio 
members should be disqualified from 
simultaneously holding office in their respective 
trade unions.
3.109 1.523 19% 25% 12% 16% 28%
Notes:
1. Statements from the survey questionnaire (See Appendix B).




















Summary of the Assessment of Own Boards’ Effectiveness













47 The undemoted themes can be considered to 
contribute to a board’s effectiveness in the 
sharing of power in a shared governance model: 
(a)--A climate of trust among all board 
members.
3.911 0.918 * 1% 8% 17% 47% 27%
47 (b)--Equal contribution by all board members. 3.455 1.188 7% 17% 20% 36% 20%
47 (c)--Independence of all board members from 
their constituency.
3.290 1.076 6% 17% 31% 34% 12%
47 (d)—Board members not bringing vested interest 
to the board table.
3.416 1.013 5% 12% 32% 39% 12%
47 (e)~Management/labour relations not 
infiltrating the board culture.
3.400 0.955 | 3% 15% 34% 35% 13%
Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
48 The undemoted themes can be considered to 
contribute to a board’s effectiveness in the 
shared decision-making process in a shared 
governance model:
(a)~Clear rules of boardsmanship, consistently 
applied.
3.869 1.007 1% 11% 18% 40% 30%
48 (b)--Accountability for board decision-making. 3.960 0.947 1% 9% 13% 47% 30%
48 (c)~Meeting obligations of the College and 
Institute Act.




















48 (d)-Coping with the tendency toward 
centralized (provincial) decision-making.
3.510 0.846 1% 11% 34% 45% 9%
48 (e)-No bias shown by employee board members 
in dealing with budget issues and distribution of 
resources.
3.825 0.990 2% 8% 22% 41% 27%
48 (f)--No bias shown by student board members in 
dealing with budget issues and distribution of 
resources.
3.546 0.990 2% 13% 29% 39% 17%
48 (g)--Understanding the distinction between 
leadership and management and acknowledging 
the roles of the board and administration.
3.714 1.112 3% 13% 21% 34% 29%
48 (h)--The college having a history of informal 
shared governance, therefore, the introduction of 
legislated shared decision-making was not 
difficult.
3.344 1.034 3% 18% 35% 29% 15%
How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed
49 The undemoted themes can be considered to 
contribute to a board’s effectiveness in dealing 
with real or perceived conflict of interest of 
employee and student board members in a 
shared governance model:
(a)~A clearly understood and accepted bylaw 
and/or policy on conflict of interest having been 
developed by the board.
3.889 1.203 I 7% 8% 11% 36% 38%
49 (b)--Elected board members as members-at- 
large and not representing their constituencies.
3.500 1.133 6% 14% 22% 40% 18%
49 (c)--The oath of office, sworn by each member, 
preventing management/labour problems among 
board members.




















49 (d)--A personnel or labour relations committee, 
with restricted membership, preventing 
management/labour problems among board 
members
2.570 1.355 32% 14% 29% 14% 11%
49 (e)-The president being able to make a full 
contribution to board affairs.
4.323 0.967 1% 7% 8% 26% 58%
49 (O-The education council chair being able to 
make a full contribution to board affairs.
4.162 0.987 0% 9% 14% 28% 49%
Notes:
1. Statements from the survey questionnaire (See Appendix B).



















Sum m ary of Data liy Constituent C ro up , Dccision-MuLing Context, 
and Aspect o f Leadership
(ie n e ra l M atters  o f B oard Business; Sharing o f Power
Elected Elected Elected Council
S tatem ent1 Vulue Appointees Faculty starr Students Presidents Chairs T u ta l P-
1 My board has established a climate ol'misl Mean' 3.746 3.571 3 875 4.000 3 333 4.000 3.730 6720
among all members (irrespcctite ol the S D ' 0.975 1.512 0 641 1.095 1.073 0.926 1.004
constituency they eoine from)
i Board members may bring different values Mean 3.569 2.857 3.750 3.500 26 92 3 444 3.406 .1081
and expertise but all generally contribute s n 1.078 1.215 07 0 7 1.378 1.109 1.236 1.124
equally to the timclinning ol the boaul
3 Board members view Ihcmsclvcs as Mean 3.759 2.857 4.000 3.500 3.385 3 667 3 644 .2710
equals. SD 0.961 1.574 0.926 1.225 0961 1.225 1.054
4 The six year term lor appointed board Mean 3.741 3.429 3 250 2.833 3.385 3.667 3.574 .5911
members is appropriate. SD 1 319 1.272 1.389 1.109 1.446 1.118 1 306
5 Ihe three year term lor elected (employed Mean 3.610 4 000 4 375 4.107 3.692 4 111 3.784 .3292
board members is appropriate. SD 1.204 1.000 0.744 0.408 0.947 0.947 1.087
6 The one year term for student board Mean 3.439 3.286 3.500 3.167 3.615 4.333 3.520 .3999
members is appropriate. SD 1 225 1.380 0 535 1.835 1.044 1 118 1.210
7a nte remuneration for appointed board Mean 2.845 3.000 4 125 4.000 3 0 0 0 2.875 3.050 .0927
members is appropriate. SD 1.399 1.155 0.835 1.265 1.291 1.458 1.366
7b The remuneration lor student board Mean 2 981 3.000 4.000 4.000 3 385 40 0 0 3.263 .0753
members is appropriate. SD 1.339 1.155 0.926 1.265 1.121 1.155 1.290
8a Faculty and support stafT members and the Mean 2.759 3.400 3.000 4.000 2.077 2.429 2.772 1487
chairs of the education council should be SD 1.413 1.817 1 732 1.095 1.441 1.902 1.513
remunerated by way ol a stipend
8b Faculty and support staff' members and Mean 3.569* 3.800 4 571* 3.500 1.833* 4 6 2 5 * 3.521 .0001
chairs of the education council should be SD 1.339 1.789 0.787 1.517 1.1)5 0.744 1.451




















Board Financial M atters: Sharing o f Power
22 All members of my board have equal 
independence and disinterest when il 


















23 Elected and cx-ufficio board members 
have an inevitable vested interest when 


















33 The composition of the board has made it 
more difficult to balance the budget in 


















Board Labour Relations M atters: Sharing o f Power
34 Shared governance as a broad goal is 



















35 Labour relations, in particular the 
negotiation and administering of collective 
agreements, has caused division among the 


















44 Student board members should play a full 



















45 Student members on nty board do play a 



















General M atters  o f Board Business: Effectiveness o f the Shared Occision-M aking Process
9 The composition of my board makes an 






































10 The way iny board operates makes an 






































12 My board has managed to make some 
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13 My board is accountable for its decisions 


















14 1 feel my board is fulfilling its obligations 
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.0001
IS 1 feel the powers o f the board are being 
diminished as more decisions arc being 


















Board F inancial M a tte rs : Effectiveness o f the Shared D ecision-M aking Process
24 1 feel that elected and ex-officio members 
have generally NOT shown bias towards 
tlicir own department, area, or 
constituency (trade ur student union) when 
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26 My board discharges its fiduciary 
responsibility to all students from whom it 



















30 The board's role is to approve the 
parameters and underlying assumptions of 
the budget, but otherwise to leave the 






































31 My board ensures that all stakeholder 



















32 1 feel that all stakeholder groups are 



















Board Labo ur Relations M atters : Effectiveness o f the Shared Decision-M aking Process
36 Labour relations has become a centralized 
provincial issue, hence my board has not 
experienced any difficulties in decision­



















37 1 Icel my board elTeclively discharges its 
labour relations responsibilities under the 


















38 1 feel my board would have generally 
adopted a different direction in labour 
relations over the last two years i f  Ihc 



















39 1 feel my board would have generally 
adopted a different direction in labour 
relations over the last two yean i f  



















40 1 feel my board would have generally 
adopted a different direction in labour 
relations over the last two yean i f  the 
board did not include elected and ex- 
officio memben and i f  provincial 





































(ic n e ra l M u lle n  o f H oard Business: How  Conflict o f Interest hus been Addressed
16 The president should be a non-voting ex- 


















17 The president should be a full voting 


















18 The chair o f education council should be a 



















19 The chair o f education council should be a 


















20 (he bylaw and/or policy on conflict o f 
interest adopted at my institution is 
generally accepted by all board members 
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Board Financial M utters: H ow  C onflict o f Interest bus been Addressed
27 My board has dealt effectively with the 
issue o f conflict o f interest as it relates lo 
student board members w nh respect to 
financial mailcis between the board and 




4 0 8 8














28 The College and Institute Act provision 
that students may vote on proposed tuition 


















29 Elected student board members should be 
disqualified from simultaneously holding 
office in their respective student unions 
because o f the perceived conflict o f 





































Board L ab o u r Relations M u llers: How C onflic t o f Interest has been Addressed
41 The clcaed and cx-ollicio board members 
have lived uplo iheir oam of office In 



















42 My board has dealt effectively with the 
issue of conllicl of inlcresl as tl relates lo 
elected and ex-officio board members with 





0 8 6 8
3.714 
1 380











43 My hoard has employed u personnel or 
labour rclaliuns committee Iroin which 
some board members are excluded on the 



















46 Elected employee members and cx-officio 
members should be disqualified from 




















1. Statements from the survey questionnaire (sec Appendix U).
2. Level o f  Significance.
3. Standard Deviation from the Mean.
4. I »  strongly disagree; 2 =  disugree; 3 =  neutral; 4 » agree; 3 = strongly agree
*> Indicates significant difference ut the O.S confidence level.










































































C h a in


































































































































































































































 -s §>.2 E
(b)-Equal coniribuuon by all board 
members.
(c)--lndcpcndencc in'all board members 
from (heir consmucncy.
(d)-Ooard members noi bringing veiled 
micrcsi lo the board table.
(e)-Management/labour relations not 
j inlillraling the board culture
The undemoted themes can be considered 
to contribute to a board's ctTcclivcness in 
the shared decision-making process in a 
shared governance model:



























ission of the copyright ow
ner. 
F

























































48 (c)--No bias shown by employee board 
members in dealing with budget issues and 


















48 (IV-No bias shown by student board 
members in dealing with budget issues and 


















48 (gHUndcrsianding the distinction between 
leadership and management and 



















48 (h)~The college having a history o f 
informal shared governance, therefore, the 
introduction o f legislated shared decision­
making was not difficult
Mean
SD









0 8 7 7
2.750




How C onflic t o f interest has been Addressed
49 The undemoted themes con be considered 
to contribute to a board's clfccuvencss in 
dealing with real or perceived conflict of 
interest o f employee and student board 
members in a shared governance model:
(a)--A clearly understood and accepted 
bylaw and/or policy on conflict o f interest 


















49 (b)-Glectcd board members as mcmbers- 






































49 (O-Tlie oath of office, sworn by each 
member, preventing managcincnVlabour 


















49 (dV-A personnel or labour relations Mean 2.564 2.857 2.000 3.000 2.538 2.714 2.570 .8507
committee, with restricted membership, SD 1.371 1.574 1.414 0 8 1 6 1.450 1.254 1.355
preventing management/labour problems
among board members
49 (c)--Thc president being able to make a Mean 4.552 3.571 4 500 4 200 3.769 4.125 4 232 .0253
full cunlribuiiun to board affairs. SD 0.841 1.618 0.535 0.837 0.927 1.126 0.967
49 (f)--llic education council chair being able Mean 4.310 4.143 4.250 4.000 .3.538 4.125 4.162 .2434
to make a lull contribution lo board affairs. SD 0.094 1.069 1.035 0.707 1.050 1.126 0.987
Notes:
1. Statements from the survey questionnaire (see Appendix B).
2. Level o f Significance.
3. Standard Deviation from the Mean.
4. I -  strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 =* neutral, 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree,
v  Indicates significant dilTcrence at the 0.5 confidence level.





















Sum m ury o f Data by College (A  lo Q ), Decision-Making Context, 
and Aspect o f Leadership
G eneral M atters  o f Board Business: Sharing o f Power
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46 M ean 3.800 2.667 3.200 2.875 3.200 2.000 3.000 3.667 3 200 2.600 1.833 3.429 4.300 3.000 2.571 3.667 2.750 3.109 .3747
SD 1 643 0.577 1.643 1.553 1.304 1.414 1.581 1.506 1.687 1.517 0.753 1.988 1.059 1.512 1.512 1.528 20 62 1.523
Notes:
1. Statements from the survey questionnaire (see Appendix B).
2. Level o f  Significance.
3. Standard Deviation from the Mean.
4. I -  strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 -  neutral; 4 -  agree; 5 = strongly ugrce.
<- Indicates significant difference at the 0.5 confidence level.














. 7 1 7 0
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4.333
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.2423








































1. Statements front the survey questionnaire (sec Appendix B).
2. Level o f  significance.
3. Standard deviation from the Mean.
4. I »  strongly disagree; 2 -  disugree; 3 “  neutral; 4 “  agree; 5 -  strongly ugree.
Indicates significant difference at the O.S confidence level.




















Summary of Matched Statements in the 1995/96 and 1997/98 Studies,
By Constituent Group














































Board Labour Relations Matters: Sharing of Power
















General Matters of Board Business: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
9.. .The composition of my board makes an effective contribution to the 


































10.. .The way my board operates makes an effective contribution to the 















Board Financial Matters: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision- Making Process
25 .. .1 feel my board effectively discharges its fiscal responsibilities under the 















26.. .My board discharges its fiduciary responsibility to all students from 















30.. .The board’s role is to approve the parameters and underlying 
















Board Labour Relations Matters: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
37.. .1 feel my board effectively discharges its labour relations responsibilities 















General Matters of Board Business: How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed















































18.. .The chair of education council should be a non-voting ex-officio 































2 0 .. .The bylaw and/or policy on conflict of interest adopted at my institution 















Board Financial Matters: How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed
27.. .My board has dealt effectively with the issue of conflict of interest as it 
relates to student board members with respect to financial matters between the 















29.. .Elected student board members should be disqualified from 
simultaneously holding office in their respective student unions because of the 


































Board Labour Relations Matters: How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed
4 2 .. .My board has dealt effectively with the issue of conflict of interest as it 
















46.. .Elected employee members and ex-officio members should be 
















1. Statements from the survey questionnaire (see Appendix B).
2. Ratio of True to Error Variance based on Mean Square.
3. Level of Significance.
4. Interaction between the pre/post test and constituent groups. 




















Summary of the Most Positive and Least Positive Attitudes1 in General 
Toward Shared Governance, by College3 and Constituent Group7
Colleges
Most Positive Least Positive
(Top Three Institutions) (Bottom Three Institutions)
Board Members3 Views 11! 2nd 3rd 15“* 16,h 17u,
General Matters ) K B L G F P
Financial Matters) Sharing o f Power G K J H P B
Labour Matters ) K P D Q B I
General Matters ) Effectiveness of G K L P F Q
Financial Matters) Shared Decision- D G H Q E F
Labour Matters ) Making Process P K G E M F
General Matters ) G P N J M Q
Financial Matters) Conflict o f Interest K L A P F Q
Labour Matters ) Addressed K G L I Q H
OVERALL K G L E F Q
Board Members3 Views of Own Board3s Effectiveness
Sharing of Power G D A 0 F Q
Effectiveness of Shared-Decision Making L G K B F Q
Process
Conflict of Interest Addressed A L G M B Q
OVERALL G D A H F Q
TOTAL OVERALL K G D E F Q
1. Attitude is measured by the net aggregate of mean scores on all questions in the survey—See Appendix B. Net aggregate is the sum of all the 
positive questions less all the negative questions.
2. Constituent Group Key: A = Appointees; F = Faculty; SS = Support Staff; S = Students; P = Presidents; C = Education Council Chairs.





















Most Positive Least Positive
(Top Three Constituent Groups) (Bottom Three Constituent Groups)
Board Members’ Views 1*« 2nd 3rd 4 * 5,h 6th
General Matters ) SS C S A F P
Financial Matters) Sharing o f Power F S C SS A P
Labour Matters ) S F A C SS P
General Matters ) Effectiveness of S A SS c F P
Financial Matters) Shared Decision- SS F A p C S
Labour Matters ) Making Process F A S SS P c
General Matters ) A F SS c P s
Financial Matters) Conflict o f Interest S C F A SS p
Labour Matters ) Addressed SS C A F s p
OVERALL s A F SS c p
Board Members’ Views of Own Board’s Effectiveness
Sharing of Power c S A SS F p
Effectiveness of Shared-Decision Making SS A F S C p
Process
Conflict of Interest Addressed SS A S C F p
OVERALL SS A S C F p
TOTAL OVERALL A SS S F C p
1. Attitude is measured by the net aggregate of mean scores on all questions in the survey—See Appendix B. Net aggregate is the sum of all the 
positive questions less all the negative questions.
2. Constituent Group Key: A = Appointees; F = Faculty; SS = Support Staff; S = Students; P = Presidents; C = Education Council Chairs














Question 9: The composition of my board makes an effective contribution to the of the institution.
o
o■O
S tro n g ly
A g re e
A g re e
3.
CD















| .  S tro n g ly  





































Question 10: The way my board operates makes an effective contribution to the governance 
of the institution.
S tro n g ly
A g re e
A g re e
N e u tra l
D isagree
































Question 37: I feel my board effectively discharges its labour relations responsibilities 
under the College and Institute Act.
S tro n g ly
A g re e
A g re e
N e u tra l
D isag ree











Grand Mean Appointees Staff Council ChairsFaculty Students Presidents
-1998/96 Study 
-1997/98 Study
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